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A STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE
CONTROVERSY OVER RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, CIVIL
RIGHTS, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
STEVEN J. HEYMAN*
ABSTRACT
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court ruled that state
bans on same-sex marriage violate the principles of liberty, equality,
and dignity that are enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. In the
wake of this decision, the battle over marriage equality has shifted to
a new front. Religious traditionalists assert that the legalization of
same-sex marriage endangers their religious liberty, and they seek
protections for those who object to such unions on religious
grounds. For example, they contend that florists, bakers, and others
who provide wedding-related goods and services should not be
compelled to follow state civil rights laws that would require them to
serve same-sex couples in the same way as opposite-sex couples.
This Article explores the conflict between religious liberty
and civil rights in connection with same-sex marriage. The Article
begins by looking at the worldviews that animate the opposing posi-
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tions. The concerns of religious traditionalists go far beyond a fear
that they will be compelled to do particular acts against their con-
sciences. Instead, they believe that the advent of marriage equality
will severely impede their ability to live out their faith in a wide
range of areas, from family life and economic activity to political par-
ticipation and religious practice. For this reason, traditionalists re-
gard the legal recognition of same-sex marriage as a fundamental as-
sault on their identity and way of life. But this view brings them into
direct conflict with the aspirations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender people to live out their own values and to fully partici-
pate in society. At the deepest level, the dispute over religious liberty
and civil rights involves a clash between the identities of these two
groups.
The crucial problem is how this conflict can be resolved in a
way that enables both groups to live together within a liberal demo-
cratic society. After examining several other approaches, the Article
argues that conflicts of this sort can be overcome only through mu-
tual recognition-that is, only when the members of opposing
groups recognize and treat one another as full and equal persons and
members of the community, who possess all the legal and constitu-
tional rights that inhere in this status. On this view, one has no right
to infringe the rights of other persons simply because one believes
(whether on religious or other grounds) that they are not entitled to
enjoy those rights or the basic human goods that those rights serve
to promote. This view has its roots in the Lockean natural rights the-
ory that laid the foundations of the American constitutional order.
The Article then offers a general account of the rights that in-
dividuals have, and situates religious liberty and civil equality within
that framework. Finally, the Article applies this approach to the cur-
rent controversy. It argues that, while the principle of religious liber-
ty protects the right to believe that same-sex relationships are im-
moral and sinful, that principle does not give religious traditionalists
a right to act on that belief in a way that is incompatible with the
basic civil rights of same-sex couples, including their rights to marry
and to receive equal treatment in the commercial sphere. A legisla-
ture may choose to grant wedding-service providers a religious ex-
emption from civil rights laws as a matter of prudence, charity, or
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compromise. As a matter of principle, however, most providers are
not entitled to demand such an exemption. But some providers are
so closely involved with the wedding ceremony or the couple that
they should not be compelled to take part.
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"It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of
a central institution of the Nation's society. Same-sex couples, too, may
aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in
its highest meaning."
- Justice Anthony M. Kennedyl
"Relationships between two persons of the same sex are not,
and can never be, marriages . . .. Far from serving the cause of civil
rights, redefining marriage would threaten the civil right of religious
freedom: it would compel everyone-even those opposed in conscience
to same-sex sexual conduct-to treat same-sex relationships as if they
represented the same moral good as marital relationships."
- United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 2
"We are in spiritual warfare."
- Pastor Ronnie Floyd,
President of the Southern Baptist Convention3
1. INTRODUCTION
In Obergefell v. Hodges,4 the Supreme Court ruled that same-
sex couples have a federal constitutional right to marry.5 Writing for
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
2 Frequently Asked Questions About the Defense of Marriage, U.S. CONF. OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-
family/marriage/promotion-and-defense-of-marriage/frequently-asked-
questions-on-defense-of-marriage.cfm [http://perma.cc/SJ6M-XTSK] (answer
to question "What about civil rights?") [hereinafter USCCB, Defense of Marriage]
(paragraphing omitted).
3 Ronnie Floyd, President, Southern Baptist Convention, Now is the Time to
Lead: President's Address to the Southern Baptist Convention 2 (June 16, 2015),
http://www.ronniefloyd.com/am-site/media/presidential-address-
manuscript.pdf [http://perma.cc/FQ4D-2RLN].
4 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
5 See id at 2602.
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a five-member majority, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy declared that
state bans on same-sex marriage violate the principles of liberty,
equality, and dignity enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment.6
Obergefell drew strong reactions from both sides. The deci-
sion was celebrated not only by same-sex couples and advocates of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights, but also by
many other people, including liberal politicians 7 and progressive re-
ligious denominations.8 By contrast, many social conservatives de-
nounced the decision in the strongest terms. Conservative religious
leaders condemned Obergefell for departing from the traditional un-
derstanding of marriage as a union between a man and a woman.9
6See id. at 2593, 2598-05, 2608.
7 See, e.g., Christine Rousselle, Roundup: 2016 Candidate Reactions to Obergefell
v. Hodges Decision, TOWNHALL.COM (June 26, 2015),
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/christinerousselle/2015/06/26/roundup-2016-
candidate-reactions-to-n2017928 [https://perma.cc/CY3H-8AQ3] (reporting
positive statements by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Senator Bernie
Sanders of Vermont, and other Democratic presidential candidates).
8 Among the religious groups that welcomed the decision were the Unitarian
Universalist Association, the United Church of Christ, the Episcopal Church, the
Presbyterian Church USA, and organizations representing Reform and Con-
servative Judaism. See, e.g., Tobin Grant, Ranking Religions on Acceptance of
Homosexuality and Reactions to SCOTUS Ruling, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (June 30,
2015), http://tobingrant.religionnews.com/2015/06/30/ranking-churches-on-
acceptance-of-homosexuality-plus-their-reactions-to-scotus-ruling/
[http://perma.cc/6LHJ-75E6]. Some of these groups had also filed amicus briefs
urging the Court to strike down bans on same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Brief for
President of the House of Deputies of the Episcopal Church et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-
556), 2015 WL 1057623.
9 For example, Archbishop Joseph E. Kurtz of Louisville, Kentucky, the president
of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), compared the decision to
Roe v. Wade and described Obergefell as "a tragic error that harms the common
good and most vulnerable among us, especially children." Supreme Court Deci-
sion on Marriage "A Tragic Error" Says President of Catholic Bishops' Conference,
U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (June 26, 2015),
http://www.usccb.org/news/2015/15-103.cfm [http://perma.cc/XB9N-
VQQT]. Similarly, the National Association of Evangelicals denounced the deci-
sion for adopting a "legal definition of marriage ... which is now at variance
with orthodox biblical faith as it has been affirmed across the centuries and as it
is embraced today by nearly two billion Christians in every nation on earth."
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Conservative political figures asserted that the decision was wholly
"lawless" and illegitimate, with no basis in the Constitution.10 Several
Republican presidential candidates proposed that the Constitution
be amended to overturn the ruling." Some same-sex marriage op-
ponents went further and called for outright resistance to this act of
"judicial tyranny," whether by the other branches of government, by
individual acts of civil disobedience, or by organized "political re-
volt."1 2 Even before the decision was issued, more than 180 leading
God Defined Marriage, NAT'L ASS'N OF EVANGELICALS (June 26, 2015),
http://nae.net/god-defined-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/BFU9-BXGW].
10 E.g., Ted Cruz, Constitutional Remedies to a Lawless Supreme Court, NAT'L REV.
(June 26, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420409/ted-cruz-
supreme-court-constitutional-amendment [http://perma.cc/J2GE-2YM3] (con-
tending that Obergefell "undermines not just the definition of marriage, but the
very foundations of our representative form of government").
11 See, e.g., id. Like Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, Governors Bobby Jindal of Louisi-
ana and Scott Walker of Wisconsin supported an amendment that would return
the power to define marriage to the states. See Alan Rappeport, In Response to
Ruling, Some 2016 Republicans Call for Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-rulings/in-response-to-ruling-
some-2016-republicans-call-for-amendment [http://perma.cc/7XMA-G7J5].
Former Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum urged an amendment to establish
a national definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman. See Sahil
Kapur, Santorum Jumps to Right of Cruz, Walker on Same-Sex Marriage Constitu-
tional Amendment, BLOOMBERG.COM (July 13, 2015, 10:17 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-07-13/santorum-jumps-
to-right-of-cruz-walker-on-same-sex-marriage-constitutional-amendment
[http://perma.cc/Y5WJ-8TAK]. Senator Marco Rubio of Florida suggested that
he would appoint Justices who would overturn Obergefell. See Ryan J. Reilly,
Marco Rubio Suggests His Supreme Court Would Roll Back Marriage Equality,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 13, 2015, 11:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/marco-rubio-meet-the-press-
marriage_566d9098e4b0fcceel6ee695 [https://perma.cc/S9NC-D9LP].
12 "This Week" Transcript: Former Gov. Mike Huckabee, Sen. Bernie Sanders,
ABCNEWS.COM (June 28, 2015, 10:11AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-gov-mike-huckabee-sen-
bernie-sanders/story?id=32037293&singlePage=true [http://perma.cc/QKY4-
KFLF] (remarks of Republican presidential candidate and former Arkansas
Governor Mike Huckabee in an interview with George Stephanopoulos); Scott
Lively, The Real Reason We Lost the Culture War, WND (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.wnd.com/2015/08/the-real-reason-we-lost-the-culture-war/
[http://perma.cc/G329-JK6A] ("The brutal truth is the church has lost the so-
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religious conservatives pledged to do everything in their power to
resist it.13
Determined opposition to Obergefell also appeared at the
state and local level.1 4 In Louisiana, state officials sought to delay
compliance for almost a month.' 5 Asserting that the Court had "ig-
nored the text and spirit of the Constitution to manufacture a right
that simply does not exist," Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton en-
couraged county clerks to disobey the decision if they had religious
objections to same-sex marriage.1 6 Across the country, some county
clerks did, in fact, refuse to issue licenses to same-sex couples-or
called culture war and is now under occupation, like the French under the Na-
zis, with nothing left to do but organize resistance and plot to overthrow the oc-
cupiers through a political revolt."); see also, e.g., Brian S. Brown, Statement Fol-
lowing US Supreme Court Decision on Marriage, NAT'L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE BLOG
(June 26, 2015), http://www.nomblog.com/40488/ [http://perma.cc/DEV5-
RA7W] (comparing Obergefell to Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade, and contending
that "Dr. Martin Luther King['s discussion of] the moral importance of disobey-
ing unjust laws . . . applies equally to unjust Supreme Court decisions"); After
Obergefell: A First Things Symposium, FIRST THINGS (Jun. 27, 2015),
http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2015/06/after-obergefell-a-first-
things-symposium [http://perma.cc/CT45-VVHZ] (contribution by Robert P.
George, who compared the decision to Dred Scott and declared that, like Lin-
coln, "we must reject and resist an egregious act of judicial usurpation").
13 See Pledge in Solidarity to Defend Marriage, DEFENDMARRIAGE.ORG,
http://defendmarriage.org/pledge-in-solidarity-to-defend-marriage
[http://perma.cc/6BGV-VHY5] [hereinafter Pledge].
14 See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold et al., Opponents Divided on How-or Wheth-
er-to Resist justices' Ruling, WASH. POST, (June 26, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/opponents-divided-how-or-
whether-to-resist-supreme-court-ruling/2015/06/26/3219f626-1cl2-1leS-
ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html [http://perma.cc/ZR8X-M9HL].
1s Julia O'Donoghue, BobbyJindal Administration Says Louisiana Won't Recognize
Gay Marriage Yet, NOLA.coM (June 26, 2015),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/06/bobby-jindal-administratio
n_sa_1.html [http://perma.cc/QW4N-A3KE].
16 Attorney General Paxton: Religious Liberties of Texas Public Officials Remain
Constitutionally Protected After Obergefell v. Hodges,
TEXASATTORNEYGENERAL.GOv (June 28, 2015),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/static/5144.html
[http://perma.cc/8DKR-ABUJ].
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sometimes to any couples at all.' 7 Other clerks resigned rather than
comply with Obergefell.'8 Some judges declined to perform same-sex
weddings.' 9
Despite this resistance, the Court's decision began to take
hold fairly quickly. Federal courts made clear that recalcitrant states
were bound to comply.20 Within days, same-sex weddings were tak-
ing place in all states.21 Clerks who initially refused to grant mar-
riage licenses often backed down when faced with lawsuits. 22
Although some states may look for new ways to oppose the decision
in the future, same-sex couples generally are now able to marry
throughout the country.23
17See, e.g., Claire Galofaro & Adam Beam, Same-Sex Marriage Fight Now Goes Lo-
cal, USNEWS.COM (June 30, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2015/06/30/same-sex-marriage-
fight-turns-to-clerk-who-refuse-licenses [http://perma.cc/RJ72-FLKF].
18 For the most striking incident, see Tom Boggioni, "For the Glory of God": En-
tire Staff in Tenn. County Clerk's Office Resigns Over Same-Sex Marriage, RAw
STORY (July 4, 2015), http://www.rawstory.com/2015/07/for-the-glory-of-god-
entire-staff-in-tenn-county-clerks-office-resigns-over-same-sex-marriage/
[http://perma.cc/EMU4-JPBE].
19 See, e.g., Toledo Judge Declined to Marry Couple Over Christian Beliefs, THE
BLADE (July 8, 2015),
http://www.toledoblade.com/Courts/2015/07/08/Toledo-judge-declined-to-
marry-couple-over-beliefs.html [http://perma.cc/9AST- PEGS].
20 See, e.g., Jay Reeves, Federal judge: Alabama Counties Must Allow Gay Mar-
riage, DENVER PoST (July 1, 2015),
http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_28413918/federal-judge-
alabama-counties-must-allow-gay-marriage [http://perma.cc/92KN-2SC5].
21 See Erik Eckholm & Manny Fernandez, After Same-Sex Marriage Ruling,
Southern States Fall In Line, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/after-same-sex-marriage-ruling-
southern-states-fall-in-line.html [http://perma.cc/X2K9-VNZU].
22 See, e.g., Marc Ramirez, Gay Couple Gets Wedding License from Holdout Hood
County, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July 7, 2015),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/state/headlines/20150706-gay-couple-
gets-wedding-license-from-holdout-hood-county.ece [http://perma.cc/YRV3-
MUQJ]. The most dramatic exception was the case of Kim Davis, the clerk of
Rowan County, Kentucky, which I discuss below. See infra text accompanying
notes 38-53.
23 For example, less than three weeks after Obergefell was decided, it was re-
ported that all but four of "the 254 counties in Texas are either issuing marriage
That does not mean that the controversy has ended, howev-
er. For some time, religious traditionalists 24 have contended that the
legalization of same-sex marriage would endanger their religious
liberty.25 This issue has now taken center stage.
Even before the Obergefell decision came down, the clash be-
tween religious liberty and LGBT rights gave rise to some pitched
battles. During the spring of 2015, the legislatures of Indiana and Ar-
kansas passed Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs), which
their supporters contended were necessary to protect such freedom
from unjustified restrictions by government. 26 This legislation ignit-
ed a firestorm of criticism from a broad range of people, including
some leading public officials and corporate executives, who feared
that these laws would authorize discrimination against LGBT people
and other minorities. 27 In the face of this criticism, both states re-
treated to some extent. 28 A similar scenario had played out the pre-
licenses to same-sex couples or plan to do so soon." Reuters, Texas County Clerk
Opposed to Same-Sex Marriage Resigns, RELIGION NEWS SERv. (July 14, 2015),
http://www.religionnews.com/2015/07/14/texas-county-clerk-opposed-to-
same-sex-marriage-resigns/ [http://perma.cc/A4Z7-JSVG].
24 In this Article, I use the term religious traditionalists (or simply traditional-
ists) to refer to those who adhere to traditional (or what they often call "ortho-
dox") Christian, Jewish, or Islamic teachings regarding sexuality, marriage, the
authority of scripture and tradition, and other theological matters. Because the
most prominent traditionalist voices in this debate have been conservative
Catholics and conservative evangelicals, my discussion of traditionalism focuses
on those groups. Of course, the range of religious views is not limited to those
held by traditionalists. As I have noted, for example, many religious progres-
sives welcomed Obergefell. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Southern Baptist Convention, Resolution on Homosexual Marriage
(1996), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/614/resolution-on-homosexual-
marriage [http://perma.cc/A9HC-JY9T].
26 See Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Sen. Enrolled Act 101, 119th
Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (2015); Arkansas Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
H.B. 1228, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Session (2015).
27 See Monica Davey et al., Indiana and Arkansas Revise Rights Bills, Seeking to
Remove Divisive Parts, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/us/indiana-arkansas-religious-
freedom-bill.html [http://perma.cc/SJKQ-JGET].
28 See id. In Indiana, the legislature revised the law to make clear that it could
not be used to justify otherwise unlawful discrimination. See An Act to Amend
[Vol. 1410 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
vious year in Arizona.29 However, Mississippi did adopt a RFRA that
year.3 0 Religious freedom bills were debated in a number of other
states in 2015 and undoubtedly will return to the agenda in coming
years.3 1 Measures to provide additional protections for religious lib-
erty also have been introduced at the federal level.3 2
Of course, the ongoing debate over religious liberty and
LGBT rights was only heightened when Obergefell was decided. The
Justices themselves offered starkly different perspectives on the
problem. Justice Kennedy expressed respect for the religious convic-
tions of traditionalists, and sought to reassure them that they would
enjoy full First Amendment protection "as they seek to teach the
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths,
and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure
they have long revered."3 3 By contrast, the four dissenters accused
Kennedy of "sully[ing] those on the other side of the debate" when
the Indiana Code Concerning Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, Sen. En-
rolled Act 50, 119th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (2015). By contrast, the Arkansas
legislature left it unclear whether its law could be used in this way. See Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, Act 975, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Session
(2015).
29 See Alia Beard Rau et al., Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes Senate Bill 1062,
AZCENTRAL.COM (Feb. 26, 2014),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20140226arizona-jan-
brewer- 1062-statement.html [http://perma.cc/6876-UZ8N].
3o See Mississippi Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 2014 Miss. Laws 1338
(2014).
31 See, e.g., Aaron Gould Sheinin & Kristina Torres, Georgia "Religious Liberty"
Bill Never Gets House Vote, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://www.myajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/georgia-
religious-liberty-bill-never-gets-house-vo/nkmCb/ [http://perma.cc/6UYV-
P972].
32 The leading measure is the First Amendment Defense Act, a bill sponsored by
Representative Raul Labrador of Idaho and Senator Mike Lee of Utah that would
prevent the federal government from denying any benefit or tax exemption to
individuals, organizations, or corporations because of their views on same-sex
relationships. See H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1598, 114th Cong. (2015);
Tim Devaney, Faith Groups Press GOP for Response to Marriage Ruling, THE HILL
(July 4, 2015), http://thehill.com/regulation/legislation/246830-faith-groups-
press-gop-for-response-to-marriage-ruling [http://perma.cc/4VCE-KFGZ].
33 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
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he contended "that 'the necessary consequence' of laws codifying the
traditional definition of marriage is to 'demea[n] or stigmatiz[e]
same-sex couples."' 34 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., found it
"[o]minous[]" that the majority had merely acknowledged the right
of religious opponents to "teach" their beliefs about marriage,35 but
had said nothing about their freedom to live out those beliefs
through the "'exercise' [of] religion."3 6 Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
prophesied that "those who are determined to stamp out every ves-
tige of dissent" would use the Court's decision "to vilify Americans
who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy."37
One of the first major post-Obergefell battles over religious
liberty arose in rural Kentucky. A county clerk named Kim Davis
steadfastly refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
on the ground that doing so would violate her Apostolic Christian be-
liefs. 3 8 In a lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky, a federal district judge ruled that Davis's policy infringed
the constitutional rights of same-sex couples, and he issued a prelim-
inary injunction ordering her to comply with Obergefell.39 After her
efforts to obtain a stay were rebuffed both by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit40 and by the Supreme Court,41 Davis,
34 Id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting
id. at 2602 (majority opinion)).
3s Id. at 2625 (emphasis added).
36 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 1) (emphasis added by Roberts, C.J.).
37 Id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, Jj., dissenting); see also id.
at 2638-39 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning that the deci-
sion would have "potentially ruinous consequences for religious liberty").
38 See Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1, *3
(E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015). In an effort to insulate her position from an equal pro-
tection challenge, Davis declined to "issue marriage licenses to any couples," re-
gardless of their sexual orientation. Id. at *1.
39 Id. at *5-8, *15.
40 Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2015) (denying stay pending
appeal), http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/kentucky-ca6 20150826.pdf
[http://perma.cc/42AT-TNNE].
41 Davis v. Miller, No. 15A250 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2015) (denying application for stay),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/083115zr2_dl8e.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4WSA-HQ9C].
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who saw herself as a "'soldier for Christ,"'42 defied the injunction and
served five days in jail for contempt of court.43
The Davis affair swiftly became a cause c616bre. At public ral-
lies and in other forums, social conservatives lionized her as a mar-
tyr for religious liberty and traditional marriage."4 Davis was even
invited to meet with Pope Francis, the head of the Roman Catholic
Church, during his September 2015 visit to the United States.45
Despite the international attention that it received, Davis's
case was hardly an ideal one in which to make a stand for religious
liberty. As an officer of the state, Davis had a sworn duty to comply
with the law as well as with the United States Constitution, which is
"the supreme Law of the Land." 46 To be sure, a state may choose to
42 Claire Galofaro, Kim Davis Calls Herself A "Soldier for Christ" In Recently Ac-
quired Emails, TALKINGPOINTSMEMO.COM (Oct. 21, 2015, 6:51 PM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/kim-davis-soldier-christ
[http://perma.cc/Y76B-ZNQY] (quoting an email that Davis sent to a supporter
in July 2015).
43 See David Weigel et al., Kim Davis Released From jail, Ordered Not to Interfere
with Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, WASH. PosT, Sept. 8, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/09/08/judge-
orders-kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-released-from-jail/ [http://perma.cc/PJ3L-
F5KN].
44 See, e.g., id. (describing the rally that was held when Davis was released, and
in which Huckabee played a central role); Jonathan Swan, Christian Group Hon-
ors Kim Davis with Award, THE HILL (Sept. 25, 2015, 9:38 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/news/25505 1-christian-group-honors-kim-
davis-with-award [http://perma.cc/U3L8-X8CP] (recounting that Davis "was
compared to Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks" as she re-
ceived the Family Research Council's "'Cost of Discipleship' award for her de-
termined resistance to same-sex marriage").
45 See Jim Yardley & Laurie Goodstein, Pope Francis Met with Kim Davis, Ken-
tucky County Clerk, in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/us/county-clerk-kim-davis-who-
denied-gay-couples-visited-pope.html [http://perma.cc/MW4V-7SMD]. The
Vatican later insisted, however, that the Pope had merely given a brief greeting
to Davis as well as to many other individuals, and that he had not meant to en-
dorse the particular position she had taken. See Jim Yardley & Laurie Goodstein,
Before Pope Francis Met Kim Davis, He Met with Gay Ex-Student, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/world/europe/pope-francis-
kim-davis-meeting.html [http://perma.cc/Z6Q8-CMTW].
46 U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 3.
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accommodate officials whose religious beliefs prevent them from
performing certain duties, so long as it ensures that those functions
are carried out by others; and some states recently have adopted
such an approach in connection with marriage. 47 But Davis took a
more far-reaching position: she contended that her religious liberty
entitled her to prohibit anyone acting under her authority from issu-
ing marriage licenses.48 Clearly, an official's personal beliefs (wheth-
er religious or otherwise) can afford her no legal justification for ob-
structing implementation of the law within her jurisdiction, and this
is especially true when the result is to infringe the constitutional
rights of other citizens.49 Thus, it is scarcely surprising that Davis's
broad position was rejected not only by the courtsso but also by
much of the public,5 and even by some staunch defenders of reli-
47 See, e.g., Protections for Religious Expression and Beliefs about Marriage,
Family, or Sexuality, S.B. 297, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015),
http://le.utah.gov/-2015/bills/static/SBO297.html [http://perma.cc/FAV8-
RXQZ] (amending Utah Code § 17-20-4(2) "to ensure that the county clerk, or a
designee of the county clerk who is willing, is available during business hours to
solemnize a legal marriage for which a marriage license has been issued") (em-
phasis added). Kentucky has a state RFRA which might be interpreted to re-
quire making an accommodation of this sort. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 446.350 (West 2015).
48 See Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *3 (E.D.
Ky. Aug. 12, 2015).
49 As the court of appeals succinctly observed, the injunction was directed
against Davis not as an individual but rather "in her official capacity" as county
clerk, and "it cannot be defensibly argued that the holder of [that office], apart
from who personally occupies [it], may decline to act in conformity with the
United States Constitution as interpreted by a dispositive holding of the United
States Supreme Court" Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880, at 2 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2015)
(denying stay pending appeal),
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/kentucky-ca6_20150826.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E7KE-ASVG].
50 See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
s1 See, e.g., Equal Treatment Prevails in Views on Gay Marriage (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.langerresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/117la4ReligionandGayMarriage.pdf [http://perma.cc/X7PC-
GWBL] (presenting ABC News/Washington Post poll that found that "63 per-
cent [of respondents] say Davis ... should be required to issue marriage licens-
es despite her religious objections"); Mike Wynn, Poll: Kentucky Voters Say Kim
Davis Should Do Her Job, USATODAY.COM (Oct. 1, 2015, 6:54 PM),
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gious liberty.5 2 In the end, Davis was compelled to allow one of her
deputy clerks to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
although she insisted on modifying the licenses to remove all refer-
ences to her name and office.53
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/10/01/poll-ky-
voters-say-kim-davis-job/73173522/ [http://perma.cc/UZV9-VGSS] (reporting
Bluegrass Poll that found that, by a margin of 51 to 42 percent, Kentucky voters
believed that Davis should be required to issue licenses).
52 See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, Kentucky Clerk Not Issuing Gay Marriage Licenses
Causes Uproar. North Carolina Shows Better Way, DAILY SIGNAL (Sept 1, 2015),
http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/01/kentucky-clerk-not-issuing-gay-marriage-
licenses-causes-uproar-north-carolina-shows-better-way/
[http://perma.cc/QG68-35CT] (contending that Davis's position "cannot be
reasonably accommodated without placing undue hardships on the citizens un-
able to receive ... licenses in their [own] county"); Rod Dreher, Kim Davis: Polit-
ical Prisoner? Culture-War Martyr?, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 3, 2015, 6:59 PM),
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/kim-davis-political-
prisoner-martyr/ [http://perma.cc/C9HG-P4EP ] (maintaining that "Obergefell
was wrongly decided," but that "there is nothing in our public order that gives
people the right to defy the law without consequence"); Jack Healy, Mormons
Say Duty to Law on Same-Sex Marriage Trumps Faith, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 22, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/us/mormons-still-against-same-sex-
unions-take-a-stand-against-kim-davis.html [http://perma.cc/5KRM-XNG7]
(quoting speech in which a top Mormon leader asserted that when individuals
are "acting as public officials, they are not free to apply personal convictions,
religious or other, in place of the defined responsibilities of their public offic-
es"). Remarkably, even the Westboro Baptist Church attacked Davis on the
grounds that her three previous marriages and divorces made her an adulterer,
and that while God "'hates same-sex marriage,"' he also "'hates oath breakers."'
Mike Wynn, Westboro Baptist Church Protests Kim Davis, USATODAY.COM (Oct 19,
2015, 6:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2015/10/19/westboro-baptist-church-protests-kim-davis/74220666/
[http://perma.cc/M6BH-6F76] (quoting Shirley Phelps-Roper).
53 See Vishakha Sonawane, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis Update: Judge Orders Gov-
ernor Steve Beshear to Address Altered Gay Marriage Licenses, INT'L. Bus. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2015, 3:58 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-
update-judge-orders-governor-steve-beshear-address-altered-2141935
[http://perma.cc/J2PV-255R]. On December 22, 2015, the newly elected Re-
publican governor of Kentucky, Matt Bevin, issued an executive order removing
clerks' names from all future marriage licenses. See Cathy Lynn Grossman, Ky.
Governor Orders Clerks' Names Removed from Marriage Licenses, RELIGION NEWS
SERv. (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.religionnews.com/2015/12/22/breaking-
ky-governor-orders-clerks-names-removed-from-marriage-licenses/
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A more difficult problem involves businesses that provide
wedding-related goods and services. In several widely publicized
cases, state courts and administrative agencies have held that con-
servative Christian bakers, florists, and photographers violated state
anti-discrimination laws when they refused to supply such goods
and services to same-sex couples in the same way they would to op-
posite-sex couples. 54 Traditionalists contend that these cases
demonstrate the grave danger that same-sex marriage poses to reli-
gious liberty,5s while many advocates of LGBT rights maintain that
this liberty should not permit businesses to discriminate against
others.56
[https://perma.cc/MD7Q-2MV3]. As of the end of the year, the validity of Bev-
in's order, as well as of the licenses altered by Davis, remained in dispute. See id.
54 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115U,
https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/CourtofAppeals/Opinion/2015/14CA
1351-PD.pdf; Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-
00871-5, 2015 WL 720213 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015); McCarthy, Nos.
10157952 et al. (N.Y. State Div. of Human Rts., July 2, 2014); Klein d/b/a Sweet-
cakes by Melissa, 34 BOLI Orders 80 (2015) (Ore. Bureau of Labor and Indus.),
http://www.oregon.gov/boli/Legal/BOLI%2OFinal%200rders%20issued%20i
n%202015/SweetCakes_44-14_and_45-14.pdf [hereinafter Sweetcakes]. Simi-
larly, a state agency ruled that an outdoor pavilion that was owned by a reli-
giously affiliated organization but held available for public use violated the civil
rights laws when it refused to host a same-sex civil-union ceremony. Bernstein,
No. CRT 614509 (N.J. Div. Civil Rights Oct. 22, 2012) [http://perma.cc/G5VF-
ZS2M]; cf Grant Rogers, Grimes'Gortz Haus to Stop All Weddings in Wake of Dis-
crimination Complaint, DES MOINES REG. (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/investigations/2015/01/28/
gortz-haus-owners-decide-stop-weddings/22492677/
[https://permacc/3RM5-SSRK] (reporting on the settlement of a civil rights
complaint against a for-profit venue that refused to host same-sex weddings).
ss See, e.g., Katie Gluck, Cruz Preaches to the Field, PoLTico.coM (Aug. 22, 2015,
12:21 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/ted-cruz-religious-
liberty-rally-iowa-121629 [http://perma.cc/SS8U-839D] (describing a rally for
religious liberty that was organized by Cruz and attended by many of the de-
fendants in these cases).
56 In addition to a great deal of discussion in the media and the blogosphere, the
clash between religious liberty and gay rights is generating a rich academic lit-
erature. See, e.g., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Douglas Laycock et
al. eds., 2008); Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty
A STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION
This Article explores the conflict between religious liberty
and civil rights in relation to same-sex marriage. Part II inquires into
the nature of the conflict by examining the worldviews that animate
the opposing positions. I begin by discussing the beliefs held by reli-
gious traditionalists regarding sexuality, marriage, and homosexual
conduct, as well as traditionalists' efforts to embody those beliefs in
law. I then focus on their concern that the legalization of same-sex
marriage threatens their religious liberty. This concern goes far be-
yond a fear that they will be compelled to do particular acts against
their consciences. Instead, they worry that the advent of marriage
equality will severely impede their ability to live out their faith in a
wide range of areas, from family life and economic activity to politi-
cal participation and religious practice. For this reason, they regard
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage as a fundamental assault
on their identity and way of life. But this position brings them into
direct conflict with the aspirations of LGBT people to live out their
own values and to participate fully in the life of the community. At
Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. PoL'Y 206 (2010); Alan Brownstein,
Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal Ac-
commodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45
U.S.F. L. REV. 389 (2010); Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption
From Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemp-
tions for Those who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173 (2012); Shannon Gilreath, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex
Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 205 (reviewing SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Reli-
gious Accommodations, and the Purposes ofAntidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CALIF. L.
REV. 619 (2015) [hereinafter Koppelman, Accommodations]; Andrew Koppel-
man, You Can't Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People
Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125 (2006) [hereinafter
Koppelman, Love]; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 [hereinafter Laycock, Culture Wars]; Ira C. Lupu & Rob-
ert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc.
PoL'Y 274 (2010); Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complici-
ty-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015);
Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 307
(2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2014).
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the deepest level, the dispute over religious liberty and civil rights
involves a clash between the identities of these two groups.
The crucial problem is how this conflict can be resolved. Af-
ter examining a variety of other approaches in Part III, I argue in Part
IV that clashes of identity can be overcome only through mutual
recognition-that is, only when the members of opposing groups
recognize one another as full and equal human beings and members
of the community with all the rights that inhere in this status. After
sketching the basic concept, I show that its philosophical foundations
can be found in the thought of John Locke, whose theory of natural
rights had a profound influence on American constitutionalism and
especially on our understanding of the relationship between reli-
gious liberty and civil rights. Finally, I apply the concept of mutual
recognition to the current problem, and argue that the root of the
conflict is that religious traditionalists do not recognize that LGBT
people have the same capacity and right to marry that the tradition-
alists themselves have. Of course, this does not mean that the law
should seek to force individuals to change their beliefs. But it does
mean that while religious liberty includes the right to believe that
same-sex relationships are immoral and sinful, it does not give tradi-
tionalists a right to act on this belief in a way that violates the civil
rights of same-sex couples to equal treatment in the public sphere.
Although this discussion points to a general solution to the
clash between religious liberty and civil rights in connection with
same-sex marriage, it does not necessarily show how this conflict
should be resolved in particular cases. To decide such cases, we need
to carefully identify and assess the rights at stake on both sides. For
this purpose, Part V offers a general account of the rights that indi-
viduals have and discusses where religious liberty and civil equality
fit within this account. This part also sketches a method for resolving
conflicts of rights.
Finally, Part VI brings this theory to bear on particular con-
flicts between religious liberty and civil rights. I focus on the widely
debated issue of whether florists and other providers may refuse to
supply goods and services for same-sex weddings. This is a difficult
problem because it pits the florist's right to follow her conscience
against the couple's right to equal treatment. In the end, however, I
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believe that we can resolve this problem by applying a simple prin-
ciple that flows from the concept of mutual recognition: an individu-
al has no right to be excused from her duty to respect the rights of
others merely because she believes (whether on religious or other
grounds) that they are not entitled to enjoy those rights or the basic
human goods that those rights serve to promote. It follows that the
florist may not violate the couple's basic right to equal treatment in
the commercial sphere (a right that includes equal access to busi-
nesses that offer wedding-related goods and services to the public)
simply because her religious beliefs tell her that the couple should
not have a right to get married, or that it is inherently wrongful for
them to do so. As I shall explain, in deciding what rights and duties to
enforce, legislatures must take account not only of principle but also
of other considerations such as prudence, charity, or a need for com-
promise. But as a matter of principle, the right to religious liberty
generally does not entitle a person to infringe the civil rights of oth-
ers. As we shall see, however, some providers are so closely involved
with the wedding ceremony or the couple that they should not be
compelled to take part.
II. RELIGIoUs LIBERTY AND THE CLASH OF IDENTITIES
This part seeks to develop a general understanding of the
conflict between religious liberty and civil rights in relation to same-
sex marriage. I begin by discussing the ways in which religious tradi-
tionalists understand sexuality and marriage, as well as the grounds
on which they condemn homosexuality. I then sketch the history of
their efforts to implement those religious beliefs within the Ameri-
can legal order. Next, I canvass the manifold ways in which they be-
lieve that legal recognition of gay rights and same-sex marriage
threatens their religious liberty. Finally, I show how the traditional-
ist position conflicts with the efforts of LGBT people to live out their
own identities.
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A. The Religious Traditionalist View of Sexuality and Marriage
Religious traditionalists derive their understanding of sexu-
ality and marriage primarily from the Bible-which they regard as
the authoritative word of God-as well as from traditional Christian
teaching.57 The first chapter of the book of Genesis describes how
God created the world and all living things.5 8 After declaring that
God made human beings in his own image and likeness, Genesis adds
that he made them "male and female" and commanded them to "[b]e
fruitful and multiply."5 9 The second chapter relates how God formed
the first woman from a rib taken from the first man.60 When the man
saw her, he recognized that she was "bone of my bones and flesh of
my flesh." 61 The story concludes: "Therefore a man leaves his father
and his mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh." 62
In the Gospels, Jesus quotes these verses and declares that those who
are married should not divorce.63 The Letter to the Ephesians also
draws on Genesis when it describes marriage as "a great mystery"
which can be used to represent the loving relationship between
"Christ and the church." 64
For religious traditionalists, these scriptural passages have
deep significance. They show that the "difference" and the "comple-
mentarity" between male and female are fundamental to the created
order; that sexuality is ordered to the uniting of the partners and the
creation of new life; and that sexual activity should be confined to
s7 For general statements of the traditionalist understanding of sexuality and
marriage, see CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 1601-66, 2331-400 (2d ed.
2000) [hereinafter CATHOLIC CATECHISM]; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELICALS,
THE THEOLOGY OF SEX (2012) [hereinafter NAE, THEOLOGY OF SEX],
http://www.millennialevangelical.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Theology-ofSex.pdf [http://perma.cc/4FY9-YJAU].
58 Genesis 1. All quotations from the Bible are taken from the New Revised
Standard Version.
9 Id. 1:26-28; see also id. 5:1-2.
6 0 See id. 2:21-22.
61 Id. 2:23.
62 Id. 2:24.
6 3 See Matthew 19:3-12; Mark 10:2-12.
64 Ephesians 5:31-32.
[Vol. 1420 FIRS T A MEND MEN T LA W RE VIE W
marriage, a relationship that by its very nature involves a union be-
tween male and female. 65 In the words of the National Association of
Evangelicals, this biblical conception holds that "marriage is a God-
ordained, covenant relationship between a man and a woman
through which the human race is propagated," a "relationship which
is intended to be lifelong and sexually exclusive," and one which "is
also iconic, intended to picture the relationship between God and his
people." 66
From this perspective, neither the state nor anyone else "has
authority to redefine marriage."67 Same-sex relationships "are not,
and can never be, marriages," 68 because they do not involve a bond
between male and female which unifies the partners and which can
naturally lead to procreation, nor are such relationships capable of
serving as a sign of "the mystical union of Christ and his Church."69
Of course, this view of sexuality and marriage is a deeply
theological one. But traditionalists insist that their position is not
"based solely on 'sectarian' religious truths."70 Instead, because
"[t]he truth of marriage" is "based . .. on the nature of the human
person," it is "accessible to everyone" through the use of "right rea-
son"71 as well as through reflection on human experience, which
shows that "[t]hroughout history and across all cultures, marriage
65 CATHOLIC CATECHISM, supra note 57, §§ 1601-17, 1643-54, 2333, 2335, 2337,
2351-72; see also NAE, THEOLOGY OF SEX, supra note 57, at 2-6, 10-11, 13-16;
Evangelicals and Catholics Together, The Two Shall Become One Flesh: Reclaim-
ing Marriage, FIRST THINGS, March 2015, at 23,
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2015/03/the-two-shall-become-one-flesh-
reclaiming-marriage-2 [http://perma.cc/QQY7-W6AR] [hereinafter One Flesh];
USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra note 2.
66 NAE, THEOLOGY OF SEX, supra note 57, at 10. For a similar definition, see
CATHOLIC CATECHISM, supra note 57, § 1601.
67 Pledge, supra note 13; see also Southern Baptist Convention, On the Call to
Public Witness on Marriage (2015), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/2255/on-
the-call-to-public-witness-on-marriage [http://perma.cc/W4NF-JUPT].
68 USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra note 2 (answer to question "Is marriage a
basic human right?").
69 One Flesh, supra note 65.
70 Id. at 28.
71 USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra note 2 (answer to question "Where does
marriage come from?").
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has been understood to be the union of male and female and is orga-
nized around the procreative potential of that union."72
Traditionalists do not merely reject the idea of same-sex
marriage; they also believe that it is immoral and sinful to have sex-
ual relations with another person of the same sex. Again, this posi-
tion is rooted in biblical passages that traditionalists take to con-
demn homosexual relations. For example, the story of Sodom and
Gomorrah in Genesis73 is often interpreted in this way.74 The book of
Leviticus decrees that "[i]f a man lies with a male as with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination [and] shall be put to
death." 75 Likewise, several passages in the New Testament are com-
monly read to disapprove of homosexual acts. For example, in his
First Letter to the Corinthians, the Apostle Paul declares that
"[flornicators, idolaters, adulterers, male prostitutes, sodomites,
thieves, the greedy, drunkards, revilers, robbers-none of these will
inherit the kingdom of God."76
As this passage indicates, homosexuality is far from the only
form of sexual conduct that traditionalists regard as sinful. Many
other acts fall into the same category, including fornication,77 adul-
tery,78 prostitution,79 incest,so and bestiality.8 ' Yet homosexuality
72 One Flesh, supra note 65, at 28-29.
73 Genesis 19:1-11; see alsoJude 1:7.
74 See, e.g., CATHOLIC CATECHISM, supra note 57, § 2357 & n.141; Jerry Falwell,
Homosexuality: Is It an Acceptable Lifestyle? (1978), in MATTHEW AVERY SUTTON,
JERRY FALWELL AND THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 107, 108 (2013). This is far from the only possible interpretation of
the story, however. The biblical text appears to focus more on the abuse of
strangers and the violation of the laws of hospitality than on homosexuality. See
Genesis 19:4-9. A long line of Jewish interpretation, following Ezekiel 16:49,
holds that the sin of Sodom consisted in hardheartedness toward the poor. See
NEHAMA LEIBOWITZ, STUDIES IN BERESHIT (GENESIS) IN THE CONTEXT OF ANCIENT AND
MODERN JEWISH BIBLE COMMENTARY 172-80 (Aryeh Newman trans., 4th rev. ed.,
n.d.); Joseph William Singer, We Don't Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommoda-
tions and the Mark ofSodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 948-49 (2015).
7s Leviticus 20:13; see also id. 18:22.
76 1 Corinthians 6:9; see also Romans 1:26-27; 1 Timothy 1:9-11;jude 1:7.
77 See, e.g., Matthew 15:19; 1 Corinthians 6:9,6:15-20; 1 Timothy 1:9-11.
78 See, e.g., Exodus 20:14; Leviticus 20:10; Deuteronomy 5:18; Matthew 5:27-28,
5:32, 15:19, 19:9, 19:18; 1 Corinthians 6:9.
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holds a prominent place in the biblical account of sin on which tradi-
tionalists rely. In the first chapter of his Letter to the Romans, one of
the foundational texts of the Christian tradition, Paul treats the "un-
natural" intercourse between two women or two men as a prime il-
lustration of the "degrading" and "shameless" conduct that fallen
human beings come to engage in when they turn away from "the
truth about God" as made known through the created order.82
For these reasons, traditionalists believe that homosexual
conduct is gravely immoral, "intrinsically disordered," and "always
wrong."83 That does not necessarily mean that they feel hatred for
those who desire to engage in such conduct. Traditionalists hold that
"[a]ll people, regardless of . . . sexual orientation, are created in the
image of God and thus are due respect and love."8 4 Moreover, tradi-
tionalists believe that all human beings, including themselves, are
sinners who can be saved only through the grace of God.85 Accord-
ingly, traditionalists often say that while they hate the sin, they love
the sinner, and that they want to do everything they can to bring him
to Christ.8 6 At the same time, they firmly believe that homosexual
7 9 See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 6:9, 6:15-16.
80 See, e.g., Leviticus 18:6-20, 20:11-12, 20:14, 20:17, 20:19-21.
81 See, e.g., id. 18:23, 20:15-16.
82 Romans 1:18-32.
83 CATHOLIC CATECHISM, supra note 57, § 2357; USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra
note 2 (answer to question "How is the love between a husband and a wife irre-
ducibly unique?"); see also NAE, THEOLOGY OF SEX, supra note 57, at 15.
84 Southern Baptist Convention, "Same-Sex Marriage" and Civil Rights Rhetoric
(2012), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/1224/on-samesex-marriage-and-
civil-rights-rhetoric [http://perma.cc/Q3NB-QDUE]. For this reason, while the
Convention opposed same-sex marriage, it also called for "compassionate, re-
demptive ministry to those who struggle with homosexuality," and took a
"stand against any form of gay-bashing, whether disrespectful attitudes, hateful
rhetoric, or hate-incited actions toward persons who engage in acts of homo-
sexuality." Id.
85 See, e.g., NAE, THEOLOGY OF SEX, supra note 57, at 6-8.
86 See, e.g., Floyd, supra note 3, at 11. As the sociologist Thomas J. Linneman ob-
serves, however, this position can lead to an inner struggle for traditionalists,
for while "[t]hey know that they are supposed to respond with love," sometimes
"what they are feeling is not compassion but revulsion." THOMAS J. LINNEMAN,
WEATHERING CHANGE: GAYS AND LESBIANS, CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVES, AND EVERYDAY
HOSTILITIES 167-68 (2003).
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conduct is profoundly immoral and that "[t]here are absolutely no
grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar
or even remotely analogous to God's plan for marriage and family."87
B. The Embodiment of Traditional Beliefs in American Law
Now let us consider how these traditional religious beliefs
have been embodied in the law. As historian Nancy F. Cott has ex-
plained, from colonial times onward, the American law of marriage
was based on a "Christian model" of "lifelong, faithful monogamy,
formed by mutual consent of a man and a woman," in which "the
husband was to be the family head and economic provider [and] his
wife the dependent partner"-a model that Americans found in the
Scriptures as well as in the common law which they had inherited
from England.88 This ideal entailed the rejection of other forms of
family life such as Mormon polygamy, a practice that Congress tar-
geted in a series of measures during the second half of the nine-
teenth century.89 In upholding one of those measures, the Supreme
Court denounced polygamy as a "barbari[c]" practice that was "con-
trary to the spirit of Christianity, and of the civilization which Chris-
tianity has produced in the western world."90
87 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Pro-
posals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons (2003),
HOLY SEE (June 3, 2003),
http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc-con_
cfaithdoc_20030731_homosexual-unionsen.html [http://perma.cc/AFB7-
TL6M]. This view of same-sex unions was recently reaffirmed by the synod that
Pope Francis called to explore issues relating to the family. See Synod of Bish-
ops, The Vocation and Mission of the Family in the Church and in the Contempo-
rary World § 76 (final report of the XIV Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod
of Bishops), HOLY SEE (Oct. 24, 2015),
http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/synod/documents/rc-synod-doc_201510
26_relazione-finale-xiv-assembleaen.html [https://perma.cc/RX6Z-Q3KR].
88 NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 2-3, 6-7
(2000). On the common law of marriage, see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *433-45.
8 9 See CoTT,supra note 88, at 72-75, 111-20.
90 Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890).
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The Christian model also led to the criminalization of some
forms of sexual activity. As William N. Eskridge, Jr. has detailed, dur-
ing the mid-seventeenth century, Massachusetts Bay and Connecti-
cut followed Leviticus in adopting the death penalty for any man who
lay with another man as with a woman.91 Taking a different route to
the same result, the middle and southern colonies modeled their law
on an act passed by the English Reformation Parliament in 1533
which "made 'the detestable and abominable vice of buggery com-
mitted with mankind or beast"' punishable by death.92 By the early
nineteenth century, American states generally had laws of the latter
sort, although without the death penalty.9 3 In line with their English
counterparts, American courts commonly interpreted those laws to
outlaw "anal intercourse between two men or between a man and a
woman (these acts are often referred to as 'sodomy') and any sexual
intercourse between a human male or female and an animal ('besti-
ality')."94 Those laws appeared in the state statutes together with
other "'crimes against public morals and decency"' such as "adultery,
fornication, and incest."95 The anti-sodomy laws remained on the
books for centuries. As late as 1961, they could be found in all
states.96
In these ways, Christianity powerfully shaped traditional
American law in matters of sexual morality. Christian leaders and ac-
tivists were also at the forefront of efforts to limit the grounds for di-
91 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American
Regulation ofSame-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946,82 IowA L. REV. 1007, 1013 (1997);
The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, Capital Lawes art. 7 (1647), in THE
SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE: SELECTED READINGS ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHURCH-
STATE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 89, 93 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark
David Hall eds., 2009).
92 Eskridge,supra note 91, at 1012 (quoting Act of 1533, 25 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (Eng.)).
93 See id. at 1013.
94 1d.at 1012.
95 Id. at 1014.
96 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986). For an overview of the
sodomy laws at that time, see MODEL PENAL CODE COMMENTARIES pt. 2, § 213.2, at
360-62 (1980).
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vorce,97 to suppress sexually explicit expression,98 and to restrict
contraception and information related to it.99
This traditional regime of sexual regulation has substantially
eroded over time. A major factor has been the sexual revolution that
gained momentum during the 1960s and that has undercut the social
norms that supported traditional regulation.100 More generally,
those norms have been undermined by what the philosopher Charles
Taylor has called the advent of an "Age of Authenticity": a way of life
that is based on the principle of "expressive individualism," or the
notion that individuals have a right to pursue their own happiness in
a way that realizes their authentic identities.101
These developments soon had an impact on American consti-
tutional law. In the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut,102 the
Supreme Court declared that the Constitution protected a "right of
privacy" 1 03-a right that was not expressly stated in the document
itself, but that could be inferred from other protections spelled out in
the Bill of Rights (as Justice William 0. Douglas wrote for the majori-
ty 104) or that was part of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment (as several concurring Justices argued 05 ). On these
grounds, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that forbade even
married couples to use contraceptives. 106 Subsequent cases extend-
ed this protection to unmarried adults as well as to minors.107 In the
97See, e.g., CoTT, supra note 88, at 105-11.
98 See, e.g., JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERs: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 156-61, 280-85 (3d ed. 2012).
99 See id. at 156-61; DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE chs. 1-2 (1994).
100 See, e.g., D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 98, chs. 11-14.
101 CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 473,484-85, 502 (2007).
102 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103 Id. at 485.
10 4 See id. at 482-85.
105 See id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring
in judgment).
106 Id. at 485-86 (majority opinion).
107 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that minors
have a right to contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding
that a law banning unmarried couples from obtaining contraceptives was un-
constitutional).
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most controversial of all these cases, the Court ruled in Roe v.
Wade'0 8 that the constitutional right to privacy was "broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy." 0 9
Decisions like these, together with the broader changes that
were taking place in American society, provoked a strong backlash
from social and religious conservatives and led to the rise of the Re-
ligious Right.11 0 At the heart of this movement has been an effort to
defend a traditionalist conception of sexual morality, especially with
regard to "homosexuality, teenage pregnancy, abortion, and pornog-
raphy."111
Conservative opposition to homosexuality prevailed when
anti-sodomy laws first came before the Supreme Court in the 1986
case of Bowers v. Hardwick.112 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected
the contention that those laws violated constitutional rights to liber-
ty and privacy. Justice Byron R. White's majority opinion stressed
that "[p]roscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots," and con-
cluded that an adequate rationale for those proscriptions could be
found in "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate ... that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable."" 3 In a concur-
ring opinion, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger emphasized that the
"[c]ondemnation of [homosexual conduct] is firmly rooted in Judeao-
Christian moral and ethical standards," and asserted that the Court
could not "hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow pro-
tected as a fundamental right" without "cast[ing] aside millennia of
moral teaching."11 4 In these ways, the Justices in the majority sided
108 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109 Id. at 153.
110 See, e.g., RUTH MURRAY BROWN, FOR A "CHRISTIAN AMERICA": A HISTORY OF THE
RELIGIOUS RIGHT (2002); SUTON, supra note 74.
M BROWN, supra note 110, at 85.
112 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
113 Id. at 194, 196.
114 Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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with social and religious conservatives, who had urged them to up-
hold anti-sodomy laws.115
Within a decade, however, the Court began to chart a differ-
ent course. In Romer v. Evans,116 the majority struck down a ballot
measure in which the voters of Colorado had barred the state and its
localities from protecting individuals against discrimination based
on sexual orientation. Because the measure "singl[ed] out a certain
class of citizens for disfavored legal status," it constituted "a denial of
equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."117
In its next major gay rights decision, Lawrence v. Texas,118
the Court overruled Bowers and held that anti-sodomy laws violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 Writing for the Court, Justice Kenne-
dy acknowledged that condemnations of homosexuality reflected the
traditional "religious beliefs" and deep moral convictions that some
people used to "determine the course of their lives."12 0 But it did not
follow that "the majority may use the power of the State to enforce
these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal
law." 121 Instead, Kennedy declared that "[t]he liberty protected by
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right" to choose to
enter into intimate "personal relationship[s]" in "their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."1 22
In Lawrence, as in Romer, Justice Antonin Scalia filed an im-
passioned dissent, which denounced the Court for intruding into the
us See, e.g., Brief for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, Amicus
Curiae, in Support of Petitioner, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No.
85-140), 1985 WL 667940; Brief of the Rutherford Institute et al., Amici Curiae,
in Support of Petitioner, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140),
1985 WL 667943.
116 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
117 d. at 633-34.
118 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For a comprehensive account of this case, see DALE
CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TExAs (2012).
119 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
120 Id. at 571.
121 Id.
122 d. at 567.
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democratic process. 12 3 Scalia insisted that "a governing majority's
belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable'
constitutes a rational basis for regulation," and added that the deci-
sion in Lawrence "called into question" the whole gamut of "tradi-
tional 'morals' offenses," including "bigamy, same-sex marriage,
adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, besti-
ality, and obscenity."1 24 Although many people welcomed the Law-
rence decision, it "infuriated" many religious traditionalists, includ-
ing the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), the
Reverends Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, Pastor Fred Phelps, Jr.,
and Senator Rick Santorum.1 2 5
Yet by the time Lawrence was decided in 2003, the legal bat-
tle over homosexuality already had shifted to a new front. A decade
earlier, the Hawaii Supreme Court had issued a decision that made it
likely that the state would legalize same-sex marriages. 126 Congress
responded in 1996 by passing the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).1 2 7 This law provided that even if one or more states were
to permit such marriages, neither the federal government nor the
other states would have to treat them as valid.12 8 Between 1996 and
1997, twenty-three state legislatures acted to ban same-sex mar-
riage within their own jurisdictions.1 29 During the decade from 1998
to 2008, voters in thirty states passed constitutional amendments
that reserved marriage for opposite-sex couples.' 3 0
123 See id. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636,
646-647, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125 CARPENTER, supra note 118, at 249, 268.126 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
127 Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996), invalidated by Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
128 Id.
129 See Brief of the Organization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners at 30, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-
556), 2015 WL 1004709, at *30.
130 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
Kenneth P. Miller, The Democratic Coalition's Religious Divide: Why California
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These measures were adopted with strong support from re-
ligious traditionalists. 131 In addition to public policy arguments-
such as the claim that children do better when raised by a father and
a mother-traditionalists relied on the same views I described
above: that reason and revelation show that homosexuality is wrong,
and that by its very nature marriage consists in the union of a man
and a woman. 132 In addition, traditionalists often argued that the
adoption of same-sex marriage would threaten their religious liber-
ty,133 for example, by compelling clergy to perform gay weddings.1 34
In United States v. Windsor,135 a 5-4 majority of the Court
struck down the provision of DOMA that barred federal recognition
of same-sex marriages that were valid under state law. And in Ober-
gefell v. Hodges,136 the same majority ruled that the federal Constitu-
tion guarantees same-sex couples the right to marry.1 37 The Court
reasoned in these cases that the values that are promoted by mar-
riage do not depend on the gender of the partners, and that bans on
same-sex marriage are inconsistent with the constitutional rights of
gays and lesbians to liberty, equality, and dignity.1 38
Voters Supported Obama but Not Same-Sex Marriage, 119 REVUE FRANCAISE
D'ETUDES AMtRICAINES 46, 52 (2009)).
131 See, e.g., Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 955-56 (discussing the broad coalition of
conservative religious groups in 2008 that supported California Proposition 8,
which banned same-sex marriage in the state).
13 2 See supra Part II.A.
13s See, e.g., Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (recounting statement by the sponsors
of Proposition 8 that "'[t]he 98% of Californians who are not gay should not
have their religious freedoms and freedom of expression be compromised to
afford special legal rights for the 2% of Californians who are gay"') (quoting
Protect Marriage, Honest Answers to Questions Many Californians are Asking
About Proposition 8 (2008)).
134 See Laurie Goodstein, A Line in the Sand for Same-Sex Marriage Foes, N.Y.
TIMEs (Oct 26, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/27/us/27right.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all
[http://perma.cc/WJ5B-JYXJ].
135 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
136 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
137 Id at 2602.
13 8 See infra Part V.A.3.a (discussing Obergefell).
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With the advent of marriage equality, the thrust of the reli-
gious traditionalists' position has changed once more. Throughout
much of our history, they supported the traditional regime govern-
ing sexuality and marriage, including laws that made sodomy a
crime.139 After Lawrence, they argued that even though same-sex re-
lationships were no longer illegal, the state should not accord them
the status of marriages.1 40 Now, in the wake of Obergefell, tradition-
alists contend that there is an urgent need to adopt laws to protect
their religious freedom against the threat posed by same-sex mar-
riage.141
139 See supra text accompanying notes 91-96, 112-15.
140 For some briefs taking this position, see Brief of Major Religious Organiza-
tions as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1534341 [hereinafter Major Religious Or-
ganizations Briefj; Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops in Support of Respondents and Supporting Affirmance, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1519042 [hereinafter
USCCB Brief].
141 This development can be traced in the work of Professor Robert P. George of
Princeton University, who is a leading advocate of the traditionalist view. In
2003, he co-authored an amicus brief in Lawrence that defended the constitu-
tionality of anti-sodomy laws, and he excoriated the Court's decision after it
came down. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Family Research Council, Inc. and
Focus on the Family in Support of the Respondent, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 470066; Robert P. George,judicial Usurpa-
tion and Sexual Liberation: Courts and the Abolition of Marriage, 17 REGENT U. L.
REv. 21, 27-29 (2004) [hereinafter George, judicial Usurpation] (accusing the
Lawrence Court of "Lochnerizing on a massive scale" by "impos[ing] a particular
set of cultural leftist doctrines about the nature, meaning, and moral signifi-
cance of sexuality and marriage"). After the demise of the anti-sodomy laws,
George maintained that the defense of traditional marriage "certainly isn't
about legalizing (or criminalizing) anything," for "[i]n all fifty states two men or
women can have a [ceremony] ... and share a domestic life" if they wish. ROBERT
P. GEORGE, What Marriage is-and What It Isn't, in CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES
126, 130 (2013). George's recent defense of traditional marriage has stressed
the danger that allowing same-sex couples to marry would pose to religious lib-
erty. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, The Myth of a "Grand Bargain" on Marriage, in
CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES, supra, at 142. On the eve of the Obergefell decision,
George gave a talk that dwelled on those dangers. See Rick Plaster, Robert
George Discusses Same-Sex Marriage and Its Social Consequences, CHRISTIAN POST
(June 26, 2015), http://www.christianpost.com/news/robert-george-
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C Why Do Religious Traditionalists Believe That Same-Sex Marriage
Threatens Their Religious Liberty?
This discussion leads to a central question: Why do religious
traditionalists believe that the legal recognition of same-sex mar-
riage, and of gay rights in general, endangers their religious liberty?
In this section, I maintain that the answer to this question is much
more complex than it may seem at first glance. We need to explore
this subject in some depth if we wish to fully understand the tension
between religious liberty and civil rights in this area and how it can
best be resolved.
As a threshold matter, it is helpful to reflect on the concept of
liberty. It is often said that liberty should be understood in purely
negative terms-as the absence of interference or constraint-and
that this was how the founders understood liberty. 14 2 In my view,
however, this position is mistaken in both historical and conceptual
terms. From a conceptual standpoint, I believe that philosophers like
John Rawls are right when they hold that liberty has a positive as
well as a negative dimension.' 4 3 On this view, liberty consists in the
ability to act in a particular way (the positive side) without interfer-
ence by others (the negative side).144 As I have shown elsewhere,
this is the understanding that characterized classical liberal thought
and that prevailed at the time the Constitution was adopted.1 4 5 I be-
lieve that the traditionalists' demand for religious liberty also is best
seen in this light: they seek to conduct their lives and to shape the
world in accord with their religious beliefs, without unjustified inter-
discusses-same-sex-marriage-and-its-social-consequences-
140891/#j4TzxWPJgEGCOW.99 [http://perma.cc/Y5DD-V28P].
142 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631, 2634-35 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 812 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
143 See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 32, at 177-78 (rev. ed. 1999). In this re-
gard, Rawls follows the position taken in G.G. MacCallum, Negative and Positive
Freedom, 76 PHIL. REv. 312 (1967).
144 See Steven 1. Heyman, Positive and Negative Liberty, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81
(1992).
145 See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 526-30 (1991) [hereinafter Hey-
man, Protection].
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ference by other individuals or the state.146 Traditionalists contend
that the rise of gay rights and same-sex marriage interferes with this
freedom in a wide range of ways.
1. Compulsion to Act Contrary to Conscience
To begin with, religious traditionalists are concerned that the
law may compel them to do particular acts that violate their con-
sciences. This concern is exemplified by those cases in which state
civil rights laws have been interpreted to require florists, bakers, and
others to provide wedding-related services to same-sex couples-
rulings that the providers contend would compel them to betray
their religious convictions by participating in or facilitating events
that celebrate relationships they regard as sinful and contrary to the
divinely ordained nature of marriage.1 47
2. Compulsion to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages
Although these cases provide the most straightforward ex-
amples, traditionalists also believe that the advent of marriage
equality endangers their religious liberty in many other ways. Sup-
pose, for example, that a religious organization or other employer
that opposes same-sex marriage provides benefits such as health in-
surance to the opposite-sex spouses of its employees. Under a law
that prohibits sexual-orientation discrimination, the employer might
be required to provide the same benefits to same-sex spouses.
Traditionalists regard this as an infringement of the employ-
er's religious liberty.148 This infringement can be understood as an-
other instance of the first category, on the ground that the employer
is being compelled to perform a particular act that violates its reli-
146 On freedom as the activity of shaping the world in a particular way, see
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 4, 8 (Allen W. Wood ed.,
H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1820) [hereinafter HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].
147 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
148 See, e.g., USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra note 2 (answer to question
"What's the real threat to religious liberty posed by same-sex 'marriage'?").
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gious beliefs by providing material support for a same-sex marriage.
But traditionalists also contend that in this situation religious liberty
is being violated in another way, by requiring the employer to recog-
nize a same-sex relationship as a legitimate marriage.1 49 Indeed, re-
ligious traditionalists sometimes suggest that this notion lies at the
heart of their claim to religious liberty. As the Catholic Bishops have
put it, "far from serving the cause of civil rights, redefining marriage
would threaten the civil right of religious freedom [because] it would
compel . . . even those opposed in conscience to same-sex sexual
conduct" "to treat [a same-sex] relationship as if it were a mar-
riage." 50
3. Impact on the Traditionalists' Own Marriages
Supporters of marriage equality often contend that it will
simply expand the institution without causing any harm to those
who have traditional marriages.1 5 In response, religious traditional-
ists assert that redefining marriage will "change its meaning for eve-
ryone."1 52 Instead of being understood as a natural relationship that
unites male and female in a way that is oriented to procreation, mar-
riage will become a "socially constructed unit" that is based on mere
"personal desires" or emotions.15 In turn, this will weaken the
norms of "permanence and exclusivity" that traditionally have char-
acterized marriage, as well as the partners' commitment to having
149 See, e.g., Brief of Douglas Laycock et al. as Amid Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 3-4, 22-24, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-
556), 2015 WL 1048450, at *3-4, *22-24 [hereinafter Laycock Brief] (explain-
ing that "[m]any religious organizations and believers . . . refuse to recognize
same-sex civil marriages as marriages" due to a conflict with their religious un-
derstandings of marriage).
150 USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra note 2 (answer to question "What about
civil rights?").
1s1 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606-07 (2015).
152 SHERIF GIRGls, RYAN T. ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE? 55
(2012).
153 Id. at 56-58; One Flesh, supra note 65, at 27.
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and raising children. 154 These concerns have led some prominent
traditionalists to characterize same-sex marriage as an even "graver
threat" to marriage than "widespread cohabitation" or an "easy ac-
ceptance of divorce." 55 While it is true that those phenomena "dam-
age[]" and "devalue[]" the institution, "what is now given the name of
marriage in the law is a parody of marriage," a fundamental distor-
tion of its very nature. 156 The result is to "redefine the institution
and, strictly speaking, abolish it."1 57
From this perspective, same-sex marriage can be seen as the
most recent and catastrophic stage in the ongoing "crisis of marriage
culture" brought about by "the sexual revolution."15 8 As Pastor Ron-
nie Floyd, the president of Southern Baptist Convention, recently
told the group, Obergefell has the potential to "chang[e] the trajecto-
ry of our nation unlike anything we have seen since . . . the Roe vs.
Wade decision," by "add[ing] more fuel to the already sweeping
wildfire of the sexual revolution, and mov[ing] it beyond anyone's
control."159
On this view, the recognition of same-sex marriage does not
merely allow more couples to marry. Instead, it transforms the insti-
tution in a radical way that involves "abandoning the possibility of
restoring a sound understanding of marriage and, with it, the hope of
rebuilding a healthy marriage culture"-a culture that is needed to
sustain the marriages of everyone in the society, including religious
traditionalists.16 0
154 GIRGIS ET AL., supra note 152, at 56-58, 62, 67; see also Manhattan Declara-
tion: A Call of Christian Conscience 5 (2009),
http://www.manhattandeclaration.org/man-dec-resources/ManhattanDeclar
ation_full_text.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3KA-LT9X].
155 One Flesh, supra note 65, at 27.
156 Id.
157 GeorgeJudicial Usurpation, supra note 141, at 28-29.
158 One Flesh, supra note 65, at 24, 27.
159 Floyd, supra note 3, at 4.
1 6 0Manhattan Declaration, supra note 154, at 5.
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4. Impact on Their Child-Rearing
Religious traditionalists also believe that the normalization
of homosexuality impacts their families in another way, by affecting
their ability to raise their children. 16 1 Those children may encounter
LGBT people and same-sex couples in the course of everyday life, es-
pecially at school. The public schools may teach about same-sex
marriage and may seek to promote tolerance toward those who dif-
fer in sexual orientation. 16 2 And, of course, children may also en-
counter positive portrayals of same-sex relationships in popular cul-
ture. Moreover, because many traditionalists believe that
homosexuality is not innate but is a voluntarily chosen lifestyle,1 6 3
they fear that such social acceptance may lead their children to ex-
periment with or adopt that lifestyle. 164 In all these ways, tradition-
alists believe that social recognition of homosexuality interferes with
their ability to pass their religious values on to their children.
5. Impact on Their Educational Institutions
Traditionalists also are concerned that the advent of gay
rights and marriage equality may impair their ability to promote
161 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
162 See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
163 See, e.g., Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but Key Segments
Remain Opposed, PEw RESEARCH CENTER at 20 (June 8, 2015),
http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/06/6-8-15-Same-sex-marriage-
releasel.pdf [http://perma.cc/GX2V-W4Q4] [hereinafter Pew Report] (report-
ing that 62 percent of black Protestants and of white Evangelical Protestants
express this view).
164 See, e.g., Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 988, 990; LINNEMAN, supra note 86, at 163-
65. In recent years, several states have made it unlawful to subject minors to
conversion therapies that seek to alter their sexual orientation. See, e.g., CAL.
Bus. & PROF'L CODE § 865 (2015); N.J. STAT. § 45:1-55 (2015). These bans also
have been criticized as violations of religious liberty. See, e.g., Brief for Catholic
Answers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 23, Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1534335, at *23 [hereinafter
Catholic Answers Brief]. Courts have upheld such laws against free exercise and
other constitutional challenges. See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216
(3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015).
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their religious beliefs through their own educational institutions. In
this connection, they frequently point to BobJones University v. Unit-
ed States,165 in which a religious university and a religious elemen-
tary and secondary school challenged an Internal Revenue Service
policy that denied charitable tax exemptions under 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) to educational institutions that discriminated on the ba-
sis of race.166 In an 8-1 ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the plain-
tiffs' religious liberty claim and held that educational institutions
that engage in racial discrimination do not qualify as "charitable"
under the tax code.1 67 Religious traditionalists fear that the federal
government will use similar reasoning to revoke the tax-exempt sta-
tus of educational institutions-and even of churches-that adhere
to traditional teachings on homosexuality, or that refuse on religious
grounds to accord same-sex spouses the same benefits as opposite-
sex spouses, such as access to married-student housing.168
6. Impact on Their Charitable Work
Religious traditionalists believe that they are called not simp-
ly to obey God's will in their own lives, but also to carry out God's
mission in the world through service to others.1 69 They are con-
cerned, however, that the movement toward LGBT rights and mar-
165 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
16 6 See id. at 579-85.
167 Id. at 592-96, 602-04.
16 See, e.g., Brief of the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists and the
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
25, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL
1022705, at *25 [hereinafter Adventists Brief]. Many traditionalists expressed
alarm after Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. conceded at oral argument
that the question of tax-exempt status was "certainly going to be an issue."
Transcript of Oral Argument on Question 1 at 38, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
The Obama Administration recently declared that it would not seek to revoke
tax exemptions on this ground. See Sarah Pulliam Bailey, IRS Commissioner
Promises Not to Revoke Tax-Exempt Status of Colleges That Oppose Gay Marriage,
WASH. PosT (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-
faith/wp/2015/08/03/irs-commissioner-promises-not-to-revoke-tax-exempt-
status-of-colleges-that-oppose-gay-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/T467-7KA5].
169 See, e.g., CATHOLIC CATECHISM, supra note 57, § 1932.
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riage equality will impair their ability to do this. A frequently cited
example is the decision by Catholic Charities of Boston to cease
providing adoption services rather than to comply with a state rule
that prohibited foster-care and adoption agencies from discriminat-
ing against same-sex couples.170 In many other situations, religious
traditionalists worry that their charitable and social service agencies
will be denied government funding because of their refusal to serve
such couples.171
7. Impact on Their Ability to Engage in Business and the Professions
Another major concern is that traditionalists will be forced to
choose between following their religious beliefs and engaging in
business and the professions.1 72 In addition to the cases involving
wedding-service providers,173 they point to incidents in which stu-
dents have been dismissed from graduate programs in counseling
because they refuse on religious grounds to counsel individuals in-
volved in same-sex relationships.1 74
8. Compelled Association
Traditionalists also maintain that their religious liberty is
compromised by laws that require them to associate with LGBT peo-
ple.175 For example, the Catholic Bishops assert that compelled asso-
ciation would result if "the government... obligates wedding-related
businesses to provide services for same-sex 'couples"' or "forces reli-
gious institutions to retain as leaders, employees, or members those
who obtain legalized same-sex 'marriage."1 76 Similar objections
have been raised against laws and policies that ban discrimination
170 See, e.g., Adventists Brief, supra note 168, at 22.
171 See, e.g., id. at 22-25.
172 See, e.g., id. at 25-26.
173See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., USCCB Brief, supra note 140, at 24.
175 See, e.g., USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra note 2 (answer to question
"What's the real threat to religious liberty posed by same-sex 'marriage'?").
176Id.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1438
A STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION
within some community organizations. In a 1999 decision, the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the Boy Scouts of America were
covered by the state law that barred sexual-orientation discrimina-
tion in public accommodations. 177 Although the Supreme Court held
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale178 that the New Jersey decision vio-
lated the organization's First Amendment right to freedom of associ-
ation,1 79 some government bodies have severed their own connec-
tions with the Boy Scouts or declined to allow them to use certain
forms of public property.180 Moreover, some public educational in-
stitutions have adopted an "all comers" policy under which student
organizations may not receive official recognition unless they are
willing to allow any student to join.1 81 In Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez,182 a narrowly divided Court upheld such a policy against a
constitutional challenge brought by an evangelical student group
that had required its members to sign a "Statement of Faith" that in-
cluded an affirmation "that sexual activity should not occur outside
of marriage between a man and a woman," and that had the effect of
"exclud[ing] from affiliation anyone who engages in 'unrepentant
homosexual conduct." 183
177 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999).
178 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
179 Id. at 659.
180 See, e.g., Adventists Brief, supra note 168, at 21-22. In response to "cascading
social and legal changes," the Boy Scouts recently ended their national ban on
gay members and leaders, while allowing "church-sponsored units to choose
local unit leaders who share their precepts." Erik Eckholm, Boy Scouts End Ban
on Gay Leaders, Over Protests by Mormon Church, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/us/boy-scouts-end-nationwide-ban-
on-gay-leaders.html [http://perma.cc/53B3-LUGN].
181 Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 671 (2010) (describing such policies at Hastings and
other law schools).
182 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
183 Id. at 672 (citation omitted).
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9. Impact on Their Relationship with the Political Community
For the most part, the points that I have just discussed relate
to the ability of religious traditionalists to follow their beliefs within
the private sphere. This is the image that the term religious liberty is
apt to call up in the minds of many people. But traditionalists often
understand the term in a broader way: they see religious liberty as
extending-or at least as closely related-to freedom of political
participation as well. As the Catholic Bishops have expressed it, the
American principle of "religious liberty . . . safeguards our right to
bring our principles and moral convictions into the public arena."1 8 4
Many traditionalists believe that they have a duty to actively
promote their beliefs in the political realm.185 In their view, a deci-
sion like Obergefell threatens this aspect of religious liberty in two
ways. First, by imposing a judicial solution to the debate over same-
sex marriage, the Court abrogates the democratic process and de-
prives all "citizens of the liberty to join with others in shaping" policy
on one of the great public issues of the day.18 6 Second, such a deci-
sion "den[ies] religious believers equal citizenship by unfairly deem-
ing the laws and policies they favor presumptively illegitimate."1 8 7
To put it another way, traditionalists worry that such a decision will
"endorse the message that traditional religious beliefs about mar-
riage and the family are-as a matter of constitutional law-akin to
racism, a form of condemnation that will result in marginalization
and ostracism of religious believers" not only in the political process
but also in the broader culture.' 8 8
184 USCCB, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, Introductory Note
(2011), http://perma.cc/DM6B-SNHN [hereinafter USCCB, Forming Conscienc-
es]; see also Joseph D. Harder, "Heal Their Land": Evangelical Political Theology
From the Great Awakening to the Moral Majority 166-68 (May 2014) (un-
published Ph. D. dissertation, University of Nebraska),
http://digitalcommons.un.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=his
torydiss [http://perma.cc/W99S-YN7N].
185 See, e.g., USCCB, Forming Consciences, supra note 184; CHRISTIAN SMITH ET AL.,
AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM: EMBATTLED AND THRIVING 132-33 (1998).
186 Major Religious Organizations Brief, supra note 140, at 36.
187 Id. at 18-19.
188 Catholic Answers Brief, supro note 164, at 30.
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Finally, a decision like Obergefell may also affect religious
traditionalists' relationship with the society in another important
way. Traditionalists often strongly identify with America and believe
that it is-or at least was founded to be-a Christian nation.' 8 9 By
interpreting the Constitution to support same-sex marriage, such a
decision tends to undermine traditionalists' sense of identity as
American citizens and to heighten their feelings of alienation from
the country.1 90 To put it another way, although traditionalists often
have experienced some tension between their identity as Americans
and their religious identity, a decision like Obergefell may exacerbate
this tension and thus lead to a deep internal conflict in their sense of
self.
10. Impact on Their Worldview and Identity as Believers
On the most fundamental level, the identity of religious tradi-
tionalists is formed by their faith in God and their commitment to
follow God's laws.'1 9 At the same time, they believe that those laws
express "a universal morality, encompassing all peoples and cul-
tures."19 2 It follows that violations of those laws should be stigma-
tized and condemned as sinful. When traditionalists encounter
same-sex couples who appear to be leading flourishing lives, and
whose relationships receive social acceptance and even legal recog-
189 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 110; Harder, supra note 184. For a critical as-
sessment of this belief by three leading evangelical historians, see MARK A. NOLL,
NATHAN 0. HATCH & GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SEARCH FOR A CHRISTIAN AMERICA (ex-
panded ed., 1989).
190 For an extreme statement of this point, see Rod Dreher, Orthodox Christians
Must Now Learn To Live as Exiles in Our Own Country, TIME (June 26, 2015),
http://time.com/3938050/orthodox-christians-must-now-learn-to-live-as-
exiles-in-our-own-country/ [http://perma.cc/WBF6-U4QE].
191 On the role that religious worldviews play in forming the identity of believ-
ers, see PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF
RELIGION ch. 1 (1967).
192 Francis Cardinal George, A Tale of Two Churches, CATHOLIC NEW WORLD (Sept.
7-20, 2014),
http://www.catholicnewworld.com/cnwonline/2014/0907/cardinal.aspx
[http://perma.cc/L2UX-XTQX].
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nition, traditionalists experience a profound challenge to their be-
liefs and to the identity that has been formed around those beliefs.
This experience may generate strong "existential anxieties" by un-
dermining their sense of order in the world and of their place within
it.193
As a result of the contradiction between the norms that apply
within their religious world and the ones that prevail within the
larger society, religious traditionalists face a difficult choice: either
they must abandon (or at least modify) their beliefs, or they must
adhere to those beliefs in the face of what they perceive to be a hos-
tile society. Some traditionalists are concerned that taking the latter
course will subject them to persecution. For example, they fear that
their arguments against same-sex marriage may be outlawed as a
form of hate speech or harassment, thereby restricting their freedom
to advocate their beliefs.1 94 The end result, they warn, may be "the
193 The quoted language is taken from LYNN DAVIDMAN, BECOMING UN-ORTHODOX:
STORIES OF Ex-HASIDIC JEWS 144 (2015), which offers a similar account of the anx-
ieties that individuals experience when they leave the community of Haredi
(that is, ultra-Orthodox) Jews in which they have grown up. As Davidman ex-
plains, the ritual practices that Haredi Jews follow "create what social theorists
Anthony Giddens and Bryan Turner refer to as a strong sense of ontological se-
curity-a comfortable sense of being in the world-and of being a member of
the group." Id. (citing ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND
SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991); BRYAN TURNER, REGULATING BODIES (1992);
BRYAN TURNER, THE BODY AND SOCIETY: EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL THEORY (1984)). De-
parture from the community and its practices leaves individuals "vulnerable to
existential anxieties that threaten[] their sense of self-identity." Id. Davidman
also invokes Peter Berger's metaphor of "the sacred canopy," which "refers to
the overarching shelter enclosing and securing a religious community's way of
life and shielding its boundaries from outside intrusions." Id. at 29 (discussing
BERGER, supra note 191). As Davidman shows, some experiences, such as "expo-
sure to the secular world," can "reveal[] holes in the seemingly solid sacred
canopy" and thus lead individuals to question the way of life and worldview in
which they have been raised. Id. at 31. This account may also provide valuable
insight into the experiences that religious traditionalists may have when they
encounter same-sex marriage.
194 See, e.g., Alexandra Jaffe, Rubio: Gay Marriage Proponents Pose "Danger" to
Christianity, CNN (May 28, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/27/politics/rubio-gay-marriage-hate-speech/
[http://perma.cc/N2GH-7E4H].
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criminalization of Christianity."s9 5 This development would either
separate them from God or require them to suffer martyrdom. As the
late Francis Cardinal George of Chicago put it in a frequently quoted
statement, "I expect[] to die in bed, my successor will die in prison
and his successor will die a martyr in the public square."19 6 For these
reasons, traditionalists sometimes describe the conflict over gay
rights as a matter of "spiritual warfare" or an epic battle between the
forces of good and evil.19 7
11. Conclusion
In this section, we have explored what traditionalists mean
when they assert that same-sex marriage, and gay rights in general,
pose a threat to their religious liberty. By religious liberty, they mean
the unimpaired capacity to live out their religious beliefs. Tradition-
alists seek to do this in the realms of family, education, charitable
work, business and the professions, community affairs, politics, cul-
ture, and religion. But they believe that legal recognition of gay rights
and same-sex marriage threatens their freedom in all of these
realms: by compelling them to act against their consciences by par-
ticipating in, facilitating, or recognizing relationships they consider
19s Kyle Mantyla, "Satan Dancing With Delight": The Religious Right Reacts to the
Legalization Of Gay Marriage, RIGHTWINGWATCH.COM (June 26, 2015, 11:36 AM)
(quoting message from Concerned Women for America),
www.rightwingwatch.org/content/satan-dancing-delight-religious-right-
reacts-legalization-gay-marriage#sthash.LIB7cXRG.dpuf
[http://perma.cc/GQE6-J3PH]; see also Paul Bremmer, Schlafly: "Gay Marriage"
Advocates Want to "Wipe Out" Christianity, WND (May 16, 2015),
http://www.wnd.com/2015/05/schlafly-gay-marriage-advocates-want-to-
wipe-out-christianity/ [http://perma.cc/HC97-N6QT].
196 Francis Cardinal George, The Wrong Side of History, CATHOLIC NEW WORLD
(Oct. 21-Nov. 3, 2012),
http://www.catholicnewworld.com/cnwonline/2012/1021/cardinal.aspx
[http://perma.cc/HN9L-6897]. In 2012, George acknowledged that he had
made this statement to a group of clergy several years before, but explained
that he had been "trying to express in overly dramatic fashion what the com-
plete secularization of our society could bring." Id.
197 Floyd, supra note 3, at 2; see also, e.g., LINNEMAN, supra note 86, at 156-57,
162.
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to be sinful; by according legal status to those relationships in a way
that undermines the "culture of marriage" that sustains their own
unions; by interfering with their ability to inculcate their religious
and moral values in their children; by endangering their ability to
maintain educational institutions and engage in charitable work; by
threatening to exclude them from business and the professions un-
less they abandon their religious beliefs; by compelling them to as-
sociate with others who do not share their values; by denying them
full participation in, and alienating them from, the political and cul-
tural life of the community; and by undermining their religious be-
liefs and threatening them with persecution.
In all these ways, religious traditionalists perceive the advent
of gay rights and same-sex marriage as interfering not only with
their freedom as individuals, but also with the culture that supports
and sustains their religious practices. Over time, they have con-
structed a rich cultural world in which they seek to live out their be-
liefs-a world that is based on a shared faith in God and a commit-
ment to follow God's precepts. Moreover, traditionalists believe that
this cultural world is, or should be, aligned with the legal, political,
and social order of America, which they regard as a Christian nation,
as well as with the cosmic order ruled by God. Decisions like Oberge-
fell bring about a profound disruption of this traditionalist cultural
world in all the ways I have discussed. For these reasons, traditional-
ists experience the advent of gay rights and same-sex marriage as a
fundamental threat to their identity and their way of life.
D. The Clash with Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)
Identity
Contrary to what religious traditionalists often assert, how-
ever, this threat does not necessarily stem from hostility toward
them or their views. Instead, it results from the efforts of LGBT peo-
ple to affirm and live out their own identities. In contrast to hyper-
bolic warnings about "the criminalization of Christianity,"' 98 the an-
198 See supra text accompanying notes 194-95.
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ti-sodomy laws actually did threaten to imprison gay and lesbian in-
dividuals merely for engaging in sexual relationships. 199 In Law-
rence, the Court held that under the Constitution they have a right to
enter into such relationships in "their own private lives and still re-
tain their dignity as free persons." 200
As in the case of the religious traditionalists, however, the
liberty that LGBT people claim goes far beyond the ability to perform
particular acts. As the whole line of cases from Romer through Ober-
gefell makes clear, LGBT people should be free to form socially and
legally recognized relationships on the same terms as heterosexuals
can; to raise their children in a stable and secure environment; to en-
joy equal treatment in civil society, free from invidious discrimina-
tion; to participate openly in the political arena; and to lead their
own religious and spiritual lives. Above all, they have a right to live
in accord with their own values and identities while being treated as
full and equal human beings and citizens. In all these ways, LGBT
people make claims that are parallel to those made by religious tra-
ditionalists.
In a situation like this, one might expect that a common
commitment to liberty would lead each group to acknowledge the
other's right to pursue its own identity and way of life. Although
some religious traditionalists may be inclined to adopt this position,
it runs counter to the conception of liberty that many of them hold.
This conception maintains that "[t]here is no true freedom except in
the service of what is good and just," as found in the law of God and
in the natural order God has created. 201 By contrast, "[t]he choice to
disobey and do evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to 'the slavery
of sin."' 202 From this traditionalist perspective, the liberty that LGBT
people claim is not "[g]enuine freedom," but rather is "a deceptive
pseudo-freedom that degrades our humanity" by allowing us "to ex-
199 See supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
200 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
201 CATHOLIC CATECHISM, supra note 57, § 1733.
202 Id. (quoting Romans 6:17). Similarly, Harder explains that "[flor the Christian
Right, liberty was not the freedom to do whatever one wanted," but rather "the
freedom to do what was right in God's eyes." Harder, supra note 184, at 10.
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alt our personal desires and choices over the created order."203 To
put it another way, only the truth can set us free.204 Religious tradi-
tionalists often believe that they have come to know "an unchanging
and universal Truth . . . because God has revealed it to them," 205
whereas their opponents go astray by attempting to "construct[
their] own moral truths."206
For these reasons, the conflict between religious traditional-
ists and LGBT people cannot easily be avoided by an appeal to a
shared conception of freedom. Instead, there is a fundamental clash
of identities between the two groups. At bottom, this clash arises be-
cause traditionalists understand the two identities as antithetical-a
point that clearly emerges from some of the amicus briefs they filed
in Obergefell. As one brief put it, the same-sex plaintiffs "seek affir-
mation of their own sexual identities, and corresponding condemna-
tion of contrary religious identities in many ways."207 In a similar
vein, a coalition of conservative churches maintained that a ruling in
favor of same-sex marriage "might enhance the equal treatment of
gays and lesbians, but only by subtracting from the First Amendment
liberties of religious institutions and believers." 208
III. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT
In the previous part, I showed that the ongoing legal and po-
litical dispute over religious liberty and same-sex marriage is rooted
in a deeper clash between the identities and ways of life of religious
traditionalists and LGBT people. The central problem is how this
203 One Flesh, supra note 65, at 27.
2 04 See John 8:32.
205 SMITH ET AL., supra note 185, at 126.
206 One Flesh, supra note 65, at 27.
207 Catholic Answers Brief, supra note 164, at 37.
208 Major Religious Organizations Brief, supra note 140, at 31. Likewise, Linne-
man reports that the religious traditionalists he interviewed "assume[d] that
gays and lesbians are their natural antithesis." See LINNEMAN, supra note 86, at
157. For this reason, the traditionalists regarded any form of "gay progress," in-
cluding the adoption of anti-discrimination laws or same-sex marriage, "as a
sign of anti-Christian hostility." Id. at 38, 157-59.
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dispute can be resolved in a manner that enables the two groups to
live together within a liberal democratic society. In this part, I ex-
plore several leading approaches to this problem and argue that
while each has some merit, none is fully satisfactory. In Part IV, I
present an alternative approach based on the concept of mutual
recognition, and show that this approach incorporates much of what
is valuable in other views.
A. The "Culture War"Approach
The conflict between religious traditionalists and supporters
of LGBT rights is commonly described as a culture war. In many
ways, the metaphor is apt. At the same time, however, it suggests
that conflicts of this sort ultimately must be resolved by force rather
than by reason. Justice Scalia expresses a view like this in Romer
when he excoriates the Court for intervening in the "culture war" in
order to "take the victory away from traditional forces," which had
fought to defend their "view of sexual morality ... against the efforts
of a ... politically powerful minority to undermine it." 2 09
In this regard, Scalia's outlook resembles that of Justice Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes. For Holmes, society is made up of disparate
groups, each of which has its own interests and beliefs and is
"striv[ing] to make the kind of a world that [it should] like." 210 This
striving inevitably brings it into conflict with other groups-a con-
flict that in the end can be decided only by means of superior
force.211
On this view, when there is a clash between different identi-
ties and ways of life, the group with the greatest power will prevail.
209 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
id at 636 (describing a state effort to overturn civil rights protections for LGBT
people as "a Kulturkampf'); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (denouncing the Court for "tak[ing] sides in the culture war").
210 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 303,
305 (1920).
2 1 1 See Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy oflustice Holmes
for First Amendment jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 683-85
(2011).
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Although there surely is something to this view, it is inadequate even
as a descriptive matter, for it fails to recognize the impact that ideas
of justice can have on public opinion. More importantly, this view
should be rejected on normative grounds, for it is antithetical to the
core liberal principle that conflicts should be resolved by reason ra-
ther than by force. 212
B. The Majoritarian Approach
A second approach holds that conflicts between groups
should be resolved through the majoritarian political process. This is
a pervasive theme in the conservative dissents in the Supreme
Court's gay rights cases.213 Once again, this position has some merit.
As Chief Justice Roberts writes in Obergefell, it is a valuable thing for
individuals to seek to "persuad[e] their fellow citizens-through the
democratic process-to adopt their view." 214 At the same time, the
limits of this position are obvious: the mere fact that a particular
group comprises, or can gain the support of, a majority does not
mean that it should be allowed to promote its own identity at the ex-
pense of another group.
C. The Religious Liberty Approach
In contrast to majoritarianism, which takes a procedural ap-
proach to group conflicts, the next four views focus on the substan-
tive values at stake. The first of these views is what I shall call the re-
ligious liberty approach. This approach holds that the law should
212 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (contrasting "the power of reason" with "force" and coercion); JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. 11, §§ 1, 6 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, GOVERNMENT] (contrasting "Rea-
son" with "Force and Violence").
213 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 123-24 (discussing Justice Scalia's
dissents in Romer and Lawrence); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-
12, 2622-23, 2624-25 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2626-29 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
214 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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recognize a strong presumption in favor of protecting religious liber-
ty when it conflicts with other interests or values.
This position has been the subject of continuing controversy
in American constitutional history. In an early free exercise case,
Reynolds v. United States,215 the Supreme Court declared that while
laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices." 216 To hold that an individual is entitled to vio-
late the law on religious grounds would "make the professed doc-
trines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect
to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." 217
The Reynolds position was dominant until the 1960s, when
the Court held in Sherbert v. Verner218 that government actions that
had the effect of substantially burdening an individual's religious
practice should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 219 However, in the
1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith,220 Justice Scalia virtually
overruled Sherbert and declared that so long as a law is generally
applicable and does not single out religion, it may not be challenged
as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 221 On this basis, he con-
cluded that the state of Oregon could ban all use of peyote, even by
Native Americans who ingested the drug for sacramental purpos-
es. 2 22
Three years later, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) for the avowed purpose of rejecting Smith
and returning to the Sherbert doctrine. 223 Although the Act was held
unconstitutional in 1997 as applied to the states,22 4 it continues to
215 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
216 Id. at 166.
217 Id. at 166-67.
218 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
219 See id at 406-08.
220 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
221 See id. at 879.
222 See id. at 874, 890.
223 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2015)).
224 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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apply to the federal government,225 and many states have passed
their own RFRAs or have interpreted their state constitutions to in-
corporate the same standard.226 Under these provisions, the gov-
ernment may not impose a substantial burden on a person's exercise
of religion, even by means of a religiously neutral and generally ap-
plicable law, unless the government can show that imposing that
burden is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling gov-
ernment interest.22 7
It is easy to understand why Congress believed that such a
demanding standard should apply in cases like Smith, which held
that the First Amendment permits the government to apply its gen-
eral laws in such a way as to outlaw a central practice of a minority
religion. In this situation, RFRA's compelling-interest standard en-
sures that the government's decision has a substantial justification
and is not a product of mere ignorance, indifference, or insensitivity
with regard to a religious minority.
Even in cases like this, which pit minorities against the gov-
ernment, there is a good deal of disagreement about whether RFRA
takes the right approach when it opens the door to granting religious
believers an exemption to the laws that apply to all other citizens.228
Regardless of how one comes out on this issue, however, there are
strong objections to applying such an approach to the problem we
are considering now: whether religious opponents of same-sex mar-
riage should be exempt from general laws that are intended to pro-
tect LGBT people from discrimination. As we have seen, this problem
ultimately involves a clash between the identities of these two
groups. Yet the approach represented by RFRA appears to place a
heavy thumb on the scale in support of religious liberty, thus privi-
leging the claims of religious traditionalists over those of LGBT peo-
ple.
225 See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
418 (2005).
226 See Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 56, at 844-45.
227 See, e.g., RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2015).
228 For a powerful critique, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD V. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF
EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (rev. 2d ed. 2014).
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A defender of the RFRA approach might respond that this ob-
jection is unfounded because the government has a compelling in-
terest in protecting LGBT rights, and so this approach places the two
groups on the same level. But there are two difficulties with this re-
sponse. First, while I agree that the government has a compelling in-
terest in protecting LGBT rights, there is nothing in the language of
the RFRAs, or in the broader approach they represent, that makes
this clear.229 And second, even when a law is found to promote com-
pelling interests, it does not pass the RFRA test unless it also consti-
tutes the least restrictive means of promoting those interests. If this
requirement were to be interpreted in a stringent way, the RFRA ap-
proach would still tend to favor religious liberty over competing
claims.
For these reasons, it is unclear whether the RFRA approach
would hold an even balance between religious traditionalists and
LGBT people, let alone whether it would protect the latter against re-
ligiously motivated discrimination. The RFRAs themselves do not di-
rectly address this question, and the case law does little to clarify the
matter. There are few judicial decisions on this issue, and the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.230 suggests that the question is an open one on the federal level.
Although Justice Alito emphasized that RFRA provides no "shield" for
"racial discrimination," he conspicuously avoided any comment on
other forms of discrimination such as those based on gender, sexual
orientation, or gender identity.23 1
Moreover, the high standard of justification is not the only
way in which the RFRA approach tends to favor religious believers
over other citizens. This tendency also results from the very way that
this approach conceives of the problem of religious liberty-as a
clash between the religious liberty of individuals and the interests of
the government. As I have suggested, this is a reasonable way to con-
ceptualize cases like Smith, which involve government measures that
restrict religious liberty in order to promote public welfare in gen-
22 9 As I have noted, Indiana's law is now an exception. See supra note 28.
230 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
231 Id. at 2783.
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eral. But it is not a reasonable way to conceptualize the present
problem. Applying the RFRA approach here fundamentally distorts
the nature of the issue, so that instead of a clash between two groups
of individuals-religious traditionalists and LGBT people-it is seen
as a clash between some individuals (traditionalists) and the gov-
ernment. In this way the rights of LGBT people are deprived of any
independent standing in the analysis and instead are recategorized
as mere "government interests"-interests which, under this ap-
proach, presumptively do not justify the imposition of burdens on re-
ligious liberty. Thus, the RFRA approach inevitably downplays the
values on the equality side of the balance. 23 2 This is problematic not
only as a basis for legal doctrine, but also as a way of addressing the
underlying social conflict between the two groups.
D. The Equality Approach
Alternatively, we could take a diametrically opposite tack
and hold that the law should always, or at least presumptively, pro-
tect equality when it conflicts with religious liberty.2 33 Although this
approach has the virtue of affording strong protection to equality, it
suffers from the mirror image of the problem I just discussed, for it
may unjustifiably sacrifice the value of religious liberty to that of
equality.
In response, a defender of this approach might seek to refine
it by focusing on the concept of civil rights, and by defining those
rights in a strict sense to mean claims to equality that are justified
and that should be recognized and protected by the law. The equality
approach would then hold that the law should always, or at least
presumptively, protect civil rights when they conflict with religious
liberty. As I explain in Part V.C, I believe that this principle can find
strong support in the liberal tradition. As a general rule, religious
232 For an analogous critique of current free speech jurisprudence for failing to
adequately consider the rights of individuals who are injured by some forms of
speech, see STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 28-29, 96 (2008)
[hereinafter HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH].
233 See, e.g., Gilreath, supra note 56.
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liberty should not permit one to violate the civil rights of others.234
Yet this formulation goes only so far in resolving the problem. It is
still necessary to determine precisely what civil rights individuals
have, as well as to ascertain the boundaries between those rights and
religious liberty. For example, while individuals should have a civil
right to be free from discrimination based on gender or sexual orien-
tation, it seems clear that the state would go too far if it sought to
compel a minister to perform a same-sex wedding or a church to hire
a female priest, contrary to the tenets of their faith.
E. The Balancing Approach
Yet another approach would balance the values that exist on
both sides. In the case of wedding-related services, that would mean
weighing the interest of providers in following their religious convic-
tions against the interest of same-sex couples in receiving equal
treatment in the commercial sphere.235
There is much to be said for an approach of this sort. It is ev-
enhanded and seeks to respect all of the competing values at stake as
well as the groups that assert them. The approach is also valuable for
its effort to take into account all relevant factors and to reach the
best solution all things considered.
For these reasons, balancing will be one element in the ap-
proach that I develop in Parts IV and V. In my view, however, there
are at least two reasons why we cannot rely solely on a balancing
approach, at least as I have described it so far. The first is what may
called the apples-and-oranges problem: it is impossible to balance
two different values in a reasoned and coherent way unless one first
identifies some feature that they have in common, or some standard
by which they can be assessed. Second, as we shall see, balancing
may reach the wrong results in some cases unless it is constrained
by other principles which are rooted in respect for the rights of oth-
ers.236
234 See infra text accompanying notes 416-28.
235 See, e.g., Koppelman, Accommodations, supra note 56, at 629-30.
236 See infra Part VI.A.2.
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F. The "Live and Let Live"Approach
Finally, let me turn to an approach that has been developed
by Thomas C. Berg, Douglas Laycock, Marc D. Stern, Robin Fretwell
Wilson, and other scholars in a series of important academic writ-
ings,237 briefs,23 8 and letters to legislators. 239 This approach, which
is often referred to as "live and let live,"240 begins with the insight
that LGBT people and religious traditionalists have something essen-
tial in common: the members of each group seek to engage in activity
that expresses their fundamental identity. The state should respect
their ability to do so to the maximum extent possible. For these
scholars, it follows that the law should recognize the right of same-
sex couples to marry while at the same time protecting the right of
religious traditionalists to follow their own beliefs. Many conflicts
could be avoided if each group simply respected the other's liberty.
As Laycock writes, "[i]n principle we can create private spaces in
which each side can live its own values. Such a commitment to live
and let live is the essence of civil liberty."24 1 For example, tradition-
alists should not fight against the legalization of same-sex marriage,
while gay rights advocates should not seek to compel churches to
recognize such marriage.
237 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 56; Laycock, supra note 56; Stern, supra note 56;
Wilson, supra note 56.
238 See, e.g., Laycock Brief, supra note 149.
239 See, e.g., Letter from Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. et al. to Hawaii State Sen.
Rosalyn H. Baker (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/hawaii-special-session-letter-10-17-13-
1.pdf [hereinafter Hawaii Letter]; Letter from Douglas Laycock et al. to Brent
Steele, Chair of Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.indianasenaterepublicans.com/clientuploads/Documents/Profess
ors'%20Letter%20Supporting%20Religious%20Freedom%20Restoration%20
Act.pdf [hereinafter Indiana Letter].
240 E.g., Berg, supra note 56, at 208, 226; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Con-
science: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIous LIBERTY, supra note 56, at 77, 81 [hereinafter Wilson,
Matters of Conscience].
241 Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, Su-
pra note 56, at 189, 192 [hereinafter Laycock, Afterword].
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On the other hand, conflict is unavoidable when same-sex
couples and religious traditionalists encounter one another in "pub-
lic spaces" such as the commercial sphere.242 In situations like this,
Laycock and his colleagues hold that we must engage in "some bal-
ancing of conflicting interests," such as the couple's interest in equal
treatment and the florist's interest in following her beliefs, which tell
her that it is sinful to "facilitate, or help celebrate, what [she consid-
ers] to be a deeply immoral relationship."243 This balancing leads to
the conclusion that the vendor's "right to [her] own moral integrity
should generally trump the inconvenience [to the couple] of having
to get the same service from another provider," except in cases
where the couple would suffer substantial hardship because no oth-
er provider is available.244 "Live and let live" scholars unsuccessfully
urged some states to adopt a model statute that reflected this analy-
sis, 245 and later advised other states to adopt a version of RFRA that
might have the same result.246
Like the balancing approach, "live and let live" has the merit
of according respect to both sides of the current dispute. In addition,
this view has the advantage of identifying what the two sides have in
common: an interest in "liv[ing] their lives according to their own
beliefs, values, and identity."247 This view offers a powerful argu-
ment for respecting the liberty of both groups, and it also identifies a
common value or standard that would make balancing possible.
At the same time, I believe that this approach has serious
flaws.248 To begin with, as Laycock's discussion suggests, the princi-
ple of "live and let live" has the greatest force in "private spaces"
such as a church's decision about what marriages to solemnize.249 it
is more difficult to see what that principle means in those "public
242 Id. at 194.
243 Id. at 195-98.
244 Id. at 198-99; see also, e.g., Berg, supra note 56, at 229.
245 See, e.g., Hawaii Letter, supra note 239.
246 See, e.g., Indiana Letter, supra note 239.
247 Laycock, Afterword, supra note 241, at 189.
248 For some other critiques of this position, see Curtis, supra note 56, at 196-
200; Gilreath, supra note 56; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 56.
249 Laycock, Afterword, supra note 241, at 192.
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spaces" where members of the two groups interact with one another.
In that context, the approach largely reverts to the religious liberty
position discussed in Part III.C. That is, the approach holds that a
vendor's refusal to serve same-sex couples on religious grounds pre-
sumptively should be protected-a result that the scholars seek to
bring about through the adoption of specific statutory provisions, or
at least to make possible through a more broadly worded RFRA.250
Of course, insofar as "live and let live" tracks the religious
liberty approach, it is subject to the same objections I made above. 251
In addition to these criticisms from the left, the approach also is vul-
nerable to criticisms from the right (that is, from strong advocates of
religious liberty). For example, "live and let live" theorists would re-
quire vendors to provide services to same-sex couples in communi-
ties where no other providers are available, on the ground that in
this situation "the merchant's right to moral integrity is outweighed
by the same-sex couples' right to live in the community in accord-
ance with their moral commitments." 252 Although this position intui-
tively seems correct, the reasoning offered does not adequately ex-
plain why, in a case of inescapable conflict, the religious believer's
claim is the one that must give way.
In short, the "live and let live" approach has difficulty ex-
plaining which interest should prevail in cases of conflict. But this
approach also suffers from a deeper flaw: its basic solution to the
conflict between religious traditionalists and LGBT people is to sepa-
rate the two groups from one another, rather than to explore how
they can interact in a positive manner. In this way, "live and let live"
turns out to be a sort of "separate but equal" approach, which en-
courages (though it by no means requires) the two groups to live in
separate and distinct spheres with a minimum of interaction. While
the approach seeks to "create rules that enable Americans with fun-
damentally different views of marriage to live in peace and equality
250 See supra text accompanying notes 245-46.
251 See supra Part III.C.
252 Laycock, Afterword, supra note 241, at 199.
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in the same society," 25 3 that coexistence takes the form of living sep-
arately more than living together.
It is also difficult to see what "live and let live" should mean
when the state is actively involved. For example, when it provides
benefits-such as funding the provision of social services through
private agencies, including religious organizations-the state cannot
avoid making a judgment as to what rules will best promote justice
and the common good. In such cases, the government must deter-
mine whether or not to allow participation by agencies that object to
serving particular groups, such as Catholic adoption agencies which
refuse to place children with same-sex couples. In this situation, "live
and let live" theorists contend that such organizations should not be
excluded from the public program.254 In itself, however, the principle
of "live and let live" provides little justification for this result-one
could argue with equal force that the principle requires organiza-
tions that receive public funding to serve and respect all citizens re-
gardless of whether they hold the same moral or religious beliefs.
Finally, in both of these ways-in its prescriptions regarding
the regulation of private conduct as well as the provision of govern-
ment benefits-the "live and let live" approach deviates from the
general position taken by modern civil rights law. As a rule, we do
not grant exemptions from the civil rights laws to those whose reli-
gious beliefs require them to discriminate on other grounds such as
race (or, for the most part, religion). To allow such exemptions for
discrimination against LGBT people alone would tend to make them
second-class citizens and to accord a measure of legitimacy to the
traditionalist position that disapproves of them and regards their re-
lationships as sinful and immoral.255
253 Id. at 207.
254 See, e.g., Laycock Brief, supra note 149, at 25-26.
255 See Curtis, supra note 56.
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IV. MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND THE CONFLICT OF IDENTITIES
A. The Basic Idea
Let us recur to the underlying problem. Religious traditional-
ists and LGBT people make opposing legal claims, and this conflict is
ultimately rooted in a clash between their identities and ways of life.
The question is whether there is any reasonable way to overcome
these conflicts.
In this part, I argue that the best approach is one based on
the concept of mutual recognition. On this view, such clashes can be
resolved only if those involved recognize one another as full and
equal persons and members of the community. In the present case,
that means LGBT people should recognize the freedom of tradition-
alists to hold and live in accord with their own religious beliefs,
while traditionalists should recognize LGBT people as full and equal
human beings who are entitled to all the rights that go along with
this status, including the rights to marry and to form families. 256
The following three sections outline the theoretical basis for
this view. They show that, while the term mutual recognition first
appears in the work of nineteenth century theorists like G.W.F. He-
gel, 25 7 the basic idea-that individuals have an obligation to recog-
nize the humanity and rights of others-is central to the whole mod-
ern natural rights tradition,258 a tradition which laid the foundations
of American constitutionalism. 25 9 Section B explores the work of
John Locke, the natural rights theorist who had the most profound
influence on America, 26 0 especially in the area of religious liberty
and civil rights. 26 1 Sections C and D recount how the idea of recogni-
256 For discussion of these rights, see infra Part V.A.3.a.
257 See infra text accompanying notes 285-95 (discussing Hegel's theory).
258 For a fuller discussion, see HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 232, at 171-72
(exploring the concept of recognition in the modern natural rights tradition).
259 See, e.g., MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1996).
260 See id.
261 See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 29-33, 52-53 (3d ed. 2011).
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tion was further developed by Immanuel Kant and by Hegel, as well
as by recent theorists of group conflict. Section E shows how this
idea can illuminate the conflict over religious liberty and same-sex
marriage. Finally, Section F discusses the relationship between the
mutual recognition theory and the religious traditionalist view, as
well as the approaches that we considered in Part Ill.
B. Freedom, Dignity, and Recognition in Lockean Natural Rights
Theory
To ascertain the principles that should govern social and po-
litical life, Locke begins by imagining individuals in a state of nature,
before the advent of organized society and government.262 Accord-
ing to Locke, every individual is naturally free to act as he likes and
to control his own person and property.26 3 Because individuals are
free, they are also equal in the sense that no one is naturally subor-
dinate to anyone else.264
For Locke, the inherent freedom and dignity of the individual
are "grounded on his having Reason."265 Reason enables an individu-
al to form a conception of his own good and to freely direct his ac-
tions in pursuit of that good, without encroaching on the liberty of
others to do likewise.266
This last point is crucial. Reason, which Locke equates with
the law of nature, teaches that other individuals also are free and
262See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, §§ 4-15.
2 63 See id. § 4.
264 See id.
265 Id. § 63; see also JOHN LOCKE, OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING § 6 (1706),
in SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE
UNDERSTANDING 163, 178 (Ruth W. Grant & Nathan Tarcov eds., Hackett 1996);
JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION § 31 (1693), in SOME THOUGHTS
CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING 1, 25 (Ruth W.
Grant & Nathan Tarcov eds., Hackett 1996).
266 See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXI,
§§ 54-55 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1700) [hereinafter
LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING]; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II,
§§ 56-63.
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equal.2 67 It follows that "no one ought to harm another" by violating
her rights to life, liberty, or property.26 8 On the contrary, Locke holds
that the law of nature requires individuals not only to preserve
themselves but also "to preserve the rest of Mankind" as much as they
can.269
As this formulation suggests, Locke does not understand the
law of nature and reason merely in negative terms. He describes rea-
son as the "bond" between human beings, a bond that unites them
into a single natural community.270 As members of this community,
individuals not only should respect the freedom and equality of oth-
ers, but also should interact with them in positive ways. This is what
he means when he characterizes the state of nature as a condition of
"Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation." 271
Locke understands particular political societies in a similar
way. The political community is formed through a social contract or
'mutual agreement" between persons who regard one another as
free and equal. 2 72 By entering into society, individuals obtain not on-
ly protection for their rights but also the opportunity to benefit in
many other ways "from the labour, assistance, and society of others
in the same Community"-a community that is based on mutual
"Trust" and "Friendship" among its members.273
In sum, while Locke sees individuals as inherently free, he
does not understand this freedom in purely subjective terms, as the
liberty to do whatever one likes. That sort of freedom would be self-
defeating, for it would provide no security against aggression by oth-
ers.274 To move beyond this purely subjective view, Locke appeals to
the concept of reason. On one hand, reason enables individuals to
freely determine their own actions, while on the other hand, rea-
son-and the capacity for language through which it is ex-
267See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, §§ 4, 6.
26 8 Id. § 6.
269 Id.
270 Id. §§ 128, 172.
271 Id. § 19.
272 Id. §§ 4, 6, 87-89, 100, 102.
27 3 Id. §§ 107, 130.
2 74 See id. § 57.
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pressed 275-enables individuals to form intersubjective relation-
ships with one another, relationships that are founded on mutual
recognition and respect. These principles are constitutive of our hu-
manity, for they are what make us into a single natural community.
Conversely, if I act in a way that is inconsistent with the freedom and
equality of others, I degrade not only their humanity but also my
own. 276
For Locke, one of the most important applications of these
ideas involves the relationship between different religious groups.
He holds that every individual has a natural and inalienable right to
form his own religious beliefs and to associate with others who
share them. 277 At the same time, however, Locke maintains that eve-
ry individual and religious community has a duty to recognize the
equal right of others to do the same.278 When people refuse to
acknowledge the rights of others, or when they "arrogate to them-
selves, and to those of their own sect," rights that they are not willing
to grant to others, the effect is to "undermine the Foundations of So-
ciety," which is based on mutual respect. 279 Of course, this duty of
"mutual Toleration" means that no one should inflict "Violence [or]
Injury" on others because of their religious beliefs. 280 Again, howev-
er, this duty of toleration is not merely a negative one. Instead, Locke
holds that, however much people may disagree about religious mat-
ters, they ought to treat one another with "charity" and good will in
the civil sphere-a principle that he derives not only from "the Gos-
pel" but also from "Reason" and from "that natural Fellowship we are
born into."281
275 See id. § 77; LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 266, bk. III, ch. I, § 1, at
402.
276 See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, §§ 11, 172.
277 See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1690), in A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 13-16 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010)
[hereinafter LOCKE, TOLERATION].
278 See id. at 19-26, 51.
279 Id. at 49-51.
280 Id. at 20.
281 Id.
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C. Recognition in Later Natural Rights Theory
The ideas regarding recognition that can be derived from
Locke are elaborated and deepened in later natural rights theory.
Kant finds a basis for these ideas in the concepts of human dignity
and autonomy. According to Kant, humans are autonomous beings
who are capable of giving laws to themselves.282 By virtue of this ca-
pacity, Kant writes, an individual is a "person" who is "not to be val-
ued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends,
but as an end in himself, that is, . . . he possesses a dignity (an abso-
lute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself' from all
other human beings.283 This duty of respect applies not only in the
moral but also in the legal realm, where it forms the basis of the legal
duty to act in a way that is consistent with the freedom and rights of
others.284
These themes play a key role in the work of Hegel, who de-
velops the concept of recognition more fully than any other natural
rights theorist.285 Unlike Locke, Hegel does not conceive of the state
of nature as a condition of peace and good will.286 Instead, when two
individuals encounter one another in this setting, each may regard
the other as a threat to his selfhood.287 This existential confrontation
leads to a "fight for recognition" in which each individual seeks to as-
sert his superiority over the other.288 According to Hegel, this strug-
282 See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis W.
Beck trans., Macmillan 2d ed., 1990) (1785).
283 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *434-35 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS].
2 84 See id. at *230-31, *236-38.
285 Hegel's major discussions of recognition include HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,
supra note 146, §§ 36, 57R; G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT §§ 178-96
(J.N. Findlay ed., A.V. Miller trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1807); G.W.F.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND §§ 430-39 (W. Wallace & A.V. Miller trans., Michael
Inwood rev. & ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1830, 1845) [hereinafter HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND]. For a comprehensive exploration of Hegel's view, see
ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, HEGEL's ETHICS OF RECOGNITION (1997).
286 See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND,supra note 285, § 432.
287 See id. § 431.
288 Id. § 431-32.
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gle ultimately can be resolved only when each comes to recognize
the other as a free and independent being.289 Through mutual recog-
nition, the two enter into an intersubjective relationship in which
each finds himself in the other, thereby gaining affirmation for his
own selfhood while according respect to the other person.290 In this
way, two individuals who initially were "completely rigid and un-
yielding towards one another" come to see that, as human beings,
they have a shared identity, "a single light so to speak." 291 This rela-
tionship between individuals gives rise to a common ground or
shared standpoint which enables them to reason with one anoth-
er.
2 9 2
For Hegel, mutual recognition is the foundation of person-
hood, rights, and the state. Within the state, "man is recognized and
treated as a rational being, as free, as a person; and the individual, on
his side, makes himself worthy of this recognition" by according the
same status to others.293 In this way, mutual recognition provides
the basis for a state that is founded on "rational freedom and ... civic
honour."294 Within the state and the legal order that it establishes,
everyone has a basic duty to respect the personhood and rights of
others.295
D. Mutual Recognition and the Struggle Between Groups
What theorists like Locke, Kant, and Hegel describe on an in-
dividual level also can be applied to the relationship between groups.
Indeed, as we have seen, Locke applies the concept of mutual recog-
nition or "toleration" to the conflict between religious groups, each
of which is inclined to assert that it alone possesses the ultimate
28 9 See id. §§ 431A, 436.
29 0 See id. § 436.
291 Id. § 430A.
292 See id. §§ 436-39.
293 Id. § 432A.
294Id
295 See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 146, § 36 (declaring that the basic
principle of right is to "be a person and respect others as persons").
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truth and to condemn all others as heretical. 296 As many scholars
have pointed out, the concept of recognition also sheds great light on
more recent events such as the anti-colonial movement that followed
World War II; the civil rights struggles of African-Americans, Latinos,
and other groups; and the women's movement.297 The same thing is
true of the gay rights movement: at its core, it involves a struggle to
achieve full recognition of the humanity and rights of LGBT peo-
ple. 298
E. Application to the Conflict Between LGBT People and Religious
Traditionalists
In this part, I have argued that the liberal natural rights tradi-
tion offers a way to overcome conflicts between the identities of dif-
ferent groups. On this view, the ultimate solution lies in mutual
recognition: the members of each group must recognize those who
belong to the other as full and equal persons and citizens, with all of
the rights that this entails.
From this perspective, it becomes clear that the clash be-
tween religious traditionalists and LGBT people does not simply in-
volve two groups whose identities happen to conflict with one an-
other. Instead, the root problem is that religious traditionalists
define their own identity and way of life to include a commitment to
beliefs that condemn the identity and way of life of LGBT people.
Traditionalists believe that gay and lesbian sex "is harmful and al-
ways wrong."299 For this reason, they historically supported anti-
sodomy laws which treated those who engaged in same-sex sexual
activity as criminals, 300 and which were also used as a rationale for
2 96 See supra text accompanying notes 277-81.
297 See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994); ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 154-62 (1969).
298 For a valuable account of the gay rights movement, see LINDA HIRSHMAN,
VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION (2012).
299 USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra note 2 (answer to question "How is the
love between a husband and a wife irreducibly unique?").
30 0 See supra text accompanying notes 91-96, 115.
subjecting gay and lesbian people to discrimination in virtually every
area of life, from housing to employment to immigration.30 ' After the
anti-sodomy laws were struck down in Lawrence, traditionalists of-
ten continued to oppose efforts to ban various forms of discrimina-
tion against LGBT people. 302 They also strongly opposed the move-
ment to recognize same-sex marriage.303 In taking these positions,
they have asserted that their claims to be free from incidental effects
on their religious liberty should prevent the legal system from ex-
tending protection to LGBT people for the most important interests
in their own lives. 304 Rather than accepting the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Obergefell, many traditionalists have denounced it and
vowed to continue the battle against the legalization of same-sex
marriage.305 Because this approach stands little chance of success,
the focus of the traditionalists' effort has now shifted to the conten-
tion that the legal system should protect their religious liberty by ex-
empting them from an obligation to comply with anti-discrimination
laws in jurisdictions that have them.
301 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
302 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a state constitu-
tional amendment that outlawed existing and future protections against sexual-
orientation discrimination). Religious traditionalists often continue to oppose
such protections on the ground that they will lead to violations of religious lib-
erty. See, e.g., William L. Spence, Add the Words Hopes Dashed, LEWISTON MORNING
TRIa., Jan. 30, 2015 (describing how concerns about religious freedom helped to
defeat a recent proposal to adopt such protections in Idaho); Senate Panel Ta-
bles Bill Adding Gay Protections to Law, MONTANA KAIMIN, Jan. 30, 2015 (same in
Montana). For the most dramatic recent example, see Juan A. Lozano, Houston
LGBT Nondiscrimination Ordinance Rejected by Voters, CHRON.COM (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.chron.com/news/texas/article/Houston-equal-rights-measure-in-
hands-of-voters-6606689.php [http://perma.cc/5Z8U-84E6] (reporting that
the Houston Equal Rights Ordinance was defeated in part through the efforts of
social conservatives, "including a coalition of conservative pastors, [who] said it
infringed on their religious beliefs regarding homosexuality").
303 See supra Part II.C.
304 For amicus briefs that opposed same-sex marriage on religious liberty
grounds, see Catholic Answers Brief, supra note 164; Major Religious Organiza-
tions Brief, supra note 140; USCCB brief, supra note 140.
305 See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
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As this history shows, the extension of legal protections to
LGBT people in recent years has led religious traditionalists to shift
from a defense of anti-sodomy laws to an opposition to same-sex
marriage to a claim for religious liberty. But while their legal posi-
tions have evolved, their underlying beliefs about homosexuality
have remained more constant.
This is the underlying source of the conflict we are consider-
ing. Religious traditionalists believe that homosexual conduct vio-
lates the natural order and the law of God, who ordained that sex can
properly take place only within marriage, a relationship in which a
man and a woman become "one flesh." 306 For this reason, tradition-
alists regard the way of life followed by LGBT people as illegitimate.
To use the language I developed above, traditionalists do not accord
full recognition to LGBT people. To be sure, traditionalists do recog-
nize their humanity and rights in many respects. But they deny that
LGBT people have one vital human capacity that they themselves
possess: the capacity to form a marital bond with another person.307
To put the point another way, traditionalists "arrogate to them-
selves" a right that they are not willing to concede to LGBT peo-
ple 308-the ability to marry and thus form one of the deepest and
most meaningful relationships that human beings can enter into. In
these ways, traditionalists do not recognize LGBT people as full and
equal persons who are entitled to all the rights that inhere in this
status. This is the ultimate basis of the clash between the two groups.
In response, a critic might say that recognition is a two-way
street. What liberal theory calls for is mutual recognition, a condition
in which each of the opposing groups recognizes the other. But (the
critic would continue) the advocates of LGBT rights deny the legiti-
306 See supra Part II.A.
307 More precisely, religious traditionalists contend that lesbians and gays can
form a marital bond with a person of the opposite sex but not with one of the
same sex. Yet by denying that they are capable of forming a marital bond that is
consistent with their own sexual orientation, religious traditionalists in effect
deny that most lesbian and gay persons have the capacity to form such a bond
at all.
308 LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 277, at 50-51; see supra text accompanying
note 279.
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macy of the traditionalists' identity and way of life just as much as
the traditionalists reject those of LGBT people. It follows that one
cannot lay primary responsibility for the conflict at the door of the
traditionalists. Instead, both sides are equally responsible and must
make an effort to accommodate the other's identity. Now that the
law has recognized the right of gays and lesbians to marry, the onus
is on them and on the legal system to concede the right of religious
traditionalists to live in accord with their own beliefs, which reject
the legitimacy of same-sex marriage.
Although this objection may seem persuasive on its face, re-
flection shows that it is unfounded. The best way to see this point is
to briefly look at a more extreme and clear-cut situation in which one
group denies recognition to another. Consider the case of white su-
premacists during the 1960s who regarded black people as an infe-
rior and degraded race that should be subjected to segregation, dis-
crimination, or even violence. In this situation, we hardly would say
that white supremacists and black civil rights activists were on a par,
with each group improperly denying the other's legitimacy. Instead,
we would say that the conflict arose from the fact that white su-
premacists defined their identity and way of life in a manner that
denied the equal humanity and rights of black people. It is true that a
conflict of this sort is best resolved through mutual recognition. But
that does not mean that blacks must recognize the legitimacy of the
white supremacist identity and way of life. Instead, it means that
white supremacists must abandon their commitment to treating
black people as inferior and subordinate. Only then is it possible to
achieve a state of mutual recognition, in which each group acknowl-
edges the full and equal humanity of the other.
I should emphasize that, in making this comparison, I do not
mean to accuse religious traditionalists of the sort of bigotry and ha-
tred that characterizes white supremacy. In particular, I do not sug-
gest that their position is fundamentally motivated by bias or ani-
mosity. In many cases, opposition to same-sex marriage stems from
a good faith interpretation of religious texts and traditions that the
opponents regard as authoritative, as well as from conceptions of
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natural law that many people find reasonable.309 But that is not the
critical point. On the view I am taking, individuals have a duty to rec-
ognize the personhood and rights of others. Although denials of
recognition often stem from irrational hatred or animus, what ulti-
mately counts is not the actor's subjective motivation but rather the
conclusion that, as an objective matter, the position that she is taking
fails to afford appropriate recognition to other people and their
rights.
For the reasons I have given, I believe that this is true of the
position that traditionalists take with regard to the rights of LGBT
people to form relationships and to marry. In this situation, the path
to mutual recognition requires traditionalists to recognize that LGBT
people have these rights. At the same time, LGBT people should also
recognize the identity and way of life of religious traditionalists, but
only insofar as that identity and way of life do not deny recognition to
LGBT people themselves. This account is parallel to what we would
say about the racial example: the conflict can be resolved only if
white supremacists cease to deny recognition to blacks, and if blacks
recognize the identity of whites, but only insofar as that identity is
not based on a denial of recognition to black people.
This discussion allows us to clarify the concept of recognition
by observing that it takes place on more than one level. On the first
and most fundamental level, the concept requires one person to rec-
ognize the basic status and rights of the other-that is, to recognize
her as a full and equal human being and member of the community,
with the rights that flow from this status. On a second level, the con-
cept requires a person to recognize that it is legitimate for another to
embrace a particular identity and way of life, but only insofar as that
identity and way of life are consistent with recognition of the basic
status and rights of all persons. This explains why, in the racial ex-
ample, (1) both blacks and whites have a duty to recognize the oth-
ers as full and equal persons and citizens; but (2) blacks do not have
a duty to regard white supremacy as a legitimate form of identity,
09 See supra Part II.A; see also, e.g., Koppelman, Accommodations, supra note 56,
at 653 (observing that adherence to "longstanding religious traditions that con-
demn same-sex relationships ... can't fairly be equated with irrational hatred").
[Vol. 1468 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
since that identity is defined precisely in opposition to the basic sta-
tus and rights of black people. By the same token, (1) both LGBT
people and religious traditionalists have a duty to recognize the oth-
ers as full and equal persons and citizens, with all the rights that flow
from this status, including the right to marry; and (2) traditionalists
have a duty to recognize that it is legitimate for LGBT people to have
their own identity and way of life (since they are not inconsistent
with the basic status or rights of others), while LGBT people have a
duty to recognize that it is legitimate for traditionalists to have their
own identity and way of life, except insofar as the latter are incon-
sistent with the basic status and rights of LGBT people.
Religious traditionalists might say that I am wrong to suggest
that they somehow have defined their identity and way of life in
terms of denying the morality of homosexuality. Instead, they might
stress that Christianity is a rich and deep tradition that focuses on
God's love and plan of salvation for the world, while the church's po-
sition on homosexuality plays only a minor role in its teaching as a
whole. Although I am sympathetic to this point, it highlights the di-
lemma that traditionalists face. Insofar as they downplay the role
that the condemnation of homosexuality plays in their body of be-
liefs, they also minimize the harm they would suffer if the law re-
quired them to respect the rights of same-sex couples. On the other
hand, if traditionalists assert-as they often do-that the church's
teachings on marriage and sexuality play a central role in their be-
liefs, then the condemnation of homosexuality does appear to be an
integral part of their identity, and they do define that identity in a
way that leads them to deny full recognition to LGBT people.
A further objection to the view I have presented would be di-
rected against the very idea of a duty of recognition. It might be said
that this duty compels individuals to hold or express a particular
view-one that recognizes the humanity and rights of others. In this
way, my position violates one of the cardinal principles of liberal
theory and American constitutional law: that the state has no author-
ity to control the minds of individuals or to require them to affirm
beliefs they do not hold. As the Supreme Court declared in West Vir-
692015] A STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION
ginia Board of Education v. Barnette,310 "[i]f there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein."31 1
This objection requires us to further clarify what is meant by
recognition. In one sense, it does indeed refer to a subjective attitude
that acknowledges the full humanity and rights of others. This mean-
ing of recognition has some relevance to the problem under consid-
eration. Social and cultural conflict between groups can be overcome
only insofar as they subjectively recognize one another. This form of
recognition also can be relevant in situations that do not involve le-
gal coercion. For instance, voters may and should reject candidates
for political office who hold racist views, and it is perfectly appropri-
ate for public schools to teach students the values of mutual toler-
ance and respect. Finally, and above all, it is generally accepted that
the state itself should act in a way that recognizes all of its members
as full and equal persons and citizens.
At the same time, it is quite true that a liberal state has no au-
thority to coerce individuals to hold or express particular beliefs. In-
stead, all the state legitimately can do is to require individuals to act
in a way that respects the rights of others. That is what the natural
rights tradition means when it says that individuals have a legal duty
to recognize others. On this view, the state has no authority (or in-
deed ability) to compel white supremacists to actually believe that
black people are equal. But it does have the authority to forbid white
supremacists from engaging in external conduct that disrespects
black people by violating their rights-for example, by refusing them
service at a lunch counter. Likewise, the state has no power to com-
pel religious traditionalists to alter their beliefs regarding homosex-
uality. But if (as I shall argue) there are some situations in which
merchants should have a duty to serve everyone regardless of sexual
310 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
311 Id. at 642.
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orientation, 312 then the law does not violate the Barnette principle
when it requires them to engage in that external conduct.
F. Conclusion
I have argued in this part that the idea of mutual recognition
offers a way to resolve the clash of identities that arises from the ad-
vent of gay rights and marriage equality. On this view, both religious
traditionalists and LGBT people have a duty to recognize one anoth-
er as persons and members of the community. It follows that while
traditionalists have a right to hold and live out their religious beliefs,
they have no right to treat LGBT people in a way that denies their full
and equal humanity, including their ability to marry and have fami-
lies.
The strength of this approach may be seen in the fact that the
concept of mutual recognition appears in one form or another in
many of the other views we have discussed. This is true even of the
religious traditionalist view. Conservative Christians hold that all
human beings, regardless of sexual orientation, are created in the
image of God; 313 that they are commanded to treat others as they
wish to be treated; 314 and that all people, including themselves, are
sinners who have fallen short of the glory of God.315 In these ways,
traditionalists see important commonalities between themselves
and LGBT people-commonalities which require them to treat LGBT
people with "respect and love." 316
Yet these views do not fully accord with the principle of mu-
tual recognition that I have advocated here. Conservative Christians
believe that they themselves have a hope of salvation through faith
in Jesus Christ,317 but that gay and lesbian people can be saved only
if they repent and turn away from the only forms of sexual conduct
312 See infra Part VI.B.
313 See supra text accompanying note 84.
314 See Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:3 1.
315 See supra text accompanying note 85; Romans 3:23.
316 Southern Baptist Convention, supra note 84.
317 See, e.g., Romans 3:21-26 (maintaining that sinners are justified through
faith in Jesus Christ).
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and relationships that accord with their orientations.318 In this way,
traditionalists are willing to grant acceptance to LGBT people, but
only on the traditionalists' own terms. Although this position accords
some recognition to LGBT people, it cannot lead to mutual recogni-
tion between the two groups, for it does not provide a basis for the
development of mutual understanding and acceptance.
Another version of mutual recognition can be found in the
"live and let live" approach, which holds that we should recognize
and protect the ability of both religious traditionalists and LGBT
people to live out their core identities and beliefs. 319 At times, "live
and let live" theorists focus on the role of the state in this regard.320
In my view, however, it is not enough for the state to accord recogni-
tion to both groups. Instead, those groups also must recognize one
another if they are to live together in a just and peaceful manner. On-
ly in this way is it possible to either avoid or resolve the steady
stream of social and political conflicts between them, including the
ones that arise from legalization of same-sex marriage.
At other times, "live and let live" theorists move beyond a fo-
cus on the state and instead urge each group to respect the other. For
example, Laycock contends that many conflicts could be avoided if
each group would simply allow "the other side [to] live its own val-
ues," instead of "bitterly resist[ing]" this approach and "seek[ing] to
impose its own view of marriage on everybody else."321
Although this form of the "live and let live" view would re-
quire the two groups to recognize one another, the recognition that
318s see, e.g., CAROLYN RICHARDS, WHAT ARE THEY THINKING!? CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANS
TALK ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY loc. 444-50 (2015) (ebook) (quoting a conservative
Christian as saying that she does "not wish anyone to go to hell," but "that eve-
ryone who acts on homosexual attraction will go to hell if they don't repent");
see also id. at loc. 409, 435, 469, 509 (quoting similar statements). The biblical
basis of this position may be found in passages such as 1 Corinthians 6:9 (listing
the categories of individuals who will not "inherit the kingdom of God").
319 See supra Part Ill.F.
320 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 56, at 230-31 (contending that the best approach
to the problem is to "focus on the state, which presumptively should not deny
either same-sex civil marriage or the religious objector's ability to refuse partic-
ipation in it").
321 Laycock, Afterword, supra note 241, at 192.
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it calls for is merely formal: it urges the members of each group to
respect the others' right to live out their values within their own
separate domains, but it does little to resolve the problems that arise
when the two groups interact with one another.322 In such situa-
tions, what the principle of mutual recognition calls for is not a mere
formal acknowledgment that the other group is entitled to its own
values, but the substantive recognition that comes about when the
members of both groups actually do treat one another as full and
equal human beings and members of the community.
V. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CIVIL EQUALITY IN A FRAMEWORK OF RIGHTS
In Part IV, I argued that the concept of mutual recognition of-
fers a promising approach to the dispute over religious liberty and
civil rights in relation to same-sex marriage. However, what I have
said so far is not sufficient to resolve particular issues, such as
whether the law should require those who provide wedding-related
services to serve same-sex couples. Issues of this sort involve a con-
flict between particular rights, such as the providers' right to reli-
gious freedom and the couples' right to equal treatment in places of
public accommodation. To resolve such a conflict, we need to care-
fully consider the competing rights. I believe that the best way to do
this is to sketch the broader framework of rights to which they be-
long, and then to situate them within this framework. In this way, we
can develop a deeper understanding of the rights involved and avoid
the confusions that might arise from a more ad hoc discussion.
In this part, I begin by outlining a framework of basic rights,
highlighting the ones that are most at stake here. Second, I explore
the relationship between religious liberty and civil rights, as well as
the closely connected question of the relationship between church
and state. Finally, I discuss the analysis that should apply when the
exercise of one right conflicts with that of another. In this way, I hope
to develop a general approach that will enable us to address in a
322 See supra Part III.F.
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principled way the conflicts that arise from the legalization of same-
sex marriage.
A. A Framework of Rights
There are many ways to give an account of the basic rights
that people have. The view presented here is rooted in the natural
rights tradition.323 As I have noted, this tradition had a deep influ-
ence on American constitutionalism. In particular, it is clear that
those who adopted the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
understood many of the rights that they secured-including the reli-
gious liberty protected by the First Amendment and the equality
guaranteed by the Fourteenth-in the context of natural rights theo-
ry. 324 Although this theory fell into decline after the Civil War, by the
mid-twentieth century the fundamental rights tradition began to re-
assert itself.325 Decisions like Obergefell fall squarely within this tra-
dition, as do many efforts to defend religious liberty.
For these reasons, we may be able to shed light on the prob-
lem of religious liberty and civil rights by viewing them within a
broader framework of rights. In developing this framework, I shall
draw not only on the classic Lockean thought that was influential
during the founding and Reconstruction periods, but also on more
recent developments in fundamental rights theory and jurispru-
dence.
As we saw in Part IV, the fundamental rights tradition is
based on a principle of respect for persons.326 Individuals are enti-
tled to respect because they are self-determining beings who are ca-
pable of directing their own actions in accord with reason.327 By vir-
tue of this capacity, individuals are inherently free and possess an
intrinsic dignity or worth.328 Thus, freedom and dignity provide the
323 This view is developed more fully in HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 232,
chs. 3-4.
32 4 See id. at 11-15, 20-22.
325 See id. at 23-27.
326 See supra Part IV.A-C.
327 See supra text accompanying notes 265-66.
328 See supra text accompanying notes 265, 282-83.
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foundation for human rights. The particular rights that we have re-
flect what it means for a person to enjoy freedom and dignity in dif-
ferent areas of human life. Those areas include: (1) the external
world; (2) the internal realm of the self, together with its expression
in the world; (3) the social, economic, political, and cultural spheres;
and (4) the intellectual and spiritual domain. In this section, I ex-
plore the rights that arise in each of these areas. Finally, I explain
how the right to equality is inherent in all the rights we have.
1. External Rights
The first category of rights relates to a person's existence as
an embodied being in the external world. In this context, respect for
his freedom and dignity means that he should be able to exercise
control over his own mind and body without unjustified interference
by others. More specifically, he should have a right to personal secu-
rity or freedom from violence; a right to move freely without im-
proper restraint; and a right to acquire, use, and dispose of external
things. These are the classic natural rights to life, liberty, and proper-
ty, which are secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
against violation by the government,329 and by ordinary state law
against violation by private individuals.330
2. Personality Rights
Just as external rights protect our bodies, another category of
rights protects our inner selves. This category includes two subsets
of rights that are essential for the realization and development of
personality. The first is what Justice Kennedy calls the "liberty . .. to
define and express [one's] identity" through both speech and con-
329 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
330 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS chs. 2, 7, 9 (1965) (discussing
wrongs against person and property); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW pts. 3-4
(5th ed. 2010) (same).
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duct.33 1 This liberty enables individuals to act in ways that promote
their own values and their conception of the good. 332
The second subset of personality rights protects against con-
duct that disregards the integrity and inviolability of the self. Such
conduct includes actions that: (1) injure a person's peace of mind by
wrongfully inflicting severe emotional distress; (2) invade her priva-
cy by unreasonably intruding into her inner life or exposing it to
public view; (3) grossly violate her personal dignity; or (4) improp-
erly disparage her reputation.333 These emotional and dignitary in-
juries are guarded against by tort and sometimes also by criminal
law. 3 34
3. Social, Economic, Political, and Cultural Rights
Persons are entitled to respect not only as separate individu-
als, but also as social beings who should be free to form relationships
with others and to participate in community life. This notion of social
freedom encompasses several sets of rights that are of vital im-
portance for the problem we are considering.
a. The Right to Form Personal and Family Relationships
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Constitution pro-
tects the freedom to associate with others and to form relationships
in the personal sphere. 35 In Lawrence, the Court makes clear that
this freedom allows adults to form consensual sexual relationships,
and that this right may not be denied to LGBT people. 336
331 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584, 2593 (2015).
33 2 See HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 232, at 52-53.
333 See, e.g., id. at 54-59, 144-46, 149-63.
334 See id.
33s See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545
(1987).336 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
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Obergefell holds that the same is true of the right to marry.33 7
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy identifies four reasons why
marriage is a fundamental right. First, he asserts that "the right to
personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of in-
dividual autonomy," 338 which protects the freedom to make the
deeply "intimate" decisions through which individuals define them-
selves and "shape [their own] destiny." 339 Second, the right to marry
allows two individuals to form a deep human bond based on mutual
commitment.340 Third, although this right is not conditioned on hav-
ing offspring, marriage provides important material and social bene-
fits that can promote the "permanency and stability" of family rela-
tionships and thereby safeguard the well-being of children. 341
Finally, marriage plays a central role in our "legal and social or-
der." 342 Because Kennedy finds that these four principles apply to
same-sex couples no less than to opposite-sex couples, he concludes
that there is no valid justification for banning same-sex marriage. 343
As Kennedy emphasizes, the right to marry has an important
dignitary dimension. The union of a man and a woman has always
conferred dignity upon them, and the law must recognize that the
same is true of "the bond between two men or two women who seek
to marry."344 No other result would be consistent with the "just
claim" that "gays and lesbians" make to "equal dignity in the eyes of
the law." 345
337 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Only a few weeks after Oberge-
fell, the European Court of Human Rights held that nations that are subject to
the European Convention on Human Rights are obligated to grant legal recogni-
tion to same-sex relationships, although this recognition need not take the form
of marriage. See Oliari v. Italy, Applications Nos. 18766/11 & 36030/11 (Eur. Ct.
Hum. Rts., July 21, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156265
[http://perma.cc/E88F-JZZ3].
338 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584, 2589.
33 Id. at 2599.
340 Id. at 2 599-600.
341 Id. at 2600-01.
342 Id. at 2601-02.
343 Id. at 2599.
344 Id. at 2594, 2599.
34s Id. at 2596, 2608.
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Just as dignity is a key term in the Obergefell opinion, so is
recognition. In Kennedy's words, "marriage is a keystone of our so-
cial order."346 "For that reason, just as a couple vows to support each
other, so does society pledge to support the couple" by offering not
only "material benefits" but also "symbolic recognition."347 Likewise,
the law promotes the emotional and material welfare of children
"[b]y giving recognition and legal structure to their parents' relation-
ship."3 "8 By denying such "recognition," bans on same-sex marriage
"impose stigma" upon and "diminish [the] personhood" of gays and
lesbians, and "harm and humiliate" their children by teaching that
"their families are somehow lesser."349
In addition to marriage and sexual relationships, the Court
has held that the Constitution also protects other forms of "intimate
34 6 Id. at 2601.
347 Id.
348 Id. at 2600.
349 Id. at 2590, 2600-2602; see also id. at 2606 (stating that Tennessee may not
deny one of the plaintiffs "the basic dignity of recognizing his New York mar-
riage").
As the dissenting Justices point out, Locke, like other thinkers of his time,
"described marriage as 'a voluntary compact between man and woman' cen-
tered on 'its chief end, procreation' and the 'nourishment and support' of chil-
dren." Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). This position was consistent with Locke's general understanding of
nature in physical terms and his conception of natural law as directed to "the
preservation of Mankind." LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, § 135. Yet
his position also contained elements that were capable of giving rise to a broad-
er view. Locke maintained that marriage involved not merely procreation but
also "mutual Support,... Care, and Affection." Id. § 78. Contrary to traditional
religious and legal doctrine, he intimated that the partners should be free to
choose how long their marriages should last. See id. § 81. More broadly, his nat-
ural rights theory accorded a central place to individual self-determination and
"the pursuit of happiness." LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 266, bk. II,
ch. XXI, §§ 41-71; see also supra text accompanying notes 265-66. A commit-
ment to such values has led current liberal thought and jurisprudence to focus
less on external rights such as life, liberty, and property and more on the free-
dom of individuals to realize their personalities, to live in accord with their own
values, and to form relationships with others. See, e.g., HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, SU-
pra note 232, at 42-43, 51. As justice Kennedy explains in Obergefell, this con-
ception of freedom provides strong support for a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage. See supra text accompanying notes 338-43.
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association," including the rights to raise and educate children, to
live with family members, and to form other deeply personal rela-
tionships.350 The freedom of association also encompasses the "right
to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, so-
cial, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."3 5
b. Economic Liberty and Participation
The principles of freedom and dignity also apply in the eco-
nomic sphere. As free persons, individuals have a right to economic
liberty as well as a right to participate in the economic life of the
community. In this section, I show how this view emerges from
Lockean natural rights theory and Anglo-American legal history, and
I explore the implications of this view for one of the central issues in
this Article: whether individuals have a right to equal access to plac-
es of public accommodation without discrimination on the basis of
characteristics such as sexual orientation.
The concept of economic liberty plays a vital role in Lockean
theory. Because human beings have a right to life, they also have a
right to acquire and use material things "for the Support and Comfort
of their being." 352 In this way, they come to possess property in ex-
ternal things.353 The duty to respect others includes an injunction to
respect what belongs to them, including their property.35 4
Like all other rights, however, property is insecure in a state
of nature.355 To escape from this precarious condition, individuals
establish a civil society that will protect their rights and allow them
to pursue their economic and other well-being in peace and securi-
ty.3 s6 When they enter into the social contract, individuals relinquish
some of their natural freedom and agree to obey laws made by the
350 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rothry Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
3s1 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
352 LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, §§ 25-26.
353 See id. ch. V.
354 See id. § 6.
3ss See id. § 123.
356 See id. § 95.
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society for the good of all.357 At the same time, individuals receive
two sorts of benefits in exchange for what they give up. First, they
obtain protection under the law for their natural rights to life, liber-
ty, and property.358 Second, they gain the opportunity to benefit
from "the labour, assistance, and society of others" by participating
in the economic sphere as well as in the broader life of the communi-
ty.3 59
This discussion enables us to understand the classical liberal
conception of civil rights. The term refers to the rights that individu-
als are entitled to enjoy as members of civil society. The category of
civil rights embraces (1) the natural rights that individuals retain
when they enter into civil society, and that attain recognition and
protection under the law; and (2) the positive benefits to which they
are entitled as members of the society, including the freedom to par-
ticipate in the economic life of the community.360
There is an important connection between this account of
civil rights and the concept of equality. Individuals in a state of na-
ture are not only free but also equal, in the sense that they are equal-
ly entitled to their natural freedom and rights. 36 1 When they enter
into the social contract, they all stand on the same footing and have
an equal claim to the civil rights that belong to members of the socie-
ty.362 It follows that all citizens have an equal right to life, liberty,
and property; to protection under the law; and to participate in the
357 See id. §§ 128-31.
35 8 See id. § 131.
3s9 Id. § 130; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *125 (explaining that indi-
viduals enter into civil society to obtain "the advantages of mutual commerce").
360 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *129 (stating that the basic rights of
individuals under the law consist of (1) "that residuum of natural liberty, which
is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience," as
well as (2) "those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu
of the natural liberties so given up by individuals"). Blackstone's formulation is
one antecedent of the term "privileges or immunities" in the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 64 (1986).361 See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, §§ 4, 6, 54.
362 See id. §§ 22, 59, 142; Heyman, Protection, supra note 145, at 563-65 (dis-
cussing the roots of equal protection in Lockean thought).
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economic life of the society. The enjoyment of these rights defines
what it means for a person to enjoy freedom, equality, and dignity
within the sphere of civil society.
On this account, the category of civil rights includes the free-
dom to engage in several kinds of economic activity, subject to regu-
lation for the common good.3 63 First, individuals have a right to ac-
quire, possess, use, and dispose of property.36 4 Second, they have a
right to make contracts with others for the exchange of property and
services.36 5 Third, individuals should be free "to engage in any of the
common occupations of life," including those that involve the provi-
sion of goods and services to others.3 66 Fourth, individuals have a
right to seek goods and services from those who provide them.
As a general matter, economic liberty gives one a right to
freely choose whether or not to enter into contracts with others, in-
cluding contracts regarding the provision of goods and services. But
there are important exceptions to this principle that serve to protect
the economic rights of other people. Two of these exceptions are rel-
evant for our purposes.
First, although economic liberty generally gives one a right to
decline to enter into a particular transaction, it does not follow that
one has a right to categorically refuse to enter into transactions with
others on the ground that they belong to an inferior group, or a
363 Although American courts during the early twentieth century acknowledged
that economic freedom was subject to regulation for the common good, they of-
ten afforded excessive protection to such freedom. See, e.g., Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-64 (1905) (striking down a maximum-hours law as an
unreasonable restriction on economic liberty). By contrast, current constitu-
tional law appropriately recognizes that legislatures have broad authority to
regulate economic activity. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2 (5th ed. 2015). 1 have argued elsewhere that,
properly understood, Lockean natural rights theory fully supports the view that
economic liberty and property are subject to reasonable regulation for the
common good. See Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First
AmendmentJurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REv. 231, 304-05 (2014).
364 See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, ch. V; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 88, at *138; 2 id. at *2-9.
365 See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, §§ 14, 46, 85, 194; 2
BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *9-10.
366 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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group that should not have the same rights as one's own. Conduct of
this sort does not merely deprive the potential buyer of an oppor-
tunity to obtain a particular benefit. Instead, it treats that person and
other group members as if they lack the capacity and right to enter
into economic relations with members of one's own group. In this
way, the refusal to transact can be understood to infringe the other
person's rights to make contracts or acquire property. Even more
fundamentally, the refusal denies recognition to the other as a full
and equal person and citizen who possesses all the rights that flow
from that status. In these ways, the refusal to transact violates the
individual's civil rights.
The Supreme Court has interpreted a major federal civil
rights law in a similar vein. After their defeat in the Civil War, many
southern states enacted Black Codes that severely restricted the civil
rights of African-Americans in an effort to restore slavery in all but
name.367 The Reconstruction Congress responded by adopting the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, the first section of which provided that all
"citizens, of every race and color," should have the same rights that
white citizens have to personal security; "to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property"; and "to make and
enforce contracts." 368 As the Act's supporters made clear, its goal
was to protect the "natural" or "'absolute rights of individuals"' to
life, liberty, and property-rights that were transformed into civil
rights within organized society.3 6 9
The 1866 Act clearly was meant to invalidate state action
that denied equal civil rights to blacks. In an important series of de-
cisions, however, the Supreme Court has held that the Act also bans
367 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873); ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-77, at 198-202 (1988).
368 Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2015)).
The statute also protected the equal rights "to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
... and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property." Id.
369 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Wilson)
(quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw *1 (1826)); see also id. at
1118 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *129, *134, *138); Heyman, Pro-
tection, supra note 145, at 552 (discussing the supporters' views).
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racial discrimination by private persons. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 370 Justice Potter Stewart reasoned that the right to acquire prop-
erty "can be impaired as effectively by those who place property on
the market as by the State itself." 37 1 Accordingly, he held that the Act
makes it unlawful for homeowners to refuse to sell to African-
Americans. 372 Likewise, in Runyon v. McCrary,373 the Court ruled that
a private school that refused to admit black students infringed their
parents' rights to make and enforce contracts. 374 In these decisions,
the Court also determined that Congress has the constitutional au-
thority to ban such private conduct by virtue of the Thirteenth
Amendment.375 As the Justices explained, that Amendment not only
ended slavery but also empowered Congress to abolish "the badges
and incidents of slavery"-that is, "its 'burdens and disabilities"'-by
securing to all citizens "'those fundamental rights which are the es-
sence of civil freedom."'37 6
These decisions are consonant with the position I am defend-
ing in this section: that as a matter of principle, it is wrongful to re-
fuse to enter into economic relations with the members of a group
on the ground that they are inferior or should not have the same
rights that you do. This is the first exception to the general principle
that the right to economic liberty permits one to freely choose
whether or not to deal with others.
The second exception relates to what our law has come to
call public accommodations. On the theory of rights I am presenting,
some goods, services, facilities, and accommodations ("goods") are
appropriately regarded as public in the sense that they should be ac-
cessible to all members of the community. A provider of such goods
is obligated to serve all persons on an equal basis and may not arbi-
370 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
371 Id. at 420-21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
372 Id. at 412-13.
373 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
374 Id. at 172-75.
375 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 439-44; see also Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179 (following
Jones).
376 Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-41 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22
(1883)).
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trarily refuse to serve a particular individual. Such a refusal violates
the individual's right of full and equal access to the good in question.
Moreover, if the refusal is made on the ground that the individual be-
longs to an inferior group, or a group that should not have the same
rights as one's own, the refusal also infringes that individual's right
to equal participation in the economic life of the community. Most
profoundly, such a refusal violates the person's right to be recog-
nized and treated as an equal member of society.
The principle that some goods should be accessible to all has
long been recognized in Anglo-American law. As Blackstone ex-
plained, under the common law:
[I]f an inn-keeper, or other victualler, hangs out a
sign and opens his house for travellers, it is an im-
plied engagement to entertain all persons who trav-
el that way; and upon this universal assumpsit an ac-
tion on the case will lie against him for damages, if
he without good reason refuses to admit a travel-
ler.37 7
Similarly, common carriers were liable at common law if they re-
fused without just cause to accommodate a passenger or to accept
goods for shipment.378
These rules were widely accepted in antebellum America.379
But they faced a crisis during the Reconstruction era, when blacks
invoked them to challenge their exclusion from inns, public convey-
ances, and other places.380 In 1875, Congress adopted a new Civil
Rights Act which provided that all persons in the United States "shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on
land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement," free
3" 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *166 (footnote omitted).
378 See, e.g., Lane v. Cotton (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1465-66; 1 Ld. Raym. 546
(Holt, C.J., dissenting). For an overview of the traditional English law in this ar-
ea, see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1304-11 (1996) [hereinafter Singer, No
Right to Exclude].
379 See Singer, No Right to Exclude,supra note 378, at 1312-21.
380 See id. at 1348-49.
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from discrimination on the basis of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude. 38 1 The Act's sponsor, Senator Charles Sumner of Massa-
chusetts, explained that its goal was to implement the "'great princi-
ple of equality"' enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, as
well as to prevent '[the] indignity, [the] insult, and [the] wrong"'
that blacks suffered when they were excluded from such places. 38 2
Eight years later, the Supreme Court invalidated the 1875 Act
in The Civil Rights Cases.3 83 In his majority opinion, Justice Joseph
Bradley assumed for purposes of argument that equal access to such
places was "one of the essential rights" that belonged to all citi-
zens.3 84 But he insisted that, even after the adoption of the Recon-
struction Amendments, primary responsibility for enforcing this
right remained with the states, and that Congress had constitutional
power to act only when states failed to discharge that responsibil-
ity.385 In a powerful dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan maintained
that Congress did have the authority to ban racial discrimination in
public accommodations, both as a "badge[] of slavery" under the
Thirteenth Amendment and as a violation of the rights of equal citi-
zenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 8 6
Although The Civil Rights Cases blocked federal action in this
area, during the late nineteenth century many states enacted stat-
utes, or applied their common law, to uphold the right of blacks to
equal access to public accommodations.3 8 7 Today, all but a handful of
381 An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and Legal Rights, ch. 114, § 1, 18
Stat. 335, 336 (1875).
382 See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION
62-64 (2011) (quoting 14 CHARLES SUMNER, THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 375-
76, 361 (1883)). Similarly, the Act's preamble indicated that its aim was to "rec-
ognize" and give force to the "great fundamental principlel" of "the equality of
all men before the law." 18 Stat. at 335.
383 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
384 Id. at 19, 24; see also id. at 14, 2 1-22, 24-25 (recognizing that state laws that
deny blacks equal access to public accommodations arguably violate the Four-
teenth Amendment).
385 See id. at 10-11, 13-14, 18-19.
386 Id. at 35, 43, 56, 59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
387 See Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 378, at 1357-67, 1374-83.
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states have adopted such laws.388 Moreover, in the mid-twentieth
century, Congress passed a new public accommodations law, Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.389 This statute was promptly upheld
by the Supreme Court under its broad, post-New Deal understanding
of the federal government's power to regulate interstate com-
merce.390 At the same time, the Justices observed that "the funda-
mental object of Title 11 was to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public es-
tablishments."' 391
In these ways, contemporary American law supports my con-
tention that, as a matter of principle, there are some goods that
should be available to all individuals on an equal basis. The scope of
this doctrine depends on both (1) what constitutes a public accom-
modation, and (2) what constitutes prohibited grounds of discrimi-
nation.
It is often thought that the common law rule of equal access
applied only to inns and common carriers, and that it was based on
considerations such as necessity, local monopoly, or government li-
censing.392 As Joseph William Singer has argued, however, there is
good reason to believe that the traditional common law took a
broader view, and that the rule applied to many sorts of "common
employments," on the ground that those who performed them held
themselves out as providing goods or services to the general pub-
38 See Anne-Marie G. Harris, A Survey of Federal and State Public Accommoda-
tions Statutes: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Cases of Retail Discrimination, 13
VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 331, 340 (2006) (observing that, by 2006, 45 states had
adopted such laws).
38 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, tit. II, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2015)).
390 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
391 Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (quoting S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 16-17 (1964)); see also Martin Luther King, Jr., The Burning Truth in the
South, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 94, 94-96 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) (characterizing
the movement to obtain equal service in public accommodations as a "struggle.
.. [for] human dignity and freedom" and "a demand for respect").
3 92 See Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 378, at 1291-92.
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lic.393 Singer suggests that during the late nineteenth century, the le-
gal concept of public accommodations was narrowed in response to
African-Americans' claims to equal treatment.3 94 In any event, the
concept has expanded considerably since that time, and state public
accommodation laws now commonly cover a wide range of estab-
lishments including "hotels, restaurants, transport facilities, places of
entertainment, retail stores, lodgings, and state facilities."395
The law's current position on the scope of the public accom-
modations doctrine is an appropriate one. As the passage quoted
from Blackstone suggests, when providers hold themselves out as
open to business with the public, it is reasonable to regard them as
assuming a duty to serve all persons without arbitrary discrimina-
tion.396 Moreover, from a social contract perspective, this is a duty
that reasonably can be imposed on business owners in return for the
positive benefits that they themselves receive from the society and
the government.397
393 Id. at 1303-31.
394 See id. at 1390-1412.
395 Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Note, Discrimination in Access
to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 240-41 (1978); see also Harris, supra note 388,
at 340-41 & n.41 (stating that, of the 45 states that have public accommoda-
tions laws, all but two cover retail stores). A broad definition of covered estab-
lishments also appears in Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which
requires that places of public accommodation be made accessible to individuals
with disabilities. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336,
tit. Ill, § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2015) (defining "Public Accommodation").
396 See supra text accompanying note 377; Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra
note 378, at 1457-58.
39 A powerful contemporary articulation of the social contract view may be
found in a speech given by Elizabeth Warren when she successfully ran for the
U.S. Senate in 2012. See Steve Benen, "The Underlying Social Contract," WASH.
MONTHLY: POL. ANIMAL (Sept. 21, 2011, 1:45 PM),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-
animal/2011_09/the-underlyinsocial-contractO32342.php
[http://perma.cc/5YX5-TZJH] (quoting speech of Elizabeth Warren). As Warren
explains, when an individual builds a prosperous business, her success derives
not only from her own efforts but also from her ability to hire educated work-
ers, to use public roads and infrastructure, and to rely on public services like
police and fire departments, all of which are paid for by the community in gen-
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To put the point another way, commercial dealings have a
dual nature. On one level, they involve private interactions between
the parties involved. But on another level, they involve a form of so-
cial interaction between the parties, which takes place within a larg-
er social order.398 The public accommodations doctrine can be un-
derstood as a reasonable effort to determine which dimension is
more salient in a particular context-the private or the social. Indi-
viduals and businesses that do not offer to serve the public fall on
the private side of the line. For the most part, they are entitled to
choose whom to interact with, and they do no wrong to others mere-
ly by declining to do business with them.3 99
By contrast, an enterprise that offers to serve the public be-
comes part of the social realm of commerce. Such an enterprise
properly can be regarded as a place of public accommodation with a
duty to serve everyone. When such a business denies service to indi-
viduals on an invidious basis, its conduct has the effect of improperly
excluding them from "a sphere of social life to which everyone
should have access."400 In addition to the material harm that this
eral. See id. On these grounds, Warren argues that "the underlying social con-
tract" obligates the business owner to pay taxes in return for the positive bene-
fits she receives from the society. Id. Similar considerations show that the law is
justified in treating a wide variety of commercial businesses including retail
stores as public accommodations. Because they rely on public services that are
paid for by all of society's members, such businesses reasonably can be re-
quired to supply their goods and services to all without invidious discrimina-
tion.
For these reasons, I disagree with those "live and let live" theorists who
object to what they see as "a concerted effort to take same-sex marriage from a
negative right to be free of state interference to a positive entitlement to assis-
tance by others." Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 240, at 80; see also
Laycock, Afterword, supra note 241, at 192 (endorsing Wilson's objection).
From a social contract perspective, those who operate public accommodations
should have a positive duty to afford equal access to all members of society, and
the latter should have a positive right to such access.
398 For a systematic account of the dual nature of interactions within civil socie-
ty, see HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 146, §§ 189-208.
39 As we have seen, however, even such individuals and businesses properly
can be forbidden to refuse to interact with others when this amounts to denying
their capacity or right to contract. See supra text following note 366.
400 Singer, No R(qht to Exclude, supra note 378, at 1476.
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conduct may cause, it also inflicts dignitary injury by treating them
as though they were not "equal members of the community."401 At
the same time, such refusals injure the social realm of commerce it-
self by carving out "no-go zones" where particular groups are not
welcome. Of course, these injuries to individuals and society will be
magnified if many enterprises refuse to interact with particular
groups. But every denial of service on invidious grounds is wrongful,
for it violates the principle of justice that should govern this social
sphere: respect for the basic civil right that individuals have to par-
ticipate on equal terms in the economic life of the society.402
The second issue that arises in defining the scope of the pub-
lic accommodations doctrine concerns the grounds on which dis-
crimination should be forbidden. While Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act is limited to discrimination based on race, religion, and
national origin,403 state and local laws generally go further and ban
many other forms of discrimination. 404 About twenty states, as well
as numerous localities, recognize that individuals should be protect-
ed against discrimination because of their sexual orientation or gen-
der identity.405
c. Rights of Citizenship and Political Participation
Among the most important rights that individuals possess as
members of the community are the ones they have in the political
sphere. In addition to voting rights, this category includes the First
Amendment freedom to take part in political discourse.
Like the other rights we have discussed, political rights have
an important dignitary dimension. As Kant observes, "no man in a
401 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 311 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
402 See supra text accompanying notes 359-66.
403 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, tit. II, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2015)).
404 See Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 378, at 1495-97; Lerman & Sand-
erson, supra note 395, at 260-72.
405 See Facts on Nondiscrimination Laws, FAIRNESS PROJECT,
http://equalityfederation.org/fairnessproject/facts/ [https://perma.cc/5GEY-
MWW7].
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state can be without any dignity, since he at least has the dignity of a
citizen." 406 In accord with this principle, individuals reasonably can
insist that both the state and their fellow citizens should recognize
and treat them as full and equal members of the political community.
d. The Right to Cultural Participation
Finally, in addition to social, economic, and political rights,
community members have cultural rights. In particular, they have a
right to form their own particular cultural worlds, such as the ones
that religious traditionalists have developed, as well as a right "to
participate in the building of the whole culture."407
4. Intellectual and Spiritual Rights
At the foundation of the liberal theory of rights is respect for
the individual as a "rational Creature." 408 It is by means of thought
and expression that an individual is able to assert control over her
own body and actions; to formulate and act in accord with her own
values and conception of the good; and to take.part in social, eco-
nomic, political, and cultural life. Above all, thought or consciousness
lies at the core of the self. For these reasons, the liberal tradition re-
gards freedom of thought and expression as inviolable rights.40 9
The same is true of freedom of religious, spiritual, and other
forms of belief. Through such belief, an individual orients herself to-
ward what she regards as the ultimate reality and source of meaning
in the world. Beliefs of this sort are capable of shaping the self at its
deepest level, and of infusing value and meaning into a person's life
and actions.410 It follows that, like freedom of thought and expres-
sion, this form of freedom is also inviolable-a principle that is en-
406See KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 283 at *329-30.
407 THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
408 LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 266, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24, at 687-88;
see also LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, §§ 12, 91, 98, 124, 131, 163-
64, 230.
409 See HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 232, at 8-9, 64-67.
410 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 56, at 215-16.
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shrined in the First Amendment, in state constitutions, and in inter-
national charters of human rights. 4 11
5. Equality Rights
In the classical liberal tradition, freedom and equality can be
understood as two sides of the same coin: because all individuals are
naturally free, they are also equal to one another.412 In negative
terms, equality means freedom from "Subordination" to others,
while in positive terms, it means the "equal Right" that individuals
have to their "Natural Freedom"-a right that within civil society be-
comes a right to equal protection under the law.413
In a broad sense, then, equality is a right in itself. In another
sense, equality is inherent in all the rights discussed in this part.
Thus, individuals have equal rights to life, liberty, and property; to
personality; to social, economic, political, and cultural freedom; and
to intellectual and spiritual liberty.
B. Religious Liberty, Civil Equality, and the Relationship Between
Church and State
Up to this point, I have been describing freedom of religion as
one right among many. But there is also something special about re-
ligion. The liberal tradition draws a basic distinction between the
civil and religious realms. As Locke explains, civil society is con-
cerned with our interests in this world, while religion is ultimately
concerned with our spiritual interests, and especially with our inter-
est in eternal salvation. 414
411 See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 3; International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). For
a valuable discussion of religious freedom, see ROBERT P. GEORGE, Religious Liber-
ty: A Fundamental Human Right, in CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES, supra note 141, at
115.
412 See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 212, bk. II, § 4.
413 Id. §§ 4, 54.
414 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 277, at 12-16, 45-48.
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It may seem that, on this view, the civil realm is less im-
portant or valuable than the religious realm, and that the former
should be subordinate to the latter. But the liberal view holds that
the two domains are separate and that each has its own validity. On
one hand, this means that the state must respect the freedom of indi-
viduals to form their own religious beliefs and communities, and that
it may not invade the religious sphere by dictating what people must
believe or how they must worship. On the other hand, the state is a
distinct realm that is governed by its own principles, and it should
not be dominated by any religious group or doctrine.
That is not to say that religious beliefs have no place in public
discourse. Religious believers have the same right that others do to
participate in public discussion. Moreover, public discussion would
be impoverished if it did not include the whole range of beliefs that
are held by citizens. Indeed, there are occasions, as with the anti-
slavery and civil rights movements, when religious perspectives may
play a crucial role in calling on the political community to reform it-
self.
At the same time, the liberal tradition insists that an argu-
ment or doctrine can be adopted in the civil realm only if it is capable
of being reasonably accepted by citizens in general, and not simply
by those who belong to a particular faith.415 This principle is another
consequence of the idea that civil society is founded on mutual
recognition. When individuals recognize one another, they transcend
their exclusively subjective points of view and come to an intersub-
jective condition in which they can engage in reasoned discussion
about the precepts that should govern their common life. Religious
insights and perspectives can make invaluable contributions to this
discussion, but they cannot appropriately form the basis of a law un-
less they are capable in principle of being accepted even by those
who do not share the particular religious outlook from which they
derive. Otherwise, from the standpoint of nonbelievers, they are
merely the subjective or private beliefs of a particular group, rather
than principles that properly can receive public acceptance.
415 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM lecture VI (1993).
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C. Conflicts of Rights
So far, this part has situated civil equality and religious liber-
ty within a broader framework of rights and has also sketched the
relationship between religion and the state. Now let us set out some
general principles for resolving conflicts of rights.
For the liberal tradition, the most basic principle is that one
must use one's own liberty in a way that respects the equal liberty of
others. This means that one generally has no right to act in a manner
that infringes the rights of other people.4 16
This principle applies to religious liberty no less than to oth-
er forms of freedom. As a general rule, the right to religious liberty
does not authorize an individual to violate the civil rights of others.
This principle has a central place in Locke's Letter Concerning Toler-
ation,4 17 and it was widely accepted during the period when the First
Amendment was adopted. 4 18
Indeed, Locke appears to hold that the right to religious lib-
erty never entitles one to an exemption from a valid civil law. Ac-
cording to Locke, religious believers and churches should be allowed
to do all "things [that] are left free by Law in the common occasions
of Life," such as eating bread, drinking wine, or washing with wa-
ter.4 19 But they should not be permitted to do anything that is "not
lawful in the ordinary course of life," such as "sacrific[ing] Infants."4 20
Only in this way is it possible to give effect to the fundamental prin-
ciple that every person should "enjoy the same Rights that are grant-
ed to others."42 1
416 See supra Part IV.B.
417 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 277, at 19-20, 23, 39.
418 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1464 (1990) (explaining that the
accepted view was that religious liberty gave "a believer... no license to invade
the private rights of others or to disturb public peace and order, no matter how
conscientious the belief or how trivial the private right on the other side").
419 LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 277, at 57.
420 Id. at 37.
421 Id. at 57.
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In this regard, Locke's position closely resembles the one
that was adopted by the majority in Employment Division v. Smith,422
which held that the right to free exercise does not excuse an individ-
ual from complying with "a valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility."42 3 This position may have made sense within the state that
Locke envisioned-a minimal state whose functions focused on the
protection of life, liberty, and property.4 24 In such a state, acts that
violated the law usually would also injure other people.
By contrast, the Locke-Smith position may be too restrictive
under modern conditions, in which the state regulates private life in
ways that go far beyond anything that Locke anticipated. Under
these conditions, even a general and neutral law, such as the peyote
ban in Smith, may impose serious burdens on religious minorities.425
In cases like this, which pit the individual's right to religious liberty
against the broad government interest in promoting the general wel-
fare, it may be reasonable to hold that such liberty should be pro-
tected except when it conflicts with a compelling government inter-
est.426 As I have argued, however, this strong presumption is not ap-
appropriate in cases that involve individual rights on both sides.427
In such cases, we should follow the position that has long been taken
in the liberal tradition: as a general rule, one has no right to use one's
religious or other liberty in a way that infringes the rights of oth-
ers.428
422 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
423 Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, Locke's
position may be even stricter than that taken in Smith, since he seems to believe
that it would be inappropriate for legislatures to grant religious exemptions, a
course of action that Smith permits, see id. at 890.
4 24 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 277, at 12.
425 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 902-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
426 See supra text following note 227.
427 See supra text following note 228.
428 For some contemporary restatements of this position, see Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2790-91 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "with respect to free exercise claims no less than free speech
claims, '[y]our right to swing your arms ends just where the other man's nose
begins"') (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L.
REV. 932, 957 (1919)); HAMILTON, supra note 228, at 16, 242-43, 300-01, 312-
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At the same time, it is important to recognize that some situ-
ations involve a genuine conflict between rights. Conflicts like this
can be resolved either by adjusting the boundaries between the con-
flicting rights or by allowing one right to trump the other. In either
case, a similar analysis applies. 429
The first and most obvious method of resolving conflicts is to
balance the competing rights. This balancing process takes account
of the value of each right under the circumstances as well as the ex-
tent to which it would be impaired if it were not upheld. The process
also considers whether there are any alternatives that would avoid
or mitigate the conflict. In addition to such balancing, the law may
consider whether there is any internal relationship between the two
rights, as well as what resolution is most consistent with the overall
scheme of liberty and the framework of rights developed above. Ul-
timately, the question is what resolution would best accord with the
principle that underlies all rights: respect for human freedom and
dignity. This is the principle that emerged from our exploration of
the concept of mutual recognition-the notion that individuals
should recognize one another as free persons of intrinsic worth. This
is a principle that applies not only to individuals themselves but also
to the political community that they establish. This principle enables
the process of resolving conflicting rights to be a reasoned and co-
herent one, rather than merely an ad hoc choice between competing
values.
To illustrate how this process works, consider the case of an
individual who is hiking in the mountains and is suddenly caught in a
dangerous storm. Both tort and criminal law permit the hiker to in-
13, 320 (maintaining that the right to religious liberty does not allow one "to
inflict significant harm against others"); Letter from Katherine Franke et al. to
Rep. Ed DeLaney, Indiana House of Representatives at 2-4 (Feb. 27, 2015),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-
sexuality/law-professorsletteron-indiana.rfra.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX92-
LHCD] (contending that a "longstanding constitutional principle has held that
neither the government nor the law may accommodate religious belief by lifting
burdens on religious actors if doing so shifts those burdens to third parties").
429 For a fuller discussion of this approach to conflicts of rights, see HEYMAN,
FREE SPEECH, supra note 232, at 69-80.
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vade the property rights of another in order to save his own life, say
by breaking into an unoccupied cabin and eating the food he finds
there.430 Under the approach to conflicts of rights that I have
sketched, this is clearly the correct result. From a balancing perspec-
tive, if the hiker is not permitted to break into the cabin, he will suf-
fer a total loss of his right to life, which is the most valuable of all
rights. By contrast, if he is allowed to break in, the cabin owner will
merely suffer a partial impairment of her right to property, which is
a less valuable right.431 It follows that in this situation the right to life
should prevail. The same outcome emerges when we consider the
internal relationship between the two rights, for the right to life pro-
vides a basis for property rights. Likewise, when we look to the
scheme of rights as a whole, it clearly would make no sense to sacri-
fice the right to life-a right that lies at the foundation of the entire
edifice-to protect the right to property.
Finally, this is the result that best conforms to the basic prin-
ciple of respect for human freedom and dignity. To put the point in
terms of mutual recognition, I have an obligation to regard others in
the same way I regard myself, that is, as a free person of intrinsic
worth. Just as I would view my life as having incomparably higher
value than mere property, and would not hesitate to sacrifice my
property to save my own life, so I must acknowledge that the life of
another person has the same paramount value and that it should be
preserved in a situation where it unavoidably comes into conflict
with the preservation of my property.
In this way, the concepts of mutual recognition and respect
for persons sometimes allow one right to trump another. At the same
time, however, these concepts also impose important deontological
constraints on the situations in which this can occur. In particular,
these concepts dictate that one is never entitled to be excused for in-
fringing the right of another person simply because one does not
recognize that person or her rights. Thus, while the hiker may have a
right to break into another's cabin to save his own life, a Klansman
430 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02
(1962).
4 31 See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 146, § 127.
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who burns down a house may not defend his conduct on the ground
that he does not recognize the right of the homeowner, as a racial
minority, to live in the neighborhood. As we shall see, this constraint
and others like it have important implications for the problem of re-
ligious liberty and same-sex marriage. 432
VI. APPLICATIONS
Part V outlined a framework of basic rights and offered an
approach to resolving conflicts between them. With this background,
we are now in a position to explore the clash between religious liber-
ty and civil rights in relation to same-sex marriage. To focus the is-
sues, I want to begin by marking out the boundaries of agreement
and disagreement. To this end, I shall start with some cases in which
almost everyone would agree, and then move on to the hard case
presented by wedding-service providers.
A. Easy Cases
1. For Protecting Religious Liberty
Of course, religious traditionalists are free to form their own
families as they wish.4 33 This is a fundamental right in itself, and it is
also supported by other rights such as individual autonomy, privacy,
and religious freedom.434 This point is so obvious that it might go
without saying, except for the fact that this right was denied for so
432 See infra text accompanying notes 440-45, 456-90.
433 This freedom is subject to reasonable limits, such as the laws that bar mar-
riage between individuals who are closely related by blood. In the aftermath of
Obergefell, there has been some debate about whether polygamous relation-
ships should also receive legal recognition. See, e.g., Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Is Po-
lygamy Next in the Marriage Debate?, WASH. POST (July 10, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/07/10/heres-
why-people-are-arguing-over-whether-polygamy-is-the-next-gay-marriage-
debate/ [http://perma.cc/VU8D-Q5T4].
4 34 See supra Parts V.A.2, V.A.3.a, V.A.4.
2015]1 97
long to same-sex couples, first by anti-sodomy laws and then by bans
on same-sex marriage.
Although traditionalists rarely assert that the advent of mar-
riage equality will directly interfere with their ability to form their
own families, they often express the fear that the law will force pas-
tors to officiate at same-sex weddings.435 This fear is wholly un-
founded, for the principle of religious liberty bars the government
from either compelling or forbidding people to perform religious
acts as such. 43 6 Thus, even under Smith, the government would vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause if it ordered pastors to perform such
ceremonies.437 By the same token, churches cannot be coerced to al-
ter their doctrinal opposition to same-sex marriage.438 As Justice
Kennedy reaffirms in Obergefell, the First Amendment also guaran-
tees traditionalists the freedoms to teach and advocate for their be-
liefs.439 Finally, churches generally should not be required to allow
their property to be used for same-sex weddings or receptions.
2. For Protecting Civil Rights
At the opposite extreme, the clearest case for protecting civil
rights would be one in which religious believers actively sought to
interfere with a same-sex wedding ceremony. Although to my
knowledge no such incident has yet occurred, we can learn a good
deal from considering such a case. Suppose that a group of people
435 See, e.g., Casey Harper, Pastors: We Don't Have to Obey the Supreme Court on
Gay Marriage, DAILY CALLER (June 10, 2015),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/06/10/pastors-we-dont-have-to-obey-supreme-
court-on-gay-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/2QV5-ZDQT].
436 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 277, at 33-38.
437 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78
(1990). At the oral argument in Obergefell, Justice Scalia insisted that if the
Court found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, "a minister who is au-
thorized by the State to conduct marriage [could not] decline to marry two
men." Transcript, supra note 168, at 23-27. As justices Elena Kagan and Ste-
phen G. Breyer explained, however, this result clearly would be precluded by
the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 26-27.
4 38 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
4 39 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. CL 2584, 2607 (2015).
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who believe that same-sex marriage is deeply sinful and immoral,
and that they have a religious duty to protest against and prevent
such unions from taking place, seeks to blockade the entrance to a
venue in which a same-sex civil wedding is to be performed.440 intui-
tively, it seems clear that any claim that the group's conduct is pro-
tected by religious liberty should fail.
At first blush, it might seem that we could clearly reach this
result through a straightforward balancing approach. In this situa-
tion, the group has infringed not only the couple's right to marry, but
also their rights to liberty of movement, to formulate and act in ac-
cord with their own values, and to enjoy personal dignity, as well as
their freedom from unwarranted infliction of emotional distress.441
Yet the group's members can also point to several rights that would
be impaired if they were not allowed to blockade the venue, includ-
ing their own liberty of movement and freedom to formulate and act
on their values.442 Above all, they could argue that the law would in-
terfere with their religious liberty if it prevented them from ob-
structing the wedding.443 In the end, we might conclude that the bal-
ance favored the same-sex couple in this situation. Yet the case could
hardly be described as an easy one. This suggests that a balancing
approach does not fully capture our intuitions in this situation.
This point becomes even clearer if we modify the hypothet-
ical. Suppose that, instead of attempting to prevent the wedding, the
group simply wished to demonstrate against it by blocking access for
a symbolic period of ten minutes. In this instance, it is by no means
clear that the group would lose under a balancing approach. Instead,
that approach might endeavor to reconcile the competing interests
by allowing the group to stage its brief protest, after which the cou-
ple could proceed with the wedding as planned. In my view, howev-
440 Similar conduct at abortion clinics led Congress to pass the Freedom of Ac-
cess to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No 103-259, § 3, 108 Stat. 694 (cod-
ified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2015)), which makes it unlawful to obstruct
access. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1372 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.)
(upholding the Act's constitutionality), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996).
441 See supra Part V.A.1-2.
442 See id.
443 See supra Part V.A.4.
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er, this is clearly the wrong result. Instead, I believe that we would,
and should, say that the group has no right to obstruct the wedding
even for a few minutes.
Two important lessons emerge from this discussion. The first
is that the force of religious liberty claims in this area derives almost
entirely from the idea that individuals should be free to follow their
beliefs in their own lives, and not from any notion that they should be
allowed to interfere with other people's ability to do so. In this way,
the concept of religious liberty seems to parallel the Millian principle
that liberty should be protected in the sphere of self-regarding ac-
tion, but not when one person's conduct infringes the legitimate
claims of others. 444
Second, what makes the hypothetical an easy case is the sort
of deontological principle that I discussed earlier445-in this case,
the principle that one may not use one's religious liberty to actively
interfere with the civil rights of others. In this way, the hypothetical
shows the critical role that such constraints play in an appropriate
analysis. On the other hand, a general balancing approach would re-
gard this as a hard case, and in some instances might not even reach
the correct result.
B. A Hard Case: Wedding Services
In contrast to the easy cases just discussed, the problem of
wedding-service providers has generated a great deal of academic
and popular controversy. 446 The problem arises when the owner of a
florist shop, bakery, photography studio, or other business declines
on religious grounds to provide services in connection with a same-
sex wedding. On its face, the owner's refusal to provide the same-sex
couple with the same services that he would provide an opposite-sex
couple appears to be unlawful in a state or locality whose civil rights
444 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 1,
13-14, 16-17 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
445 See supra Part V.C.
446 See supra note 56.
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law bans discrimination based on sexual orientation. 447 The question
is whether applying the law in this way would violate the owner's re-
ligious liberty. I begin by addressing this question as a matter of
principle, and then discuss how it should be resolved as a doctrinal
or a political matter.
1. As a Matter of Principle
a. The General Argument for a Religious Exemption
For purposes of discussion, let us focus on a hypothetical
case involving a florist.448 The florist contends that if the law were to
require her to do the flowers for a same-sex wedding, she would be
compelled to participate in or facilitate the celebration of a relation-
ship that she believes to be profoundly immoral and sinful because it
violates the law of God. In this way, she would be forced either to
perform an action that violated her deeply held religious beliefs or to
give up her florist shop. In terms of the framework of rights I laid out
in Part V, such compulsion would violate not only her religious free-
dom, but also her freedom to live in accord with her own values and
to follow her own business or profession.449 On these grounds, she
argues that the law should exempt her from an obligation to comply
with the civil rights statute in this situation.
Although the florist's argument is a powerful one, there are
also weighty considerations on the other side. By refusing to serve
same-sex couples, the florist subjects them to precisely the kind of
discrimination that the civil rights laws aim to prevent. In addition to
any economic loss that may result, this discrimination may also im-
pact the personality rights of the same-sex partners by subjecting
447 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115U, ¶¶I 25-42;
Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61-63 (N.M. 2013), cert. de-
nied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
448 The most widely publicized actual case is State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., No.
13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015).
449 See supra Part V.A.2, V.A.3.b, V.A.4.
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them to emotional distress, 50 infringing their personal dignity,451
and interfering with their freedom to follow their own values. 45 2 The
denial of service also makes it more difficult for them to exercise
their fundamental right to marry.453 Finally, if the wedding is a reli-
gious one, the refusal makes it harder for them to live out their own
religious beliefs.454
As this discussion shows, important values are at stake on
both sides. This makes the case a very hard one, at least if one ap-
proaches it in terms of straightforward balancing.
The theory that I have presented allows us to cut through
many of the difficulties presented. That theory holds that society is
founded on mutual recognition, which makes it possible for people
to live together in a just and peaceful way.455 Everyone has a duty to
recognize others as full and equal persons and citizens with all the
rights that inhere in this status.456 A vital corollary is that one has no
right to be excused from this duty merely because one does not be-
lieve that another individual is entitled to this status or to the rights
that derive from it.4 57
This approach offers a solution to the florist problem. Ameri-
can law holds that individuals have a basic civil right to equal treat-
ment in places of public accommodation. 458 In light of the Supreme
450 A dramatic example may be found in the Sweetcakes case, in which Aaron
Klein, one of the bakery's owners, not only declined to make a wedding cake for
Rachel Bowman-Cryer's same-sex wedding, but also explained his position to
her mother by quoting Leviticus in a way that implied that the lifestyle followed
by Bowman-Cryer and/or her gay brother was "an abomination" to God. Sweet-
cakes, supra note 54, at 5-6 (quoting Leviticus 18:22). Bowman-Cryer, who had
been "raised as a Southern Baptist," testified that this conduct caused her to suf-
fer deep shame and humiliation and to feel "as if God had made a mistake when
he made her, that she wasn't supposed to be, and that she wasn't supposed to
love or be loved, have a family, or go to heaven." Id at 6.
451 See supra text accompanying note 333.
452 See supra Part V.A.2.
4 5 3 See supra Part V.A.3.a.
45 4 See supra Part V.A.4.
455 See supra Part IV.A.
456See supra Part IV.A-C.
457See supra text accompanying note 432.
458See supra Part V.A.3.b.
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Court's decisions from Romer through Obergefell,4s9 this right should
belong to LGBT people in the same way it does to other groups. In
the case we are supposing, the applicable state or local law does ban
discrimination against LGBT people. In this way, the law protects
their right to participate on an equal basis in the economic sphere, 460
as well as their fundamental claim "to be treated as equal members
of the community."4 6 1 For these reasons, business owners should
have a legal duty to serve all customers without regard to their sexu-
al orientation.462
In response, the florist might say that although this may be
true in general, the law should grant her an exemption in this in-
stance, for her conscience does not allow her to provide services for
same-sex weddings. The crucial problem with this argument emerg-
es when we consider the grounds of her position. The florist con-
tends that, where wedding-related services are at issue, she should
not have a legal duty to act in a way that respects the same-sex cou-
ples' right to equal treatment in public accommodations, for she be-
lieves as a matter of religious conviction that they should have no
right to get married. Thus, the florist's claim to a religious exemption
from the civil rights law is premised on her denial that LGBT people
have a fundamental right to marry463-a right that flows from their
45 9 See supra text accompanying notes 116-38.
460 See Part V.A.3.b.
461 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
462 Just as the refusal to serve African-Americans can be regarded as a badge or
relic of slavery, see supra text accompanying notes 376, 386, the refusal to serve
LGBT persons may be seen as a badge or relic of the traditional legal regime
that criminalized sodomy and subjected them to far-reaching discrimination.
See supra text accompanying notes 91-96, 300-01.
463 In Arlene's Flowers, for example, the florist asserted that, "as part of the
Southern Baptist tradition," she "is compelled to follow Resolutions of the
Southern Baptist Convention," which include "an explicit rejection of same-sex
marriage as a civil right." State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015
WL 720213, at *6 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015). Of course, the refusal of
county clerks to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples is also clearly
based on a rejection of their right to marry. See, e.g., Emergency Application to
Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal, Davis v. Miller, No. 15A250, at 1, 5
(U.S. Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Kentucky-marriage-15A250-application.pdf
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status as full and equal human beings. It follows that the florist's
claim must fail, for it violates the principle that a person is not enti-
tled to be excused from a duty to act in a way that respects the rights
of others simply because she does not recognize those rights or the
status from which they are derived.464
Although this argument may seem complex, it is ultimately
based on simple ideas of equality and reciprocity. I cannot properly
demand that you respect me and my rights unless I am willing to ac-
cord you the same respect. The florist is insisting that the same-sex
couple recognize her basic rights at the same time that she refuses to
recognize theirs.465 This position is inconsistent with basic concepts
[https://perma.cc/8JJ9-L25P] (explaining that Kim Davis "cannot authorize the
marriage of same-sex couples because it violates her religious beliefs," which
hold that "marriage is a union between one man and one woman" and "that
same-sex unions are not and cannot be 'marriage"').
464 See supra text accompanying notes 432, 457. To put the point another way,
an actor may not justify her violation of one basic right belonging to another
person on the ground that she does not believe that the person is entitled to
some other basic right. Here the florist is claiming that she should be allowed to
violate the same-sex couple's right to equal treatment in places of public ac-
commodation because her religious beliefs teach her that they should not have
a right to marry. This position is incompatible with her duty to act in a way that
respects the rights of others.
465 As I have explained, it is not the case that both religious traditionalists and
LGBT people refuse to recognize the humanity and rights of the other group. See
supra Part II.C-D. While traditionalists may acknowledge that LGBT people are
entitled to many rights, they deny that LGBT people are entitled to at least two
basic rights: (1) the right to marry; and (2) the right to equal treatment in pub-
lic accommodations (in situations involving wedding-related services). By con-
trast, LGBT people do not hold that traditionalists lack a right to religious liber-
ty or any other basic right; instead, they merely deny that religious liberty gives
one the right to treat others in a way that is inconsistent with their status as full
and equal persons who possess fundamental rights, including the right to mar-
ry.
Once again, the asymmetrical relationship between the two groups be-
comes clear when we consider a more extreme instance of discrimination-the
racial segregation involved in Jim Crow. Suppose that a white business owner
during the early 1960s asserts that his religious freedom would be violated if he
were required to serve black customers on an equal basis with whites. See, e.g.,
Curtis, supra note 56, at 188-91 (recounting the religious arguments that were
made for segregation). In this context, I do not believe that we would think it
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of justice as well as with the principles that underlie a system of
rights based on mutual recognition. 466
Up to this point, I have described the florist's position as flat-
ly denying that same-sex couples have a right to marry. Religious lib-
erty claims often take this form.467 But they do not need to. For ex-
ample, the florist might say that she does recognize that the law
grants same-sex couples a civil right to marry, but that she cannot
serve them because she disapproves of same-sex marriages or rela-
tionships as a moral and religious matter. On this ground, she might
contend that the argument I have just made does not apply to her,
because she does not reject the right of same-sex couples to marry.
I would respond to this contention in two ways. The first fo-
cuses on the concepts of rights and recognition, while the second
concerns the relationship between rights and morality.
First, on this revised account, the florist professes to be tak-
ing a purely hands-off approach to same-sex marriage: while she will
not seek to interfere with the freedom of same-sex couples to marry,
she wants nothing to do with such marriages because she regards
proper to simply balance the owner's religious liberty against the customers'
right to equal treatment. Instead, we would hold that, however sincere the
owner's beliefs might be, he has no right to be excused from the duty to serve
African-Americans simply because he does not recognize them as equal persons
who are entitled to such treatment. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966) (rejecting claim to religious exemption from
bans on racial discrimination in public accommodations), affd in relevant part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), affd and modi-
fied on other grounds, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). The same principle is at work in the
present case: a provider of wedding-related services should have no right to an
exemption from the general duty to afford equal treatment to LGBT people on
the ground that, according to her religious beliefs, they should not be entitled to
marry.
466 In this connection, it is worth noting that while conservative Christians argue
that the civil rights laws should not compel them to serve LGBT persons in
some situations, those laws do not allow LGBT persons to discriminate against
Christians. See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 395, at 263 (observing that all
state public accommodation laws ban discrimination on grounds of creed or re-
ligion).
467 For some clear examples, see supra note 463 (discussing the Arlene's Flowers
and Kim Davis cases).
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them as profoundly immoral. In this way, she claims that she is not
denying the right to same-sex marriage but only its moral legitima-
cy.4 68
This claim may seem persuasive if we understand rights in
purely negative terms, as an absence of interference. But on the view
I am presenting, rights are also positive in nature. This is true in two
respects. First, because rights are specific instances of liberty, they
have the same two-fold structure I described above: a right to do X
consists in (a) the ability to do X (the positive dimension of the right)
(b) without unwarranted interference by others (the negative di-
mension).469 Second, rights are also positive in the sense that they
are entitled to recognition and protection within the legal and social
order.470
We can illustrate these two points by considering the classic
right to personal liberty or freedom of movement.471 This right con-
sists of (a) an individual's ability to move as he likes without (b) im-
proper interference.472 This right is recognized and protected under
the law, which requires both the government and private individuals
to respect the personal liberty of others.473 In these ways, the right to
personal liberty is positive as well as negative in character.
468 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Five Hard Issues, and How to Think About Them ch.
6, at 37 (Jan. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (character-
izing the florist's position as follows: "I fully recognize your right to marry, but
because I oppose and am offended by it, I simply don't want to deal with you, so
go in peace and find another provider who isn't.").
469 See supra text accompanying notes 142-46 (analyzing the concept of liberty
in this way).
4 70 See Heyman, Protection, supra note 145, at 532-33.
471 See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *134-38 (discussing this right).
472 See id. at *134.
473 The Fifth Amendment forbids the federal government to deprive any person
of "liberty . . . without due process of law," while the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes the same limitation on the states. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. The
Thirteenth Amendment's declaration that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary
servitude ... shall exist within the United States" applies to private as well as to
governmental action. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-39
(1968) (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 103 U.S. 3, 20, 23 (1883)). Finally, tort and
criminal law ban various forms of private conduct that violate the personal lib-
erty of individuals. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 430, art. 212 (pro-
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The same is true of sexual freedom. By striking down laws
against sodomy, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas 4 7 4 ensured that LGBT
people would have the positive liberty to enter into sexual relation-
ships without negative interference or punishment by the state. 475 In
Obergefell v. Hodges, 4 76 the Court expanded and reinforced this liber-
ty by holding that it is not enough to merely decriminalize same-sex
relationships; instead, the state must also afford them the same posi-
tive recognition that it traditionally granted to those of the opposite
sex.477
Now let us bring this understanding of rights and recognition
to bear on the florist problem. On her revised position, the florist
concedes that the state's law now permits same-sex couples to mar-
ry. But she insists that she should not be required to provide services
to such couples, for that would require her to facilitate or recognize
relationships that she regards as gravely immoral. By taking this po-
sition, the florist may respect same-sex couples' right to marry in a
negative sense, since she does not propose to directly interfere with
their exercise of that right. But she rejects the positive side of their
right to marry in two ways. First, she continues to insist that, as far
as she is concerned, same-sex couples lack the ability or capacity to
marry. That is what religious traditionalists mean they say that
same-sex relationships "are not, and can never be, marriages."478 Se-
cond, the florist denies recognition to the marriages that same-sex
couples enter into when she refuses to provide them with the same
services as opposite-sex couples. In both these ways, the florist's
conduct does imply that same-sex couples have no right to marry.
scribing "Kidnapping and Related Offenses"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 330, § 35 (defining the tort of false imprisonment).
474 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4 75 See supra text accompanying notes 118-22 (discussing Lawrence).
476 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
4 77 See supra text accompanying notes 33 7-49 (exploring Obergefell).
478 USCCB, Defense of Marriage, supra note 2 (answer to question "What about
civil rights?"). As I have explained, in taking this position, traditionalists deny
full recognition to the humanity of LGBT people. See supra text accompanying
note 307.
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Once again, it is essential to be clear on how the liberal natu-
ral rights tradition understands the duty to recognize others and
their rights. 4 7 9 In its broadest meaning, this duty applies to the sub-
jective beliefs and attitudes that people hold. In this sense, all of so-
ciety's members should regard one another as full and equal human
beings and community members who possess the rights that flow
from that status, for it is only in this way that different groups can
live together in a condition of peace and mutual respect. But that
does not mean that people can be forced to adopt such an attitude
toward others. As I have said, the state may not coerce anyone to
hold or express particular beliefs. 480 Thus, I do not suggest that indi-
viduals or organizations can be compelled to recognize same-sex re-
lationships in the sense of believing or affirming that they are legiti-
mate. Instead, the duty of recognition simply requires that one
should not engage in external conduct that treats others in a way
that is inconsistent with their basic status or rights. For example,
while landlords and employers need not actually believe in the valid-
ity of same-sex marriage, they violate the duty of recognition when
they insist on treating same-sex couples as though they were not
married, by refusing to rent to them or to grant them spousal bene-
fits on the same terms as other married couples. 481 The same is true
of the florist: while the law cannot properly demand that she affirm
the legitimacy of same-sex marriage, it may insist that, as the owner
of a place of public accommodation, she provide wedding-related
services to everyone without regard to sexual orientation. If she re-
fuses to do so, she acts in a way that implicitly asserts that same-sex
couples have no right to marry, by denying that they have the capaci-
ty to form conjugal bonds and that their unions in fact constitute
marriages.
My second response to the florist's revised position focuses on
the relationship between rights and morality. The florist contends
that she does not deny that same-sex couples have a right to marry;
she simply holds that it is inherently immoral for them to do so. This
479 See supra text accompanying notes 310-12.
480 See id.
4 81 See supra text accompanying notes 148-50 (discussing spousal benefits).
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clear-cut distinction between rights and morality might be convinc-
ing if the right at issue were merely one that was created by positive
law and that had no necessary relationship to what was morally
right or good. But that is not the case here. Marriage is a fundamental
right which is rooted in respect for human dignity and autonomy,
and which is integrally related to the good for human beings.482 On
the view I am taking, it cannot be inherently wrongful or immoral to
exercise such a right. In other words, one cannot consistently hold
(1) that an individual has a fundamental human right to engage in a
particular activity, such as marriage; and also (2) that it is always
and inherently immoral for him to engage in that activity. To assert,
as the florist does, that it is always immoral for gays and lesbians to
marry is tantamount to denying that they have a fundamental human
right to do so. A right that can never be rightfully exercised is no
right at all.48 3 Thus, even in this modified form, the florist's position
violates the principle that one has no right to be excused from one's
482 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 337-49 (summarizing Obergefell).
483 Of course, I do not mean to say that every exercise of a fundamental human
right is morally permissible. For instance, an individual may act immorally by
using the fundamental right to freedom of expression to engage in vicious but
constitutionally protected hate speech. In such cases, it is perfectly consistent to
say that the individual has a fundamental right while at the same time con-
demning a particular exercise of that right as immoral. By contrast, in the case
we are supposing, the florist holds that it is always and inherently wrongful and
immoral for LGBT people to marry (in the only way that they can consistent
with their sexual orientations). My claim is that one cannot consistently take
this position and also hold that LGBT people have a fundamental human right to
marry, for it is of the essence of fundamental human rights that they enable in-
dividuals to participate in or realize the human good, and to do so is not im-
moral or wrongful.
Some religious traditionalists might respond that their conception of mo-
rality is based not on the human good but on the standards prescribed by God.
Those who take this position either would deny the existence of fundamental
human rights, or would maintain that religious believers are not obligated to
respect such rights when they conflict with divine law. Neither variation of this
position should excuse noncompliance with civil rights laws, for the position is
inconsistent with the principle that one is not entitled to violate the fundamen-
tal rights of others simply because one does not accept the validity or the bind-
ing force of such rights.
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obligation not to violate the rights of others merely because one be-
lieves that they do not have those rights.
To avoid this objection, the florist might concede that a same-
sex couple has both a legal and a human right to marry, but assert
that her religious beliefs preclude her from providing services for a
same-sex wedding. If this position were tenable, the florist could
persuasively argue that she is not denying recognition to the same-
sex couple or their rights, but is merely claiming the freedom to fol-
low her own beliefs.
One certainly can imagine cases in which this sort of position
would be tenable. Consider a personal trainer whose religion for-
bade him to be alone with a client of the opposite sex. The trainer
properly could argue that he does not deny that the client has a right
to obtain training services; he simply believes that he himself may
not provide them. In a case like this, I believe that it is appropriate to
balance the competing interests, and to grant the trainer an exemp-
tion if there is no shortage of others willing to perform the same ser-
vice.
The florist's case is fundamentally different, however. For if
one asks why the florist believes that her religion forbids her to pro-
vide such services, the only answer seems to be that it condemns
same-sex relationships as immoral. In this way, the florist's claim
that she herself is prohibited from facilitating a same-sex wedding
depends on her position that it is wrong for the couple to have one.
And acting on this position is inconsistent with the principle that an
individual has no right to disregard the rights of others merely be-
cause she believes on religious (or other) grounds that they are not
entitled to enjoy those rights, or to realize the components of the
human good that those rights serve to promote.
This discussion enables us to respond to what is perhaps the
most persuasive argument in the literature for protecting the flo-
rist's religious liberty. As Laycock expresses it, "[w]hat is most im-
portantly at stake for each side is the right to live out core attributes
of personal identity."4 84 To compel the florist to act against her con-
484 Laycock, Afterword, supra note 241, at 198.
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victions would violate her right to "moral integrity"-an injury that
Laycock regards as more substantial than "the inconvenience [to the
couple] of having to get the same service from another provider
nearby," as well as the dignitary harm that comes from being re-
minded of something that the partners already know: "that some fel-
low citizens vehemently disapprove of what they are doing."485 On
this view, it follows that the law should grant a religious exemption
to wedding-service providers, except in cases where the denial of
service would cause the couple substantial hardship-for example,
where "there is only one or a few relevant merchants in a community
and none of them will serve same-sex couples."4 86
The fundamental problem with this "live and let live" argu-
ment is that it treats the interests of the two sides as equally legiti-
mate. As a general matter, it is true that the law should protect each
group's "right to live out core attributes of personal identity."487 But
we should not take this position in situations where one group has
defined its own identity in a way that denies the legitimacy of the
other group's identity.4 8 8 Religious traditionalists do this when they
hold that LGBT people are guilty of "wrongdoing" and "deeply im-
moral" behavior when they seek "to live out core attributes of [their
own] personal identity" by marrying and establishing families.489
Although traditionalists generally should be free to live out their
identity, they have no right to do so when this involves a refusal to
respect the full humanity of others and the rights that flow from it.490
485 Id.
486 Id. at 198-99.
487 Id. at 198.
488 See supra Part II.B.
489 Laycock, Afterword, supra note 241 at 195-96, 198.
490 In a forthcoming essay, my colleague Mark Rosen offers another very inter-
esting approach to the florist problem. See Mark D. Rosen, Two Ways of Concep-
tualizing the Relationship Between Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 J.L. ST. &
RELIGION (forthcoming 2016). Following writers like Isaiah Berlin, Rosen main-
tains that basic values such as equality and religious freedom are incommen-
surable with one another and that there is no objective way to resolve conflicts
between them. Instead, such conflicts ultimately can be resolved only through
subjective choices that reflect, and at the same time constitute, the identity of a
particular political community. Rosen also presents an intriguing account of
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b. The Argument that Providers May Not Be Forced to Participate in a
Religious Event
In the previous section, I contended that the religious liberty
of business owners generally does not entitle them to an exemption
from civil rights laws that oblige them to serve all persons equally
without regard to sexual orientation. In response, the florist might
argue that even if this is true in general, it fails to appreciate the spe-
cial nature of weddings. Weddings are inherently religious in nature.
The principle of religious liberty prohibits the state from compelling
anyone to perform a religious act, and that is what the florist would
be doing if she had to participate in a wedding that violated her reli-
gious beliefs. I shall begin by discussing whether this argument is
persuasive with regard to avowedly religious weddings and then
turn to civil ones.
The major premise of the florist's argument is sound. To put
the point in Lockean terms, the state's authority is limited to the civil
realm and does not extend to religious matters.4 91 Although the state
how competing constitutional. values can be harmonized with one another.
Rosen's view is a highly sophisticated one which merits a much fuller discus-
sion than I can give it here. For present purposes, I wish to make only two
points. First, for the reasons offered in Parts IV-VI, I believe that it is possible to
give a principled account of religious liberty and civil equality, to situate them
within a broader theory of rights, and to use that theory to guide the resolution
of particular conflicts. Second, while in some cases my theory might provide
less protection for religious liberty than would Rosen's view, see supra text ac-
companying notes 440-45, 455-90 (relying on categorical principles to deny
religious exemptions to those who seek to blockade a wedding venue, as well as
to most wedding-service providers), in other cases my theory would provide
greater, or at least clearer, protection for religious liberty, see supra Part VI.A.2
(arguing that categorical principles should shield pastors and churches from
having to participate in same-sex weddings); supra text following note 483
(maintaining that a balancing of values should protect a personal trainer whose
religious beliefs preclude him from working with opposite-sex clients); infra
text accompanying notes 502-03 (contending that providers like photogra-
phers and wedding planners can appeal to a categorical principle against being
compelled to participate in a wedding service).
4 9 1 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 277, at 12-15.
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may require individuals to act in a way that respects the civil rights
of others, it may not compel a person to perform a religious ac-
tion.492 Of course, the same principle is firmly settled in free exercise
jurisprudence.493 For example, the Supreme Court's decisions make
clear that the state may not force individuals to say prayers or to af-
firm religious beliefs.494
This principle is what makes it easy to say that the law may
not require pastors to officiate at weddings that violate their reli-
gious beliefs. 49 5 Presiding at a wedding ceremony and pronouncing
God's blessing on the couple are religious acts. Pastors must be en-
tirely free to engage in or to refrain from such acts without compul-
sion by the state.
Moreover, I believe it is fair to say that this principle is not
limited to those who perform religious acts themselves, but also to
those who participate in religious acts done by others.49 6 At a reli-
gious wedding, this includes not only the officiant but also the cou-
ple's attendants, the witnesses, and the guests who sit in the congre-
gation and observe the ceremony. To be sure, some of those
individuals may not hold the religious beliefs that are expressed in
the ceremony, and they may not take a religious attitude toward the
event. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that all those who are
present at the ceremony as either actors or guests become a part of
the event and lend their affirmation and support by their very pres-
ence. If this is correct, then the state should have no power to compel
anyone to take part in a religious wedding, whether as a guest or in a
more active role.
It is difficult to see, however, how the florist can bring herself
within this principle. Her role ordinarily would not require her even
to be present when the ceremony is taking place. Furthermore, as a
492 See id. at 33-34.
493 See supra text accompanying notes 435-37.
494 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591-99 (1992); Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
4 95 See supra Part VI.A.1.
496 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (stating that a public school may not "compel a
student to participate in a religious exercise" consisting of a graduation prayer
offered by a clergy member).
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business owner, she must frequently find herself providing flowers
for events whose content she is indifferent to. In particular, she may
provide flowers for weddings in which she hardly knows the couple
and has no personal attitude toward their relationship. It follows
that the mere act of preparing flowers for a couple's wedding cannot
reasonably be taken to show that she personally affirms and sup-
ports their relationship or their choice to get married. In these ways,
her situation is essentially different from that of the active partici-
pants or the guests at a wedding.
For all these reasons, it cannot be said that if the state com-
pels the florist to provide goods and services in connection with a
same-sex wedding, it has violated her religious liberty by compelling
her to perform or participate in the religious acts that constitute the
wedding. In this situation, the state has not overstepped its bounds
and intruded into the religious sphere by requiring the florist to act
in a religious manner. Instead, the state has merely carried out its
proper function by requiring her to respect the couple's civil rights
by supplying them with commercial goods and services on the same
basis as all other citizens.
The position I am taking can find substantial support in the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway.497 In
that case, several citizens challenged a town council's practice of be-
ginning its monthly meetings with prayers offered by local clergy.498
Although the suit was brought under the Establishment Clause, a
central issue was whether this practice compelled those citizens who
were present to participate in a religious observance. 499 The Court
held that this was not the case. As Justice Kennedy wrote for the plu-
rality, "[I]n the general course legislative bodies do not engage in
impermissible coercion merely by exposing constituents to prayer
they would rather not hear and in which they need not partici-
pate."500 If individuals who are directly exposed to such prayers are
497 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
498 See id. at 1817.
499 See id.
500 Id. at 1827 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1838 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and in judgment). Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Kagan agreed that
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not subjected to "impermissible coercion" under the Religion Claus-
es, it is difficult to see how that could be true of people who are not
even present at a wedding ceremony and who are not compelled to
do anything other than to provide the couple with commercial goods
and services which in themselves lack religious meaning.
For these reasons, the florist's argument for an exemption to
the civil rights laws on the ground that she cannot be compelled to
participate in a wedding that violates her religious beliefs should fail.
Likewise, we should reach the same result with regard to many other
providers of wedding-related goods and services, such as bakers, ca-
terers, jewelers, bridal and formal-wear shops, and limousine com-
panies. None of these providers is required to be present at the cer-
emony itself, nor do they generally supply goods and services that
have any inherent religious meaning.501
Some other providers, such as wedding photographers, pre-
sent a closer question. On one hand, the photographer obviously
does not affirm and support the couple in the same way that the offi-
ciant, guests, and members of the wedding party do. On the other
hand, the photographer not only needs to be present at the ceremo-
ny, but in some cases has a say in choreographing the event. Above
all, the photographer's role is to take pictures or videos that capture
the essence of the ceremony and present it in the most favorable
light.502 In this way, it can be said that the photographer does direct-
the Constitution permitted the town council to begin its meetings with prayers,
but found that in this case the town had failed to respect religious diversity by
including non-Christian clergy. See id. at 1841-42 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
501 In general, this is true even of wedding rings, which do not attain any reli-
gious significance until they are blessed or exchanged during the ceremony. See,
e.g., THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 427-28 (The Episcopal Church, 1979). On the
other hand, if a jeweler designed a ring to incorporate religious language or
symbols, there would be a stronger argument for holding that he could not be
compelled to sell it to be used in weddings of which he disapproved.
502 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner as Amici Curiae the Cato Institute, Prof. Dale
Carpenter, and Prof. Eugene Volokh for Petitioner at 15-16, Elane Photography,
L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (No. 33,687), 2012 WL 5990629, at
*15-16 [hereinafter Cato Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae Wedding Photographers
in Support of Petitioner at 18-21, Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d
53 (N.M. 2013), 2012 NM S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1, at *18-21.
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ly experience, and in that sense participate in, the wedding.503 Wed-
ding planners have an even stronger claim for exemption on the
ground that an essential part of their role is to affirm and support the
couple who are getting married, and to help them make the event,
including the ceremony, the best that it can be.
Thus far, I have been discussing whether an individual or
business can be compelled to provide services for a religious wed-
ding. But suppose that the wedding is a civil one. At first glance, that
would seem to preclude any possible argument that requiring the
provider to comply with the civil rights law would force him to par-
ticipate in another person's religious act.
In response, the provider could argue that weddings have an
inherent religious or spiritual dimension. But while this may be true
from the provider's religious perspective, the individuals who are
getting married may view the ceremony in purely secular terms. In a
case like this, it is hard to sustain the claim that the provider is being
forced to participate in someone else's religious or spiritual act.
I believe, however, that a more persuasive argument is avail-
able to the provider. Even if a civil wedding cannot be understood as
a religious event, it certainly is a deeply personal one. As Justice
Kennedy writes in Obergefell, "Decisions about marriage are among
the most intimate that an individual can make." 504 That is why the
Court has held that choices about family life and other highly per-
sonal matters "are protected by the Constitution."505 A provider rea-
sonably could argue that just as it would violate the Free Exercise
Clause to require him to directly participate in a religious wedding, it
would violate the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause to re-
quire him to directly participate in a wedding of any sort. To my
mind, this is a convincing argument. For the reasons I have ex-
plained, however, while this argument might shield providers like
503 Because photography is a form of art, the photographer can also make a rea-
sonable argument that his choice of whether to do an event is protected under
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See Cato Brief, supra note 502.
504 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (citation omitted).
505 Id. at 2599.
photographers and wedding planners, it should not protect most
other providers, including florists.
2. As a Matter of Doctrine
In the previous section, I argued that, as a matter of principle,
wedding-service providers generally are not entitled to an exemp-
tion from civil rights laws that ban sexual-orientation discrimination.
In my view, we should reach the same results within the existing
framework of legal and constitutional doctrine.
The problem of religious liberty and same-sex marriage can
arise in three main situations. First, a provider who refuses to serve
a same-sex couple and who is sued for violating an anti-
discrimination law may raise a defense under the Free Exercise
Clause, or under a state constitutional provision that is understood
in the same way. Under Smith, this defense should fail so long as the
civil rights law is generally applicable and neutral toward religion.50 6
However, the government may not compel an individual to perform
or participate in a religious act.s07
In the second situation, the provider raises a defense under a
state RFRA, or under a state constitutional provision that is held to
incorporate the same standard. Under that standard, the state may
impose a substantial burden on a person's exercise of religion only if
it can satisfy the demands of strict scrutiny.508 If the provider can
clear some important preliminary hurdles,s0 9 the question is wheth-
506 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990). For some decisions rejecting the defense on this ground, see Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115U, ¶¶ 74-100; Elane Photography,
L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 72-76 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787
(2014); cf Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *9-
11 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015) (relying on Smith to deny county clerk's free exer-
cise defense). For this reason, some advocates of religious liberty have urged
the Court to reconsider Smith. See, e.g., Laycock Brief, supra note 149, at 35-37.
s07 See supra text accompanying notes 436-37.
508 See supra text accompanying notes 223-27.
509 If the case involves a lawsuit brought by a same-sex couple, the provider
must convince the court that the state RFRA applies to lawsuits between private
parties and not merely to suits between a private party and the state. See, e.g.,
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er applying the anti-discrimination law is the least restrictive means
of advancing a compelling government interest.s10
Although this is an issue of state law, one source that a state
court doubtless would consider is the Supreme Court's discussion of
the federal RFRA in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.5 11 In his ma-
jority opinion, Justice Alito insists that his expansive interpretation
of the statute would not permit "discrimination in hiring, for exam-
ple on the basis of race, [to] be cloaked as religious practice to escape
legal sanction." 512 Instead, he declares that "[tihe Government has a
compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate
in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial
discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal."513
Although Alito carefully avoids discussing other forms of discrimina-
tion, I believe that a strong argument can be made for coming out the
same way with regard to discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In the only judicial decision that has reached the issue so far, the
Washington trial court in Arlene's Flowers agreed. 514
Finally, in a state without a RFRA or comparable constitu-
tional provision, the question whether to allow wedding-service
providers to refuse to serve same-sex couples is purely a matter for
the legislature to decide. As I have explained, I do not believe that
adopting a RFRA is an appropriate way to resolve conflicts between
Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 76-77 (N.M. 2013) (holding
that the New Mexico RFRA "is inapplicable to disputes in which a government
agency is not a party"), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). If the provider sur-
mounts this obstacle, she must also show that applying the anti-discrimination
law to her would impose a substantial burden on her religious practice. See, e.g.,
State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213, at *24-25
(Wash. Super. Feb. 18, 2015) (discussing this issue).
51o See supra text accompanying note 227.
511 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
512 Id. at 2783.
s13 Id.
514 See Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *26-27; cf Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115U, 11 101-02 (applying rational basis review but
suggesting that "states have a compelling interest in eliminating
such discrimination").
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religious liberty and other individual rights.515 And for the reasons
given in this part, wedding-service providers generally cannot show
that they are entitled to a religious exemption from civil rights laws.
3. Non-Ideal Considerations: Prudence, Charity, and Compromise
The previous sections argued that most wedding-service
providers have no right to a religious exemption as a matter of prin-
ciple. This view should govern the reasoning of courts, whose deci-
sions must be based on principle. Of course, legislatures also should
act in accord with principle. At the same time, however, they often
must grapple with other factors, which I will call non-ideal consider-
ations. Several of those considerations are relevant to the current
problem, including prudence, charity, and compromise.5 16
Let us begin with prudence. Although the Supreme Court has
the authority to declare what the Constitution means, its decisions
cannot become fully effective unless they are accepted by the socie-
ty.5 " Citizens generally know little about particular judicial deci-
sions and have no strong feelings about them. But that is not true of
landmark cases like Obergefell, which have a substantial impact on
the identity and way of life of the society and its members. To be ef-
fective, decisions like this need to gain broad acceptance, at least
over the long run. That is certainly true of the Court's ruling on mar-
riage equality. As Justice Kennedy argues, one of the central benefits
of marriage is the dignity that the partners have when their relation-
ship gains social acceptance and recognition.518
sI See supra text following note 228.
516 For an argument in favor of exemptions that effectively draws on each of
these considerations, see Koppelman, Accommodations, supra note 56. Koppel-
man also supports exemptions as a matter of principle. See Koppelman, Love,
supra note 56, at 135-36 (arguing that religious accommodations should be
granted "not just because it is politically sensible (though it is), but because it is
the right thing to do").
517 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS ch. 6 (1962).
518 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600-02 (2015).
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In recent years, public support for the legalization of same-
sex marriage has grown dramatically.5 19 Yet there still are a number
of states in which many or most people oppose legalization for rea-
sons that are closely connected with their identity and their religious
beliefs.520
From the standpoint of prudence, the question is what impli-
cations, if any, these facts have for the problem of religious exemp-
tions to anti-discrimination laws. On one side, it can be argued that
many people will need more time to understand and accept a judicial
decision that runs so contrary to their deeply held beliefs. Over time,
opposition to same-sex marriage may fade as people come to know
same-sex couples in everyday life and see that the dire predictions
that have been made about the decline of marriage and society do
not come to pass.521 Far from promoting social acceptance of same-
sex marriage, the use of state power to coerce bakers and florists to
violate their religious beliefs may have the opposite effect by trans-
forming them into martyrs and provoking a backlash. 522 Finally,
some LGBT advocates have observed that they would hardly wish to
519 For example, a recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll "found that 59% of
Americans support allowing same-sex marriage, nearly double the 30% support
reported in 2004." Janet Hook, Support for Gay Marriage Hits All-Time High,
WALL ST. J. (March 9, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/20 15/03/09/support-for-gay-marriage-hits-
all-time-high-wsjnbc-news-poll/ [http://perma.cc/VJR5-HDQ5].
520 See Same-Sex Marriage Detailed Tables, PEw RESEARCH CENTER (June 8, 2015),
available at http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/08/same-sex-marriage-
detailed-tables/ [http://perma.cc/CUF9-MREM] (reporting survey data that
showed that, as of May 2015, legalization of same-sex marriage was opposed by
70 percent of white, non-Hispanic Evangelical Protestants, as well as by 54 per-
cent of respondents who lived in the eight states comprising the South Central
United States). For the full report, see Pew Report, supra note 163.
521 See Pew Report, supra note 163, at 16 (finding that individuals who know
many gay and lesbian people are far more likely to support same-sex marriage).
Moreover, the data shows that younger people are much more likely to support
same-sex marriage than are older people, and that each generational cohort
(such as Millennials and Boomers) has also become more accepting over time,
see id. at 3, 6-8, which suggests that overall support will continue to increase.
522 See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Majority Report, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 2010,
http://www.jonathanrauch.com/jraucharticles/2010/12/majority-
report.html [http://perma.cc/5BML-BNFH].
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be served by-or pay money to-providers who reject their right to
marry, and that it is better to know who their opponents are than to
suppress them.523 For these and other reasons, some would contend
that even if such providers cannot demand religious exemptions as a
matter of principle, it would be prudent for a legislature to grant
such exemptions at least for a transitional period.
Although these arguments have considerable force, there are
also powerful arguments on the other side. To begin with, if religious
exemptions are granted, same-sex couples will have to search for
providers who are willing to serve them. At best, such searches may
be inconvenient and time-consuming, while at worst they may prove
fruitless, since there are some communities in which the couples
may be unable to find anyone willing to provide particular goods or
services. In any event, it is demeaning to know that some providers
will refuse to serve you because of your identity and that the state
upholds their right to do SO.524
A second concern relates to the difficult challenges that arise
in drafting religious exemptions. Suppose that the state currently has
a law that bans discrimination in housing, employment, and public
accommodations on the basis of race, sex, religion, sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity, and other characteristics. If an exemption were
drawn to apply only to same-sex marriage, the result would be to
make LGBT people second-class citizens by depriving them alone of
protection. On the other hand, if the exemption applied to all mar-
riages, providers would be allowed to discriminate against interra-
cial and interfaith couples, as well as couples who belonged to par-
ticular racial, ethnic, or religious groups. Moreover, if the exemption
applied only to wedding-related services, the anti-discrimination law
might still require traditionalists to violate their beliefs-for exam-
ple, by renting an apartment to a same-sex married couple. Yet if the
exemption were written broadly enough to cover such cases, the re-
523 See, e.g., C.J. Prince, Why I Support No Gays Allowed, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2,
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cj-prince/why-i-support-no-gays-
all_b_7710334.html [http://perma.cc/4R3S-C9TM].
524See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,supra note 56, at 123, 152-53.
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sult would be to authorize discrimination against same-sex couples
throughout their lives.
Of course, the legislature could avoid confronting such draft-
ing issues by passing a RFRA and adopting a compelling interest
standard for all exemption claims. But in so doing, the legislature
would simply be passing these difficult issues on to the courts. At a
minimum, this would create great uncertainty about what the law
was. At the same time, it would open up the possibility that the
courts would shred the state's anti-discrimination laws by granting
far-reaching exemptions, or, on the other hand, that the courts would
uphold few, if any, religious liberty claims.
Finally, one of the most serious dangers from a prudential
perspective is that granting religious exemptions would open the
door to widespread resistance to the legalization of same-sex mar-
riage.525 While bakers, florists, and other providers who refuse to
serve same-sex couples are asserting a right to follow their own in-
dividual consciences, they frequently are guided by the teachings of
their religious faiths and organizations. 526 The leaders of some of
those organizations, as well as prominent public figures and officials,
have called on those who share their beliefs to strongly oppose the
Supreme Court's decision.5 27 This raises the concern that, rather
than establishing a truce in the cultural wars, the adoption of reli-
gious exemptions may fan the flames of conflict and dissension.
In sum, there are strong arguments on both sides of the ques-
tion about what prudence dictates in this situation. Because it is a
prudential matter, it cannot be resolved by any clear-cut formula, but
only through the exercise of informed practical judgment under the
circumstances that obtain at a particular time and place.
Now let us turn to a second reason that might be given for
granting religious exemptions even if they are not required as a mat-
ter of principle. This view, which I shall call charity, holds that the
525 For a forceful argument to this effect see Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 56.
For skepticism that widespread resistance is likely, see Koppelman, Accommo-
dations, supra note 56, at 644.
526 See, e.g., supra note 463 (discussing Arlene's Flowers).
527 See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
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marriage equality movement should be "magnanimous in victory" by
declining to coerce those who disagree. 528 Again, there is much to be
said on both sides here. On one hand, the notion of magnanimity is a
highly appealing one. On the other hand, it may be asked whether
the battle for marriage equality is truly over at this point, or whether
it has shifted to a fight over religious exemptions. More fundamental-
ly, it may be asked whether charity should prevail over justice by al-
lowing religious traditionalists to violate the civil rights of same-sex
couples. 529
The final non-ideal consideration I want to mention has to do
with compromise. The controversy over same-sex marriage involves
a clash between groups that are strongly committed to their own be-
liefs and ways of life. Although the central legal question has been
resolved by Obergefell, other issues remain, such as whether a state
that has not already banned various forms of sexual-orientation and
gender-identity discrimination should do so, and, if so, whether it
should allow any religious exemptions. With regard to such issues, a
group may have to decide whether to enter into a compromise when
neither the group itself nor its opponents have enough power to fully
achieve their goals.
For a good example, consider the events that took place in
Utah in early 2015-events that attracted national coverage at the
time but that have been overshadowed by subsequent battles. For
several years, representatives of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints and the LGBT community met behind the scenes in an ef-
fort to overcome the deep rift between them. These meetings result-
528 Koppelman, Accommodations, supra note 56, at 628.
529 Of course, even if charity did not provide a good reason to carve out excep-
tions to the civil rights laws, it might lead some same-sex couples or gay rights
groups to choose not to seek legal redress in cases of this sort. See, e.g., Andrew
Sullivan, Surrender Douthat!, THE DISH (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/03/04/surrender-douthat/
[http://perma.cc/PZ5Y-9EED] (opposing legal exemptions, but arguing that
"the gay rights movement" should not "seek[] to impose gay equality on reli-
gious groups by lawsuit").
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ed in some common ground and even some personal friendships.530
A major breakthrough came in January 2015 when Mormon leaders
came out in support of legislation to ban discrimination in housing
and employment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity.5 3 1 At the same time, those leaders stressed the need to protect
religious liberty. 532 With the support both of the church and of gay
rights groups, the Utah legislature managed to pass a bill that re-
flected both principles.5 33
Of course, compromises of this sort are bound to be contro-
versial. On one hand, some members of each group will believe that
their side has given up too much and, more fundamentally, that it is
wrong not to fully defend the principles that underlie their cause. On
the other hand, some will believe that in situations like this com-
promise not only is necessary, but also offers the best way to find
common ground.
4. Conclusion
This part has argued that one has no right to be excused from
the duty to respect the rights of others simply because one believes
530 See Maria L. La Ganga, An Embrace That Swayed the Mormon Church on Gay
Rights, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
mormon-talks-20150131-story.html [http://perma.cc/67L5-9BL7].
531 See Laurie Goodstein, Mormons Seek Golden Mean Between Gay Rights and
Religious Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/mormons-seek-golden-mean-
between-gay-rights-and-religious-beliefs.html [http://perma.cc/B7D2-45AQ].
532 See id.
533 Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, S.B. 296, 61st Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015), http://le.utah.gov/-2015/bills/static/SBO296.html
[http://perma.cc/S7JM-7RM3]; see also, e.g., Jennifer Dobner, LGBT Anti-
Discrimination Bill Clears Legislature, on Its Way to Utah Governor, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (March 11, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/home/2279279-155/lgbt-
antidiscrimintation-bill-clears-legislature-on [http://perma.cc/G82W-RMX2].
Antidiscrimination legislation also received support from the Catholic Diocese
of Salt Lake City. See Jean Hill, Op-ed: Religion is Already Protected, but LGBT
Community Isn't, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2015, 1:51 PM),
http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/2199042-155/op-ed-religion-is-already-
protected-but [http://perma.cc/G9K6-VRF3].
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(whether on religious or other grounds) that they are not entitled to
enjoy those rights or the basic human goods they serve to promote.
It follows that, as a matter of principle, a wedding-service provider
who has religious objections to same-sex marriage generally should
have no right to an exemption from civil rights laws that ban dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. This principle should guide
both judicial and legislative decision-making in the area. At the same
time, a legislature reasonably may consider such considerations as
prudence, charity, and compromise in deciding whether to grant ex-
emptions.
These considerations cannot be reduced to a formula; they
call for the exercise of informed practical judgment. Yet it is possible
to offer a few observations to guide that judgment. First, as a default
position, the legislature should follow the rule that is appropriate as
a matter of principle. Thus, the legislature should grant religious ex-
emptions in the wedding context only when there are persuasive
reasons to do so. Second, in making this judgment, the standard
should be whether such exemptions would promote the public good
in a way that is consistent with principle, in the sense that they
would help to bring about broader social acceptance of marriage
equality. And finally, the ultimate end is to promote mutual recogni-
tion. That is the goal that supports the basic principle that individu-
als must respect the rights of others, as well as the non-ideal consid-
erations of prudence, charity, and compromise. All of these factors
are ultimately directed toward achieving a social condition in which
individuals recognize one another as full and equal human beings
and citizens with all the rights that flow from this status, including
the fundamental rights to marry and to enjoy religious liberty so
long as one does not violate the civil rights of others.
VII. CONCLUSION
In its landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,534 the Su-
preme Court sought to resolve the longstanding constitutional de-
s34 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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bate over whether the state must accord recognition and respect to
same-sex relationships. At the same time, Obergefell shifted the focus
of debate to another issue: the impact that the decision will have on
the liberty of those who oppose same-sex marriage on religious
grounds. Religious traditionalists regard the advent of gay rights and
same-sex marriage as a grave assault on their identity and their abil-
ity to live out their faith. But this brings them into direct conflict with
the claims of LGBT people to live their own lives and to fully partici-
pate in the society. In this way, it becomes clear that, at its core, the
debate over religious liberty and civil rights involves a clash of iden-
tity between these two groups.
In this Article, I have argued that a conflict of this sort ulti-
mately can be resolved only through mutual recognition-a concept
that lies at the foundation of liberal political theory and the Ameri-
can legal order. This concept holds that the members of each group
must recognize the others as full and equal persons and citizens,
with all the rights that this involves. That means that while tradi-
tionalists must be free to hold and advocate their beliefs regarding
sexuality and marriage, they may not act in a way that violates the
civil rights of others, including the rights of LGBT people to marry
and to be treated equally within the commercial sphere. It follows
that those who provide wedding-related services can properly be
required to comply with civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. But while religious
liberty does not justify a general exemption from the civil rights
laws, it does mean that the state may not compel individuals to par-
ticipate in a wedding ceremony against their will. For this reason, the
law should make an exception for those providers who are closely
involved with the couple or ceremony itself, such as photographers
and wedding planners. By taking an approach of this sort, we can af-
ford recognition to the competing claims that are made in this area,
and thereby give full effect to the principle of "equal dignity" that lies
at the heart of Obergefell.535
5s Id. at 2608.
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